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A B ST R A C T

This dissertation describes extensions o f post-structuralism in
contemporary curriculum discourses.

Post-structuralist thought is

m ainly associated with the seminal work o f M ichel Foucault, Jacques
Derrida, G illes D eleuze, Jean-Franfois Lyotard, and M ichel Serres.
Post-structural criticism and analysis ch allen ge prevailing
structuralist approaches and question
upon which these approaches rest.

the fundam ental assum ptions

A key assum ption o f structural

approaches is that all phenomena are constituted by an underlying
structure.

In curriculum, these structural assum ptions (often

scien tific) remain unacknow ledged and thus are im m unized against
criticism ;

rather, they are incorporated into the preferred structural

analyses, interpretations, and organizations prom oted by the prom ise
o f order and r a t i o n a l i ty .

The notion o f "rationality"—scientific in

essen ce—has been the dominating force o f curricular "planning."

The

problem is not that reason has turned into dom ination, but that we
do not fully recognize its domination.

Chapter One and Chapter Two

portray historical form ations o f post-structuralism in order to
identify specific threads or themes which lay a basis for
understanding
curriculum

post-structuralist elem en ts

o f contem porary

theory.

The author investigates the extensions (in Chapters Three and
Four) o f post-structuralism in contemporary curriculum theorizing.
W orking from concepts o f "subject," "history," and "differences"
identified in major works by Foucault, Derrida, D eleuze, Lyotard, and

Serres, this study identifies those concepts o f these scholars that
surface in contemporary curriculum discourses.
This study explores the works of eight curriculum theorists
now drawing on contemporary post-structuralist thought.

This focus

w ill not only give rise to reexam ining the questions and problematics
o f curriculum, but w ill also put forward a post-structural framework
for curriculum inquiry, w hich might provide a rethinking and
reexam ining o f curriculum discourses.
A final purpose of this study is to link aspects o f Eastern
Taoism and Zen philosophy with post-structuralist thought which w ill
provide curriculum theorists with an intercultural understanding o f
"the play o f unrecuperable differences" and irresolvable paradoxes.
The notion o f Tao and Zen may provide a useful counterweight to
W estern logocentric thought and the m etaphysics o f presence.

In

addition, the connection (passage) between Taoist and poststructuralist thought may serve to illum inate the questioning post
structuralism posits.

Curriculum as post-structuralist text may

vitalize the curriculum field itself.

INTRODUCTION
H owever far man may extend him self with his
know ledge, how ever objective he may appear to
him self—ultim ately he reaps nothing but his own
biography. (N ietzsche, 1984, p. 23)
From the idea that the self is not given to us, I think
that there is only one practical consequence: w e have
to create ourselves as a work of art. (Foucault, 1977, p.
237)

Background
In this passage Foucault expresses what has become one of the
central issues o f curriculum studies in the 1990s: The problematic o f
the formation and technology o f the self and the problematic of
theory and practice in curriculum.

There have been many emerging

theoretical approaches and practical im plications in curriculum
reform movem ents since the launching o f Sputnik in 1957 (Jackson,
1992).

Beginning in the 1960s, discontent with dominant positivist

orientations, critical analyses and theoretical understanding o f
curriculum were introduced to the curriculum studies, including
work associated with neo-M arxism , critical theory, hermeneutics,
fem inism , sem iotics, psych oanalysis, phenom enology,
postm odernism .

T hese diverse traditions have been extensively

em ployed in curriculum research (Pinar, 1988b, 1992; Jackson,
1 9 9 2 ).
Throughout my graduate studies, I have been intrigued by post
structuralists' thinking and their arguments.

When I read post

structuralists' works, there is a sense that what I read I have thought
before, albeit not realized or articulated.
1

Post-structuralists raise

radically different questions (than the ones posed by their
predecessors, the structuralists and phenom enologists) concerning
the problematics o f know ledge, language and subjectivity that are
fundamental to human understanding and existen ce.

The curriculum

question, and my question as w ell, is no longer the Kantian question
o f "what can w e know?", but rather "how has the path of my
knowing been determined?" and "how have I been situated to
experience the real, which is a product o f
1970, p. 229)

that knowing?" (Foucault,

The w hole idea of language as a sign system has

been

displaced from questioning its intrinsic nature to problem atizing its
exterior field, that space o f distribution within which signs function
a s signs, as elem ents deployed and activated through a network o f
relations.

This is the result o f relations established among

institutions, econom ic and social processes, system s o f norms, etc.—in
short, in "a field o f exteriority that is not contained in the object,"
(Foucault, 1972, p. 45), nor can be formalized as grammar, logic or
speech-act conventions.

The dichotom y o f subject and object,

fundamental to the project o f modernity, entails the search for
certainty and the effort to use reason to establish absolute and
universal truth.

In this view , the knowing

conscious guarantor o f all knowledge.
truth.

subject is the self-

Humankind is the source of all

The post-structuralists' diagnostic problematization o f the

"death o f man" or the "disappearance o f subject" is neither abstract
nor subjectless; rather, it is an exploration o f concrete bodies and
their circumstances in order to open new possibilities.
knowledge discourses create subject and deploy power?

How do
"Since man

was constituted at a time when language was doomed to dispersion,

w ill he not be dispersed when language regains its unity?" (Foucault,
1970, p. 386)

What is the linkage between the universal "I" and the

individual "me"?

What is the relationship among power, knowledge

and the self and how does it function?
replace a discredited epistem e.

These problematics do not

Rather, they create an

epistem ological space through the displacement o f old one; it is for us
to realize our position vis-a-vis that displacem ent ceaselessly
postpones and defers, and thus to make connections with ourselves.
These displacem ents or dislocations o f problematization open up a
gap that can be extended close to another "functions of
singularization"—new variables o f space and tim e—so as to obtain a
connection, a relational com plexity (D eleuze, 1991, p. 94).

The

connections among post-structuralism , curriculum and m y self seem
to be enmeshed, and therefore the purpose o f this study is to
untangle post-structuralism and its m eanings, curriculum
im plications, including efforts at self-understanding.
The ideas o f difference, m ultiplicity, transgression, nonhierarchical and non-m onolithic discourses challenge educators
(curriculum scholars in particular) to re-think their theoretical
understandings and daily practices.

One central tenet o f these post-

structuralist notions is to argue that any approach which claim s to be
a universal or totalizing realization and transcendental justification is
doomed to self-exhaustion.

Today the objective or aim o f developing

general theories or universal claim s is vulnerable to self
deconstruction, or is regarded sim ply as "anachronistic" (Burbules
and Rice, 1991).

The merging o f contemporary debates has occurred

to the extent that it is difficult to identify what distinguishes a

"curriculum theory" from

social-h istorical-political-cu ltu ral critique

concerning the discourse o f curriculum in general.

These merging

and diverse themes have been at the core o f contemporary
curriculum

d iscou rses.

Many curriculum scholars have claim ed that w e seem to be on
the verge o f a major "paradigm shift"

(Kuhn, 1970; Brown 1988)

or

an "epistem ological break" (Althusser,

1970); or rather as Jean-

Fran9 ois Lyotard (1984b) has termed

it, the "post-modern condition."

A s Lyotard says, any theory that looks to a metadiscourse o f
emancipation in order to legitim ate itself should be described as
"modern" and therefore as irredeem ably inappropriate to
contemporary conditions (Lyotard, 1984b).

It is in a space of

"heterogeneity" (Pefanis, 1991) or a state of "heteroglossia" (Bakhtin,
1981; W hitson, 1988) that w e find ourselves in the midst o f a site
among diverging discourses.

W hile in the celebration o f "difference,"

w e are urged to make connections, not to adopt a merely pluralistic
approach, but to unravel the nexus o f power, know ledge and self
among difference, to "translate" one from another (Serres, 1983).
D eleuze (1991) also notes:
[Cjoncept does not die sim ply when one wants it to,
but only when new functions in new fields discharge
it. This is also why it is never very interesting to
criticize a concept: It is better to build the new
functions and discover the new fields that makes it
useless or inadequate, (p. 94)
This study is also an attempt to suggest connections between
post-structuralism and curriculum.

It w ill also suggest that the

Eastern Taoist thought and Zen philosophy may shed light on

understanding these connections.

The im plications of these

connections for an em erging curriculum theory represent one focal
point o f this study.

Journey
Since I was in the elementary school, I have been fascinated
with the teaching profession.

It is, in part, due to the Confucian

tradition that teaching is a divine profession—to be a teacher, is to
live m eaningfully, to study, to be a literatus (wen).

"Wen," my first

name (m iddle name in C hinese), can also be translated as literature,
writing or to write; som ehow I always feel connected to that idea.
The Confucian idea o f being a teacher is to decipher the "Tao," to pass
on knowledge, and to enlighten pupils.

After I entered the Normal

University to study to be a teacher, I began to study Taoism and Zen
philosophy w hich pushed me further toward understanding my own
situatedness in the world.
remember.

Zen stories are always refreshing to

One story points to my current thought:

One day when Ma-tsu was walking with Po-Chang, a
flock of w ild geese flew overhead. Ma-tsu asked Pochang, “What is there?” “W ild geese, master.” “Where
are they now?” “They have flown away.” Ma-tsu
seized Po-chang's nose and gave it a violent twist, so
that Po-chang cried out in pain. The master said, “How
could you say that the wild geese have flown away?
They have been here from the very beginning.” Pochang was im m ediately awakened. (Cheng, 1991, p.
65)
W hile I was teaching, there were certain dilemmas I faced
everyday.

I tried to resolve them, but to no avail.

surrounded me constantly.

Questions

Is there another alternative to the

6
approach I am em ploying?
does it make?

The answer is "yes," but what difference

Is this the best I can do?

we mean by the "best" anyway?

Definitely "not."

What do

I was also troubled by the idea that

doing what you do best is to do what you can do.

Doing what I

cannot do may be the best to do.
In 1985, I came to the United States to pursue these questions.
It was at the U niversity o f W isconsin-Stout where I first encountered
hermeneutics and critical theory; I was immersed in understanding
the relation between the individual and the world.

Through

Gadamer and the Frankfurt school I realized that notions o f meaning,
interpretation and understanding are central to curriculum studies.
had been studying the work o f curricular scholars such as M ichael
Apple, Eliot Eisner, Paulo Freire, Maxine Greene, Henry Giroux,
M adeleine Grumet, D w ayne Huebner, Herbert Kliebard, James
MacDonald, W illiam Pinar, and Philip W exler since W illiam Reynolds
introduced me to the curriculum field.

In studying curriculum and

pedagogy, I found those dilem m as I had previously encountered
reemerging into my thought.

Then I decided to work with W illiam

Pinar whom I thought would be helpful to my study.
At LSU I studied postmodernism with W illiam D oll, sem iotics
with Tony W hitson, curriculum theory with W illiam Pinar, and
phenom enology with Ted A oki.

M ost importantly I was reawakened

by French post-structuralism through studying with Jacques
Daignault.

Each o f these teachers and traditions opened up new

possibilities for me to deal with curriculum theory and selfunderstanding.

These individuals allow ed me to trace my personal

journey from the East to the W est, then back to the East.

My Eastern

I

heritage has enabled me to recognize the constitution and
significance o f W estern arguments and their Eurocentric
assum ptions.

Through study o f post-structuralism , I have attempted

to discover a space in order to think "difference" and to transgress
"the order of things" (Foucault, 1970).

P erso n a l

E x p e r ie n c e

As a Chinese student, mainly influenced by Confucius, I have
com e to understand that each tradition in philosophy has its origin in
the unity of human experience and in human reason or thinking.

In

the sense, life refers to an attitude, a way o f being in the world.

The

idea that anyone can be whatever one wants to be as long as one
keeps working hard is engrained in many students' minds;
everything is possible if only one works hard enough.

I am no

e x ce p tio n .
The problematic o f language is the cornerstone o f understanding
human existence.

Language is not only a mimetic conception of

reality, but also a deictic one.

Its purpose is to "point" to reality, not

m erely to "represent" or "mirror."

Post-structural thinking is to show

an attitude, an ethics that traverses the "in-between" among
discourses.

It is an attitude of "detachment," o f conceptual

configuration which determ ines whether an action—its probable or
actual consequence—is good or evil.

It is the effect produced through

discursive practices which conditions the p ossib ilities o f discursive
formation.

Another Zen story illustrates this point:

Liang-chieh who forded a river with Master Mi.
Liang-chieh was said to have asked Mi: “What kind o f

action is it to ford a river?” “One that does not wet the
feet,” replied Mi. “Most reverend sir, you have
declared it,” exclaim ed Liang-chieh. Then Mi asked in
turn: “And how would you describe it?” “The feet are
not made w et,” answered Liang-chieh. (Cheng, 1991, p.

200)
Post-structuralism is like the art o f fording a river without
wetting the feet.

It teaches one to be moral without being bound to

or having to hold onto a set of rules and thus to sever that
attachment.

Post-structuralism is not opposed to morality, yet it is

an ethics without morals.

In this regard, teaching is like an art; it is

an "artless art," and perhaps unteachable.

It is achieved by each

individual deploying a network o f historical pow er/know ledge
relationships.

Teaching is not what one does; it happens.

This study

attempts to make these and other connections between post
structuralism and curriculum, and in elaborating them, suggests a
new stage o f curriculum theory forthcoming.

To elucidate in detail

the elem ents o f this new theory is outside the scope o f this study,
which is transitional in character.

In the last chapter, however, I w ill

draw a path from the East (Taoism and Zen philosophy) to the W est
(post-structuralism ) back to the East (a Taoist post-structuralism),
which represents not just one path o f one person, but perhaps a
possibility for a new intercultural field o f curriculum theory.

CHAPTER ONE
H ISTO R IC A L FO R M A T IO N O F PO ST-STR U C TU R A LIST
THOUGHT
L ife reiterating itself in order to recover its hold on
itself during its fall—as if holding its breath in an
instantaneous apprehension o f its origin; but the
reiteration o f life by itself would be hopeless without
the simulacrum o f the artist who, by reproducing its
spectacle, succeeds in delivering him self from
reiteration. (K lossow ski, 1970, p. 15)

S c e n a r io
In the beginning, I would like to clarify the term "post-" which
was, and has been, a trendy one used by many scholars in various
discip lin es (post-K antian, post-M arxism , post-industrial, post-liberal,
post-modern, etc.).

For som e, post- means something that is "after,"

"beyond," "above" or "transcending"; for others, it means virtually
"anti-" or "neo-"; for still others, it means simply to "stop" (an
anagram for "post"), or rather to step b e h i n d or b e n e a t h , to subvert,
to deconstruct.

In this last sense post-structuralism is a way to the

opening o f am bivalence betw een "oppositions" proposed by
structuralists through the "play o f diffe re nces" or "double science,"
those oppositions which essentially constitute binary logics in
m etaphysical thinking, such as

subject/object, presence/absence,

speech/w riting, sign ified /sign ifier, truth/error, and the like.

In

these oppositions, a hierarchy is established by privileging one side
o f each binary opposition (for exam ple, presence has com e to be
valued over absence).

Post-structuralism attempts to overturn and

dismantle this hierarchical formation.
9

This interpretation of post w ill

be the one employed in this study.

A s M ichel Serres suggests, we

need to consider beings rather than names, relations rather than
beings, and m ovem ents rather than slogans, paths rather than
m ovem ents (Serres, 1989b).

Serres (1989b) notes:

"The slave and

the master are kneeling together; they both venerate the relation
which binds them. . . . Their place changes, the spot o f relation
remains" (p. 92).

G illes D eleuze also argues that even if there are

only two terms, there is an "AND" between the two, which is neither
the one nor the other, nor the one which becomes the other, but
w hich constitutes the "multiplicity" from within.

D eleuze (1987b)

rem ark s:
It is always possible to undo dualism from the inside,
by tracing the line o f flight which passes between the
two terms or the two sets, the narrow stream which
belongs neither to the one nor the other, but draws
both into a non-parallel evolution, into a
heterochronous becom ing, (p. 35)
Structuralism in France has two different traditions.

The one I

w ill study is derived from the social sciences, and was mainly
developed by Ferdinand de Saussure (lin guistics, sem io lo g y —the
theory o f the sign), Claude L6vi-Strauss (anthropology), early Roland
Barthes (literary criticism ), and Jacques Lacan (psychoanalysis).

The

other is derived from a tradition in the natural scien ces—
mathematics, the leading exponents o f which are the N icolas
Bourbaki group (m athem atics) and Jean Piaget (b iology, mathematics
and psychology).

W hile remaining committed to its major tenets,

both groups provide their own alternatives to those problems
embedded in humanism's fundamental assum ptions.

The main

11
problem with humanism is the prioritization o f the subject in a
m ythologized fashion; the b elief that "man" has a special kind of
being; that "he" and his thought have a privileged status in the world;
that the subject is at the center o f the signification it generates.
Structuralism seem s convinced that there is an elementary and
underlying "structure" or "system" which can be system atized and
used as a method of scientific knowledge.

Structural analysis is to

reveal the underlying fundamental structure which is com m on to all
human activities, and to make it intelligible.

Such a fundamental

structure becom es an essence without which no one could be a one.
According to Josue Harari, in Textual Strategies: Perspectives in Poststructuralist

C riticism (1979), structuralism or a structuralist

"tendency o f thought" can be summarized as follow s:
The rejection o f the concept o f the 'full subject' to the
benefit o f that o f structure; (2) the loss of pertinence
o f the traditional “form /content” division insofar as for
all structuralist theories content derives its reality
from its structure; and (3) at the m ethodological level,
a stress on codification and system atization. (1979, p.
27)
Philip Lew is examined Vincent Descom bes' Modern French
P h ilo s o p h y (1986) and remarked that D escom bes had characterized
three primary themes o f sem iological structuralism:

(a) "The

signifier precedes the signified"; (b) "Meaning arises out o f non
meaning"; (c) "The subject submits to the law o f the signifier" (1986,
pp. 95-97).

Then he concluded that the structures, in structuralism,

emerge in large scale social and cultural contexts, "make themselves"
independently o f subjects.

"Myths think them selves through us,"

says Levi-Strauss (Caws, 1988, p. 29).
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These characteristics give rise to the follow ing questions raised
by post-structuralists: What is the relation between subject and
structure?

How does this relationship becom e interdependent?

is there a notion of an overall pattern in history?

Why

In all these

questions, the isom orphic idea between propositions and reality, in
terms of the signifier and the signified, com es under suspicion.

A lso

the hierarchical relation is denied; the notion of stability in either
structural linguistics by Saussure or cultural anthropology by LeviStrauss is brought into question (Derrida, 1976, 1978).

In short,

post-structuralism involves a critique o f m etaphysics, of reason, of
the concepts of history, of identity, o f the subject, and of truth.

A b b r e v ia te d

H isto r y

of

S tr u c tu r a lis m

It can be said that structuralism was inaugurated in linguistics
and anthropology, particularly in the works of Ferdinand de Saussure
and Claude Levi-Strauss.

Each tried to explain human reality, one

through literary and linguistic theory and the other through
anthropology (Scholes, 1974; Culler, 1975; Clarke, 1981; Rex, 1984;
Sturrock, 1982, 1986; Caws, 1988).

Structuralist theory arrived in

the United States during the early 1970s, founded, in part, on a
model of language proposed by Saussure.

Language, in Saussure's

mind, is a system, a whole, a body of rules, independent of any
speaker, historically given, on which speakers are forced to draw; it
also is purely "relational."

The "sign," Saussure states, is comprised of

"langue" (language) and "parole" (speech) (Saussure, 1959).

He

asserts that the supremacy of the totality is l a n g u e over p a r o l e ’, in
other words, langu e is primary, p a r o l e is secondary.

Another key

idea o f Saussure’s is the distinction between "signifier" and
"signified" which may be regarded as the central tenet in the
structuralist approach.

According to Saussure, "signifier" can be said

to be a sound-image, or its graphic equivalent; on the other hand,
"signified" is considered as the concept or meaning.

The relation

between signifier and signified is arbitrary—Saussure calls this
relation "sign" (Saussure, 1959).

Signification is the process or

activity o f relating the signifier to the signified within a system of
differences between signs; in other words, speech precedes writing.
As Terry Eagleton (1983) remarks "there is no inherent reason why
these three marks (c-a-t) should mean 'cat,' other than cultural and
historical convention" (p. 97).

Saussure (1959) states:

Language is a system that has its own arrangement.
Comparison with chess w ill bring out the point. In
chess, what is external can be separated relatively
easily from what is internal. The fact that the game
passed from Persia to Europe is external: against that,
everything having to do with its system and rules is
internal. If I use ivory chessm en instead of wooden
ones, the change has no effect on the system; but if I
decrease or increase the number o f chessm en, this
change has a profound effect on the 'grammar' of the
game. One must always distinguish between what is
internal and what is external. In such instance one
can determine the nature o f the phenomenon by
applying this rule: everything that changes the system
in any way is internal, (p. 22)
B esides linguistic structural analysis, there are anthropological
approaches, scientific in nature, toward understanding human
relation and existence.

Levi-Strauss is a cultural anthropologist.

insists that he fully recognizes the "autonomy" o f society.

He

For him,

the individual can exist only in society, but society has effective
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reality only in the individual psyche.

It is no longer possible to see

reality as something out there, a fixed order o f things which language
merely reflects.

On this assumption, there is a natural connection

between word and thing.

In his long study of relations o f kinship

and system s o f myth, he not only attempts to develop an objective
scientific analysis of meaningful cultural phenomena, but he also
gives his structural analysis a psychological foundation and insists
that this foundation is provided by a rational unconscious.
Simon Clarke argues that Levi-Strauss goes on to specify the
"fundamental structures o f the mind" which underlie "reciprocity"—a
spontaneous response to the experience o f opposition between self
and other.

These structures which, Levi-Strauss (1969) insists are

"universal," are three:
The exigency o f the rule as a rule; (2) The notion of
reciprocity as the most immediate form o f integrating
the opposition between self and the others; and finally,
(3) The synthetic nature o f the gift, i.e., that the agreed
transfer o f a valuable from one individual to another
makes these individuals into partners, and adds a new
quality to the valuable transferred, (pp. 75, 84)
It is in this sense that modern French structuralists reasoned
that if w e know the word is formed by language—in Saussure's view ,
language as a system of signs—then language may be said to
constitute our knowledge o f the world; in other words, language is
the only reality since knowledge can be represented or
communicated only through and in linguistic form.

Terry Eagleton

(1983), comm enting on structuralism, says that "reality is not
reflected by language but p r o d u c e d

by it" (p. 108).

It is assumed by

structuralists that the system o f language, its construction, is

explicable without reference to the intentions o f the user: the
structure o f mentality is derived from the observable structure o f
language, rather than presumed to be knowable as itself a cause of
language.

Structure can be analyzed as if it existed autonomously

(M egill, 1985; D escom bes, 1986).

Structures define practices that

them selves change the structures.

We can conclude that the

structural analysis assum es that through language the world can be
described, actions appropriately identified, events truthfully
d e p ic te d .
What is structuralism?
different to different people.

The answer to this question may be
Som e identify structuralism and

sem iology as the sciences o f the sign, as system s of signs (Saussure,
1959).

Others see it as a sort of scientific m ethodology to various

inquiries (Sturrock, 1981, 1986).

Still others regard structuralism as

"a movement o f mind" (Scholes, 1974, p. 1).

These different

emphases concerning structures are difficult to isolate from one
another for they are interrelated.

As Jonathan Culler (1975) notes:

"One cannot define structuralism by examining how the word has
been used; that would lead only to despair" (p. 3).

A number of

participants, including Saussure, Levi-Strauss, Roland Barthes (in his
early works), Jacques Lacan, Louis Althusser, M ichel Foucault, and
Jacques Derrida, have devoted much of their efforts to discussion (if
not definition) o f this mode o f thought; each has done so in a
different and ambiguous way based on the author's own
interpretations and suited to his own purposes.
According to J. G. Merquior (1986), structuralism can be
summarized as follow s: A "style o f thought" in the humanist wing of

know ledge, a result of disappointment with so-called humanism, an
"anti-humanism"

or an "anti-historicism" (pp. 2-3).

Structuralism

was born out of a "revulsion against the existentialist cast of mind"
(Merquior, 1986, p. 6).

Because existential humanism asserted the

primacy o f consciousness, or of the subject which has been rejected
by m ost structuralists, the "death o f the subject" and "the assault on
realism" have been two provocative slogans for many structuralists.
Eagleton (1983) remarks that the subject, for structuralists, was
effectively "reduced" to the function of an impersonal structure.

In

his view , the new subject is really the "system " or structure itself.
Structuralism is,

according to Eagleton (1983), an attempt to apply

linguistic theory

to objects and activities other than language

itself.

Eve Tavor Bannet, in Structuralism and the Logic of Dissent
(1989), argues that the label of structuralism is problematical if it is
regarded as a description o f method.
may begin to think o f it ideologically.

Conversely, she insists that we
The ideological implications of

structuralism in France are made clear, for instance, in Descombes'
Modern French P hilosophy (1986) and Rabinow's French Modern
(1989).

Here the assertion is made that structuralism was looking

for a base on which to build a rationalist human philosophy, while
rejecting phenom enology and existentialism .

The central ideological

tenet o f structuralism, remarks Bannet (1989), is

"language as a

system defines society as a system and also the forms of thought,"
that "it brings into accord, because it engenders, mental structure
and social structures" (p. 3).

It can also be said that structuralism

wants to preserve the principles o f the Enlightenment in the face of
the onslaught o f irrationalism.

As Clarke (1981) puts it,
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Structuralism therefore sought to integrate the w hole
o f human existence in a rational synthesis rooted in
the individual mind: to restore the unity o f reason and
emotion, intellect and experience as the basis of
human existence, (p. 32)
More fundamentally, its central notion is that certain basic
structures or system s govern and explain any object o f study.

The

notion or problematic o f "structure" is the central elem ent in any
structuralist's or its counterpart's mind; it is not on the basis of
human existence, but as the basis.

For some, the structures of

structuralism are "generally subsumed under a m odel, a master
structure explicated by analysis as the basic 'mechanics o f meaning'
obtaining in any given area of social life" (Merquior, 1986, p. 7).

For

others, a structure should be understood as a set o f "relations" among
entities that form the elem ents of a system; "the structure w ill be
said to be 'concrete' if the relations are actually embodied in some
system , 'abstract' if they are merely specified but not so embodied"
(Caws, 1988, p. 13).

For still others, structural analysis begins with

the structure—relations that, defined in a purely formal way by
certain properties, characterize a set of elem ents, the nature o f which
is not specified.

This analysis demonstrates that a certain cultural

content (kinship system, or myth) is a "model" o f that structure, or a
"representation" of it (D escom bes, 1986, pp. 83-85).
(1 9 8 6 )

Descom bes

remarks:
Neither more nor less than this content is “isom orphic”
to a number o f other contents. Structure is precisely
that which holds good in an isomorphism between two
sets o f contents, (p. 86)
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Other characteristic ideas and practices, important to
structuralists, are the notions o f w holeness, self-regulation, and
transformation.

Rex Gibson (1984) remarks that one of the key

assumptions structuralists hold is that the w hole is greater than the
sum o f the parts.

Reality lies not in things but in the relationships

between and among them.

This is often expressed as "decentering

the subject"; in other words, the human loses his or her place at the
center o f things.

Gibson (1984) says "no longer is m a n the proper

study o f mankind, but the w h o l e that is mankind itself' (p. 9).
Human beings become the object and subject o f study at the same
time.

The relation between s t r u c t u r e

and meaning

becom es

the

central focus o f structuralist approaches.
Another key idea o f structuralism is transformation.

Such an

idea appears to contrast strangely with the preceding characteristics
which suggest that structuralism is essentially static in its preference
for "synchronic" analysis and self-regulation.

But this idea does not

conflict with the notion o f transformation, for the latter draws
attention to those laws o f w holes that them selves constitute the
origin and direct the flow o f change.
and structuring.

Such laws are both structured

As Piaget (1970) puts it:

"[A] 11 known structures. . .

are, without exception, system s of transformation" (p. 11).

Therefore

structures are subject to change, but according to the laws o f system.
The notion o f transformation, for Levi-Strauss, is that cultural objects
are never given singly, but always in groups whose members prove
to be transforms of one another; the object of knowledge in human
sciences is therefore not the particular case but the group of
transformations to which it belongs.

For Piaget (1970), structuralism is concerned with structure, and
a structure is a "system o f transformation" (p. 5).

Allan M egill

(1985) summarizes Piaget's theses on the definitions o f structure
succinctly.

It is worth quoting here:

In the first place, for Piaget a structure is not a mere
aggregate; it is not an accidental collection of elements
and their properties. Rather, it is a whole whose
elem ents are subordinate to law s, in terms o f which
the structure qua w hole or system is defined. In the
second place, a structure is subject to transformations,
brought about by the play o f its governing laws. And
finally, a structure is self-regulating—that is, the
transformational law s o f the structure "never yield
results external to the system nor em ploy elem ents
that are external to it." (p. 212)
In short, as M egill (1985) sees it, a structure necessarily "entails
self-m aintenance and closure."

He continues to argue that "it

operates according to its own inner system of laws, a system of laws
that never transforms the system into som ething other than what it
is" (p. 212).

The structure is beyond the reach o f each element

within that structure.

One elem ent can not be m odified without

entailing a modification o f all the others.

Important

Structuralists

Ferdinand de Saussure
Structuralism starts in linguistics, particularly in the work of the
Sw iss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure.
founding father o f structuralism.

He can be considered as the

Som e aspects o f his main ideas

were mentioned in the preceding discussion.

Saussure emphasized
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the distinction between the signifier and the signified.

Such a

distinction is pertinent in structuralist approaches, for exam ple, the
sound image made by the word "dog" is the signifier, and the c o n c e p t
o f a dog is the signified.

The structural relationship between the

signifier and the signified constitutes a linguistic sign, and language
is made up o f these signs.

The linguistic sign is arbitrary; this means

it stands for something by convention and common usage, not by
necessity.

Saussure also stressed the point that each signifier

acquired its semantic value only by virtue o f its differential position
within the structure of language.

In this conception o f the sign there

is a precarious balance between signifier and signified.
no signifier without a signified and vice versa.

There can be

He also argues that

there is no intrinsic relationship between signifier and signified.
Meaning, for Saussure, derives from the system o f l a n g u e , from
its formal relationships and rules, and not from its relationship to an
outside, independent world.

In other words, meaning arises not from

objects, but from the relationships of signs.

Saussure (1959) insists

on the arbitrariness o f the sign and remarks that "in language there
are only differences without positive terms" (p. 119).

In brief, for

Saussure (1959), meaning arises out of "oppositions" (p. 119).

For

example, the color o f yellow is what is not red or blue, it is defined
by its relationship within the color system.

Therefore, it can be

concluded that meaning, in Saussure's view , is derived from the
differences arising from the relational qualities o f language, not in
the isolated words them selves; there are no positive properties in
words them selves.

This differentiation, in Saussure’s words, is "their
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m ost precise characteristic that they are what the others are not"
(Saussure, 1959, p. 59).

It gives meaning:

Signs define one another neutrally by means o f their
differences from one another. . . . “The” and “this” are
meaningful only in so far as they are im plicitly distinct
from “a” and “that.” (Saussure, 1959, p. 59)
W hile he argues that language has no positive characters, what
Saussure calls its "value," he is saying that it is constituted by
internal "oppositions," the differences.
m eaning without difference.
differences within a system.

In short, there can be no

Identity is entirely a function of
As Jonathan Culler puts it, in O n

D e co n stru ctio n (1982), "meaning is the product of a linguistic system,
the effect of a system of differences" (p. 110).

This is the "chain of

signifiers," which means exactly that a signifier is always dependent
upon, and thus elucidated by another signifier, since no one has a
"positive" property (Culler, 1975, p. 11).
The problem o f language has been a central focal issue for m ost
philosophers since antiquity.

Traditionally, language is conceived as

a mere carrier or medium of information and meaning.

For some,

language is not only the fundamental elem ent o f thought, the
condition o f knowledge, rather it co-exists with knowledge.

As Lev

Sem enovich V ygotsky contended, in Thought and Language (1962),
the developm ent o f thought is "determined by language, i.e., by the
linguistic tools of thought and by the sociocultural experiences of the
child" (p. 51).

He also believed that "a word without meaning is an

empty sound, no longer a part of human speech.

Since word meaning

is both thought and speech, we find in it the unit of verbal thought

we are looking for" (Vygotsky, 1962, p. 5).

In short, there are

intrinsic relations between language and thought.
Saussure (1959) says that "language is necessary for speech to
be intelligible and to produce all its effects; but speech is necessary
for language to be established; historically, the fact o f speech always
com es first" (p. 134).

At the same time, it is no longer to see reality

as something "out there," a fixed order o f things which language
merely reflects.

On this (false) essentialist assumption, there is a

natural connection

between

word and thing; for the

this connection is

arbitrary, historical, social.

structuralists

Claude Levi-Strauss
Simon Clarke states, in his The Foundations o f Structuralism
(1981), that "for Levi-Strauss knowledge can never be based on
subjective experience, it must have an objective foundation" (p. 31);
this foundation is exactly what Levi-Strauss sought to achieve an
"objective synthesis o f experience and reality" (Clarke, 1981, p. 31).
The foundation of this objective synthesis is the unconscious.
Strauss called the

Levi-

human subject—the center o f being—the "spoilt

brat o f philosophy" (Clarke,1981, p. 12).

He stated,

like other

structuralists, that the ultimate goal of the human sciences is not to
constitute man but to dissolve him (Levi-Strauss, 1963).

For he

claim s that the isolated sym bolic orders as a privileged reality of
which we can have direct knowledge depends on its ability to
identify the m eanings constituted by such orders independently o f
any particular subjective interpretation o f these m eanings.

In other
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words, he seeks to discover the objective residue o f meaning that
remains when rational abstraction has been made from all such
subjective interpretations.
L evi-Strauss'

Clarke (1981) lists the main themes of

structuralism:

The attempt to discover an objective meaning
immanent in the object defined without reference to
anything outside the object; the structuralist reduction
o f that meaning to the formal relations between the
parts of the object and so the reduction of the content
to form; and the theory of the unconscious, (p. 186)
The supposed opposition between n a t u r e
dominates the thought o f Levi-Strauss.

and c u l tu r e

For him, we have lost our

respect for nature, have cut ourselves o ff from it, and are not
prepared to live under its rule.

He insists that the only solution is a

reduction of culture to nature.

In looking at Levi-Strauss' structural

analysis o f "myth" one can reach the same conclusion found in
looking at Chomsky's structural linguistics.

In the relation between

language and reality, Levi-Strauss sees that the objective
unconscious meaning o f particular

sym bolic system s

is to give access

to a privileged order o f reality.
In Levi-Strauss' The Elementary Structures o f Kinship (1969),
the discovery of a theory of unconscious provides the foundation for
a rationalist, human philosophy displacing the concept of
"reciprocity" from the center o f structure.

The sym bolic is itself

underlain by the formal structuring capacity of the unconscious,
supposedly revealed by structural linguistics.

This formal

unconscious is universal and atemporal, prior to subjective
experience and to the temporal modality of that experience.

For
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Levi-Strauss (1966), a proper structural analysis of a myth w ill
decom pose the story into component parts which w ill reveal the
"unconscious infrastructure" that underlies textual surface
manifestations (p. 40).

He is searching for an universal underlying

system which constitutes segmented parts and their rules of
combination.

Levi-Strauss puts it, there are "those universal laws

which are the substance o f the human unconscious" (Perpich, 1984,
p. 37).

Jacques Lacan
Lacan's theory, a reformulation o f Freud's psychoanalytic theory,
is partly founded on the discoveries o f structural anthropology (L eviStrauss) and linguistics (Saussure).

One o f his main arguments is that

the unconscious, as a hidden structure, resembles language.
unconscious is comparable in structure to language.

The

In fact, Lacan

argues that language is the condition for the unconscious, that it
creates and gives rise to the unconscious.

For Lacan, follow ing Levi-

Strauss, the individual psyche is created in the process o f
socialization in which the individual is assimilated into sym bolic
orders, w hile at the same time being individuated within them
(Lacan, 1977).

The subject is created by a language which pre-exists

the individual.

Lacan’s conception of the "subject" is regarded as

constituted in language which can interpellate the subject and put it
in its place.

The system o f language preexists the individual.

Thus,

anything said about the world should be placed in quotations; "the
subject is spoken rather than speaks" (Lacan, 1977, p. 71).

As Clarke
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(1981) remarks:

"It is simply a way of living out a particular mode

o f integration into the sym bolic orders of society" (p. 215).

The order

o f language then constitutes both the subject and the knowledge of
the subject.
The notion of "I" is first articulated in what Lacan calls the
"mirror stage."

The mirror stage, Lacan argues, is a moment of

alienation, since to know on eself through an external image is to be
defined through self-alienation (Lacan, 1977).

The subject, then, has

a profoundly ambivalent relationship to that reflection.
coherent identity which the mirror provides.

It loves the

H owever, because the

im age remains external to it, it also hates that image.

The subject

experiences many radical oscillations among contrary em otions
(Lemaire, 1977; Said, 1985).
Saussure regarded the relationship between signifiers and
signified as stable and predictable.

Lacan insists that we are all

immersed in everyday language and cannot elude it (Lacan, 1977).
In a Lacanian view o f language a signifier always signifies another
signifier; no word is free from "metaphority" (one signifier in the
place of another).

Since any signifier can receive signification

retrospectively, after the fact, no signification is ever closed, ever
satisfied.

There is no natural link between signifier and signified.

In

repression, Lacan sees one signifier coming to substitute for another.
The old signifier and what it signifies are "pushed down" to the
u n co n sciou s.
Lacan believes that the discourse within which the subject finds
its identity is always the discourse of the Other—o f a sym bolic order
which transcends the subject and which com poses its entire history.
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Lacan, follow ing Freud, stresses that the real can not be apprehended
or investigated except through the intermediary o f the sym bolic.
One Lacanian tenet is that subjectivity is com pletely relational; it
com es into play only through the principle o f difference, by the
opposition of the "other" or the "you" to the "I."

In other words,

subjectivity is not an essence but a set of relationships.

It can only

be induced by the activation of a signifying system which exists
before the individual and which determines his or her cultural
identity.

This approach is quite similar to the developm ent o f the

Saussurean notion o f sign (Ulmer, 1985).

Roland Barthes (earlyl
Barthes started as a structuralist, with his later work moving
toward post-structuralist approaches (Sturrock,
1987).

1986; Harland,

He once defined structuralism as a mode of analysis of

cultural artifacts which originates in the methods o f contemporary
linguistics (Barthes, 1977).

He has contributed the notion o f writing

and reading, in its playfulness and pleasure, to dem ystify those
apparent, natural, familiar and "self-evident" elem ents o f literary
texts.

In doing so, he opens the text to multiple possibilities of

meaning, not simply residing in and o f a literary critic's selfconsciousness.

Barthes focuses on the "self-reflexivity" o f text itself

in order to demonstrate the text's plurality through a
"decomposition" of the forces —in terms o f "codes" in his famous S /Z
(1 9 7 4 )—within

the texts.
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Barthes has proclaimed the death of the author in order to
question the humanist assum ption that subjectivity, the individual
mind, is the source o f meaning and action.

He defines structuralism

as a method of analyzing cultural works, whose aim is not to discover
the meaning o f a work, but to reconstitute the rules governing the
production o f meaning.

He further insists on "the freedom o f the

reader"; however, this freedom is not a mere return to individualism ,
nor the free w ill o f transcendental consciousness, nor the coherent
subject of a self or an "I."

For Barthes, it is a "divided subject, even a

pluralized subject, that occupies, not a place o f enunciation, but
permutable, multiple, and m obile places" (Kristeva, 1980, p. 111).

As

Barthes (1977) puts it, "the text only exists in the movement of
discourse. . . the text is experienced only in an activity of production"
(p. 157). In other words, it is a "demystification" o f literature.

Limits or Problems of Structuralism
Since structuralism arrived in the United States in the 1970s,
literary studies have undergone a radical revision, namely the N ew
Criticism movem ent (Berman, 1988).

Structuralism challenges the

role o f the literary critic in reading the text.

Interpretation of

literary text is what readers bring to literary works—a w hole bank o f
tacit assumptions and anticipations.

Language is thus view ed as a

structure o f phonetic differences, rather than an aggregation o f terms
(words), each corresponding to a com ponent o f objective reality
(th in g s).
Structuralism is based upon the assumption that only on the
ground o f a structure o f networks, in relations to one another, do
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elem ents o f a system function or exist meaningfully.

Culler (1975)

points out that "if human actions and productions have a meaning
there must be an underlying structure or system o f traditions and
conventions which makes this meaning possible" (pp. 21-22).
W illiam Ray, in his Literary Meaning: From Phenom enology to
D e co n str u c tio n (1984), makes clear the im plicit assumption o f the
stru ctu ralists:
Events, phenomena, and objects are culturally
functional only to the extent that they have m eanings,
and objects that have meaning are by definition social
phenomena best understood in terms o f the shared
structures through which that meaning constitutes
itself, (p. 110)
This underlying "shared" structure is, for Saussure, the system of
sign; for Levi-Strauss, the idea of symbolic order; for Lacan, the
notion of the unconscious; for Barthes, the multiplicity o f "text"; all of
which are derived from a kind o f anti-existential humanism which
claim s that we can know a world independently o f its sym bolic
representation and that w e can know ourselves independently of the
sym bolism that constitutes a particular conception o f ourselves.
This Saussurean based language system im plies a kind of
"idealism," which asserts that language does not create meanings but
reveals them, in other words, meanings pre-exist their expressions.
This is exactly what Derrida strives to deconstruct; for Derrida, there
can be no meaning which is not formulated, in brief, we can not
reach "outside" language (Derrida, 1976).
Through analyzing structuralists' historical and philosophical
horizons, there are basic assertions in their notions o f identity,
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m eaning, subjectivity

and history—though all interrelated—which

appear to be somehow problematic.

In its confidence and all-

em bracingness, structuralism seem s to answer a fundamental human
need for order and coherence.

I w ill address briefly these issues

im plicit in structuralist analysis.
The main problems o f structuralism include the concept of
subject, the notion o f identity and meaning, the idea o f history and
the over reliance on reason.

The philosophy of the subject is and has

been the focus o f modern philosophers.

Structuralism is a

consequential developm ent o f disappointment with that branch o f
humanism which asserts the primacy o f the human su b je ctexistential humanism.

Structuralists’ claim the relationship between

the individual and society, the term "I," is to be understood only in
terms of the social whole.
dispersed.

Therefore, the subject "I" is decentered or

Thus, subjectivity is to be thought o f in relation to the

individual and structures; in terms o f the Saussurean m odel, this is
the embeddedness o f "the sign in the language" (Saussure, 1959, p.
67).

Saussure insists that a word has meaning only in the context o f

to ta lity —l a n g u e (Saussure, 1959).

Therefore, the centered subject—

w hich is self-consciou s, self-aw are, self-determ ining—is displaced by
a structural system; human beings, for structuralists, are carriers or
"bearers" o f structures and those structures determine their
individuality.

The eradication o f subjectivity is a rebellion of

subjects against a system that negated them as such.

Jurgen

Habermas, for instance, raises interesting questions about the
problem of the structuralists' treatment o f subjective intentionality
(Habermas, 1990).

He argues that "subjectivity and intentionality
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are not prior to, but a function of, forms of life and systems of
language; they do not 'constitute' the world but are them selves
elem ents
The

of a linguistically disclosed world" (Habermas, 1990, p. ix).
concept of subjectivity was first decentered by the

structuralists, m ainly Levi-Strauss and Saussure, who reversed the
traditional perception o f subjectivity residing with consciousness or
inner mental im ages.

The structuralists regarded the subject as the

function o f the w hole structure whose relation to each individual is
where meaning is founded.

Continuing this tradition, the post

structuralists distrust the idea that structure has its center and origin
beyond each individual's reach.
more central and problematic.
question

Their concept of relation becomes
Furthermore, Foucault argues that the

of the status of the subject is dism issed by structuralists.

The dissolution of subject appeals to

the question o f "origin,"

foundation, and the problem o f "representation" which post
structuralists seek to reexamine.

The question o f the subject, for

Foucault, has been intim ately linked with the related questions of
subjection, domination and exclusion (Foucault, 1970, 1972).
The question of identity is interwoven with the notion of
difference.

For structuralists, Saussure in particular, the meaning of

a word is constituted by its differences or oppositions within a
language system.

Saussure defines language as a system o f signs.

What gives a sign its identity?

Saussure argues that signs are

arbitrary and that each sign is defined not by some essential
property but by the differences which distinguish it from other signs.
This notion o f difference or differentiation im plies the "metaphysics
of presence" or "logocentrism," deconstructed by Derrida, which w ill
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be discussed later (Derrida, 1976, 1981a).

Structuralism maintains,

on the one hand, that no terms o f the system are ever simply and
com pletely present, for differences can never be present.

And on the

other hand, it defines identity in terms of common absence rather
than presence.

Identity, the central elem ent o f metaphysical

thinking, is made purely relational.

The question of presence and

absence also gives way to the problematic o f writing and speech that
Derrida strives to deconstruct.

There is also the involvem ent o f the

hierarchization o f identity and difference.
The difference, in terms of structuralist's binary oppositions—
sig n ified /sig n ifie r,

sp eech /w ritin g,

su bject/object,

nature/culture,

presence/absence, in telligib le/sen sib le, etc., entails the question of
"supplement," which undermines W estern logocenttic and
metaphysical thinking.

Logocentrism assumes the priority of the

first term in the bifurcation just given, and regards the second in
relation to it, as a "complication," a negation, a supplement (Derrida,
1978).

The notion o f supplement, insisted Derrida, is "always

already" present and, in fact, functions to constitute the privileged
term; in other words, it im plies that there is no origin and nothing
exists until it is supplemented (Crowley, 1989; H ayles, 1990).
The notion o f ’history" is quite different for structuralism and
post-structuralism; for structuralism, history is to be seen as a series
o f shifting configuratives opaque with the passage of time.

The

notion o f history, in a structuralist sense, is synchronic or ahistorical.
Structuralism attempts to investigate any structure from a more
"impersonal" or "scientific" perspective than that of the intending
subject.

Derek Attridge, G eoff Bennington and Robert Young (1987),
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com m enting on structuralist notions o f history, state that
"structuralism addressed questions to history even as it tended to
repress the question of history" (p. 3).

Saussure’s synchronic mode

o f analysis seems to ignore the existence of history.
with structures rather than with chronologies.

It is a concern

Structuralists' claim ,

according to Norris (1982), that "historical understanding is only
possible in so far as it adopts a synchronic standpoint, 'classes of
dates each furnishing an autonomous system o f reference'" (p. 78).
The central issue, according to M ichel Foucault, is that of the denial of
the singularity of events, o f the discredited, o f the neglected, and o f a
whole range o f phenomena (Foucault, 1970, 1972).
phenomena, known

as "naive knowledges,"

These

the structuralists located

low down on the hierarchy, beneath their required level of
scientificity.

Through Foucault's geneaological analysis, to be

discussed later, we see the problematic as the insurrection of
subjugated know ledge which runs through the w hole of Western
historical analysis.

In the post-structuralists' view o f history, mainly

that o f Foucault, there can be no constraints, no essences, no mobile
forms o f uninterrupted continuities structuring the past (Foucault,
1 9 7 2 ).
For some writers, history is always realized as "ex post facto" or,
as Hegel declared, consequent on Minerva's flight.

A ll the social actor

can do is to survey a world that can only be characterized as an
impregnable efface,
forms or realism.

which is the traditional facade associated with

all

Structuralism as a w hole is necessarily

"synchronic"; it is to investigate particular system s or structures
under artificial and ahistorical conditions, dism issing the system s or
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structures out o f which they have emerged in the hope o f explaining
their present functioning. Som e find the threatening o f "historicity o f
history" proposed by post-structuralists to be unbearable.

Perry

Anderson (1984) for exam ple, in the name o f Marxism and its
concept o f history, has dism issed all post-structuralism on the
grounds that it represents "the random ization

of history" (p. 114).

N evertheless, history is traditionally thought o f as grand
explanatory system s and as linear processes constituted by discrete
events and uninterrupted continuities.

Post-structuralism not only

"reintroduces" history into structuralism or "shows that effects o f
history have been reduced," but also questions the traditional
concept o f history itself.

Derrida (1973) remarks:

If the word "history" did not carry with it the theme of
a final repression of d i f f e r a n c e , we could say that
differences alone could be 'historical' through and
through and from the start, (p. 141)
Furthermore, Foucault’s genealogical analysis, follow in g
N ietzsche, questions the legitim acy o f the present by separating it
from the past (Foucault, 1977, 1979).
explanation is thus rejected.

The role of cause or

The gap between the past and the

present underlines Foucault's historiography.

He claim s that when

the technology o f power o f the past is exercised, the present
assumptions which posit the past as "irrational" are undermined.
Those notions o f discontinuities, ruptures, gaps, lacunae, and
thresholds, argues Foucault, have been excluded throughout Western
thought since Plato.

Another problem of structuralism is its over-reliance on reason.
Structuralism, in general, seeks a universal foundation in order to
secure logical consequence.

The question of how the human sciences

are historically possible and what the consequences of their existence
are have not been fully answered.

According to Foucault, madness,

chance, and discontinuity have been excluded by reason.

The

"otherness" of reason allow s the transgression which makes all
possible become possible, all differences becom e "differentiated"
(Foucault, 1973).

In curriculum practices, mainly in bureaucratic

organizations, the notion o f reason is transformed into scientific
rationality (Schon, 1983).

The objective of scientific rationality is to

gain control and mastery over the physical and social environment.
F ollow ing N ietzsche, Max Weber argues that scientific rationality
focuses on means but not on ends, such instrumental reason can be
but o f limited help to us as we live our lives.
Foucault reiterates and criticizes this scientific rationality by
arguing that science uncovers the m ythology in the world, but
science itself is a myth which has to be superseded.

Madan Sarup

(1989) observes, follow ing Foucault, that "scientific knowledge has
brought about a disenchantment with the world" (p. 76).

He

continues to argue that means can be calculated with efficien cy—i.e.,
technical rationality—but ends and values becom e increasingly
problematic to determine.

One effect o f the rise o f instrumental or

technical rationality is the process o f reification which has produced
d ise n c h a n tm e n t.
Structuralist approaches decenter the subject by em phasizing
relationships and not individuals.

Meaning is rooted and fixed in
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structures, not in individuals; but the displacem ent o f the individual
from the center of meaning is questionable.

As w e have seen, in

From Prague to Paris (1986), Merquior argues that structuralism has
been "vocal in asserting the centrality o f culture (and suggesting its
autonomy) and so reluctant to accept any talk o f 'hard'
infrastructural determination o f the cultural realm" (p. 115).
M eaning, for the structuralists, is fixed or rooted within the structure
o f language.

But m eaning, argue post-structuralists, is interminable

or alw ays already indeterm inate.
In Structuralist

P oetics (1975), Culler asserts that to debunk

structuralism, it is best to approach it through its linguistic
foundations.

He insists that "linguistics is not simply a stimulus and

source o f inspiration but a m ethodological model which unifies the
otherwise diverse projects o f structuralists" (Culler, 1975, p. 4).
Derrida is in the forefront o f those questioning the structuralists'
assumption.

In his view o f language, the signifier is not

subordinated to the signified, as an image to a mirror.

There is no

isom orphic correspondence between the level o f signifieds in
language.

There is no fixed distinction between signifiers and

signifieds.

Derrida argues that meaning is not retrieved from

apparent unmeaning, but rather consists in the repression of
unmeaning.

For him, any specification of meaning can only function

as a self-defeating attempt to stabilize and restrain what he terms
the "dissemination" o f the text (Derrida, 1981b).

To know the

meaning of a signifier leads to a process which is not only infinite but
also circular.

Signifiers constantly transform into signifieds, and vice

versa, and it is im possible to reach a final signified which is not a

signifier itself.

Meaning is dispersed along the whole chain of

signifiers; it is an endless interplay o f presence and absence.

In

short, the meaning of a sign, o f what is present, depends on what the
sign is not, on what is absent.
Meaning, then, is not immediately present in a sign.

Since the

meaning o f a sign is a matter of what the sign is not, this meaning is
always absent from it.

This notion o f the unstable overturns

structuralists' conception o f definable and stable structural analyses.
The stability o f structure, according to structuralists' thought, is
questionable.

N o elem ent is absolutely definable within the

structure or system.

Furthermore, Derrida's concept o f writing and

"differance" is a challenge to the idea of structure; for a structure
always presumes a center, a fixed principle, a hierarchy of meaning
and a solid foundation.

It is exactly these notions which the endless

differing and deferring of writing puts into question.

For curriculum

practices, this means that the projected "end" of knowledge could
ever coincide with its "means" is an im possible dream.

Sarup (1989)

puts it w ell by saying that "no one can make the 'means' (the sign)
and the 'end' (meaning) become identical. . . . The sign must be
studied 'under erasure,' always already inhabited by the trace of
another sign which never appears as such" (p. 36).

D eleuze (1988)

rem ark s:
Truth offers itself to knowledge only through a series
o f "problematizations" and that these
problematizations are created only on the basis of
“practices,” practices of seeing and speaking. These
practices, the process and the method, constitute the
procedures for truth, "a history o f truth." But these
two halves of truth must enter into a relation,
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problem atically, at the very moment when the
problem o f truth denies any possible correspondence
or conform ity between them. (p. 64)

Conclusion
In this chapter I have outlined major tenets of the structuralists'
enterprise along with several important and fundamental lim itations
or problems within structuralism.

As we have seen, in Saussurean

perspectives, language is conceived as a system o f signs whose
relations and differences within a system make meaning intelligible
and independent of an external world (Saussure, 1959).
Structuralism can be summarized, according to Sarup (1989), as
performing four basic operations:
F irst, it shifts from the study of conscious linguistic
phenomena to the study o f their unconscious
infrastructure;

s e c o n d , it does not treat term

independent entities, taking instead as its basis of
analysis the relations between terms; th ird , it
introduces the concept of system or structure; f in a lly ,
it aims at discovering h i d d e n general laws. (p. 43;
underlining

added)

Having outlined several lim itations and problems of
structuralism—the conceptions o f identity, subjectivity, m eaning and
history, through contrasts between structuralism and post
structuralism—we w ill see in the next sections that the structuralistminded m ovem ents in curriculum studies have faced the same
problems.

I w ill now explicate post-structuralism in relation to these

questions and point to their im plications for curriculum theory and

practice.

In doing so, I w ill also lay out the problem concerning

"rationality"—reason its e lf—which reverberates through the field
curriculum in general.

CHAPTER TW O
REVIEW O F CO NTEM PO R ARY PO ST-STRUCTURALISM
K nowledge
through, in
knowledge.
this: There
knowledge
D escom bes,

without illusion is an illusion through and
which everything is lost, including
A theorem of it might be sketched like
is no myth more innocent than that o f a
innocent o f myth. (La Traduction, cited in
1986, pp. 91-92)

Critique of Reason or Enlightenment Rationality
The Western philosophical paradigm was built upon a
"reasoning" process that involved no interventions in the
phenomenal world.

To reason, M axine Greene (1984) remarks, was

to "take the stance o f the contem plative spectator and 'see' with the
eyes of mind" (p. 547).

Starting from Plato, the philosopher detached

him self as a temporal being from the material world.

The objective

patternings and the meanings o f appearance, Plato believed, could be
achieved only through rational faculty.

For Aristotle, human

rationality entailed the ability to grasp the design or the "telos" of
reality; he stated, that "to know what excellence is, is not enough; we
must endeavor to acquire it and to act accordingly" (T h e
N ichom achean

E th ics. 1920, p. 1179b).

Follow ing this ancient tradition, Francis Bacon stressed that if
reason could be freed from error then the notion that reason
unassisted could com e to know the truth could be retained.

Thus he

introduced an "inductive logic" to replace Aristotle's "deductive logic."
W e all remember and are haunted by one of Francis Bacon's w ellknown dicta: "knowledge is power."
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For N ietzsche, knowledge is "the
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w ill to Truth," and is manifested in "the will to power" (Nietzsche,
1966).

N ietzsche replaces reason with the w ill to power.

Baruch Spinoza (Benedict de Spinoza) insisted "clear and distinct
ideas" are true when compared with confused ideas.

For him,

reasoning occurs through sequences o f propositions; and the highest
certainty is found in intuition.

He called reason and knowledge of

the second kind (distinct from opinion or imagination) as that
emanating "from our possessing common notions and adequate ideas
of the properties of things" (Spinoza, 1949, pp. 107-112).
believed all knowledge to be founded in experience.

John Locke

He was

convinced that external objects were presented in experience by
ideas, which might or might not resem ble what actually existed
outside (Locke, 1924).
In the early seventeenth century, Rene Descartes invented his
great "dualism"—idea and matter, mind and body—that we have
been haunted by from its inauguration.

The dualism that Descartes

constructed worked steadily through the decades to clear the path
for a more careful study o f the world o f things.
head was the world o f objects and things.

Outside the human

Descartes was concerned

to relate these two worlds, the world o f time and space and the
world of mental activity.

It laid the way for the development o f the

so-called hard sciences such as physics, chemistry, and biology.
also conceived the subjective world as independent from the
objective world.
Descartes' predication o f existence upon cognition—"I think,
therefore I am; I am a thing that thinks"—has been questioned
throughout the last century (Descartes, 1968).

Many contest the

It
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dualism that the relation between "I think" and "I am" proposes
(H eidegger, 1962; Silverman, 1987; Soloman, 1988; Prigogine, 1989).
For Descartes, "I think" precedes "I am."

On the contrary, argues

Merleau-Ponty (1961), really "the 'I think' . . .

is re-integrated into

the transcending process o f the 'I am', and consciousness into
existence" (p. 439).

In short, the notion of a priori

"reason"—the "I think"—is rejected.

status assigned to

Lacan (1977) argues in his

discussion of the "gaze of the other," it is the gaze o f the other which
makes the "I" possible.

He insists that "I think where I am not,

therefore I am where I do not think" (p. 166).

Lacan believes that

how w e present ourselves—the "I" o f the "I think"—is always subject
to the interpretation o f others.

I do not exist alone.

As Lacan has reversed Descartes so Derrida (1982) has
deconstructed Roger Bacon.

Roger Bacon's view of the place of

experimental philosophy is the focal point of his empiricism.
differentiates the relationship between

He

"speculative knowledge"

{scientia specu lativa) and "simple empiricism (scientia o p e ra tiv a ) "
(Fr. Roperi Bacon quaedam hactenus in e d it s . 1859).

The purpose o f

experimental science, he says, is to confirm the understanding o f the
natural and man-made things.

He insists that experimental science is

the "mistress" o f all previous knowledge and the end of deductive
reasoning.

Derrida (1978) characterizes this claim as "thinking b y

metaphor without thinking the metaphor as such" (p. 139).
David Hume concluded that we can not "really know" the world
at all.

He believes in reason and the empirical appeal to the senses,

and he detested obedience to authority on such non-rational or
nonsensical matters as m etaphysics.

His skepticism centers upon his
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denial that we ever actually experience the necessary connections-"causes"--between events; no such world exists outside our
experience, insists Hume (Hume, 1951).
Immanuel Kant in his "critical" philosophy (see his three
C ritiques of Reason, 1952, 1956, 1958), attempted to reconcile the
seventeenth century's scientific world view with a conception of
human freedom , and he undertook, follow in g Jean-Jacques Rousseau,
to redefine reason from the standpoint of a moral account o f its end.
He devoted much of his career to articulating "the limits of reason."
His proposed solution for resolving this crisis in the modern world is
illustrated in his doctrine o f the "crisis o f reason."

At the heart

o f his

works is an expansion o f the concept o f self, the "transcendental" self
or ego, suitable for all people at all times and under all conditions.
Knowledge of the world, for Kant, is possible because the self
determines the structure o f our experience.

Contrary to the

Cartesian solitary ego and Kant's transcendental subject, argues John
D ew ey, reason is social rather than solitary, historically rooted rather
than tim eless, pragmatic rather than theoretical (D ew ey, 1929).
D ew ey's reconstructive aim was to undermine the authority o f the
inherited theories o f reason and to legitim ate the

pragmatic,

experimental reason already at work in modern science.

D espite his

differences with Kant, D ew ey could agree with the Kantian maxim:
"They learned that reason has insight only into that which it
produces after a plan of its own" (Kant, 1958, p. 20).
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Rationality after the Enlightenm ent
The rationality o f the Enlightenm ent includes both rationalism
and empiricism.

Human rationality has been critiqued by N ietzsche

and his follow ers as the dialectic o f reason itself.

In defending

Enlightenm ent ideas, preserving the legacy o f Western rationality,
the contemporary critical theorist Jurgen Habermas attempts to work
out the concept o f "communicative rationality," quite different from
instrum ental-technical rationality, in order to restore the
Enlightenm ent project and to revitalize m odernity—still "an
incom plete project" (Foster, 1983, p. 3).
C om m unicative

In his books, The Theory o f

A ction (V ol I, 1984; Vol II, 1987), Habermas

contends that "universal pragmatics" enables us to understand the
foundation for emancipatory self-reflection, grounded in
intersubjective com m unicative com petences.

W hile rejecting

Enlightenment's solitary or "subject-centered" reason, he does defend
reason through "consensus."
consensus without constraint.

Communicative reason is universal
Consequently, Richard Bernstein

(1985) calls Habermas the "guardian of reason" (p. 25).

In his recent

book, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity (1990), Habermas
continues to argue that the philosophical discourse initiated by Kant
has shown the notion o f subjectivity to be the principle o f modernity.
In contrast to modern French philosophies, Habermas insists that
"the basic conceptual a p o r i a s o f the philosophy o f consciousness, so
acutely diagnosed by Foucault in the final chapter o f The Order of
T h in g s, were already analyzed by Schiller, Fitche, Schelling, and
H egel in a similar fashion" (1990, p. 295).

As Richard Bernstein
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portrays it, the project o f Habermas has been the search for reason
as a central theme in the western tradition, in hope of its
revitalization

(Bernstein,

1985).

Habermas raises the interesting point that reasons are o f a
special nature.

These reasons, he sees, can always be expanded into

arguments which we then understand only when we "recapitulate"
( n a c h v o l l z i e h e n ) them in light o f som e "standards" o f rationality.
This "recapitulation," for Habermas, requires a reconstructive activity
in which we bring into play "our" own standards of rationality, at
least intuitively (Habermas, 1984, 1987).

He continues to say,

according to Bernstein (1 9 8 5 ), that "the interpretative reconstruction
o f reasons makes it necessary for us to place 'their' standards in
relation to 'ours,' so that in the case of a contradiction w e either
revise our preconceptions or relativize 'their' standards o f rationality
against 'ours'" (p. 204).

In other words, we

can not understand

reasons without at least im plicitly evaluating them.
Conversely, Richard Rorty raises questions about the contingency
o f language (Rorty, 1986a, 1989).

After the collapse o f analytical

philosophy, he sees that there is opposition to foundational thinking
or the view that there exist representations privileged by the fact
that they mirror som e independent empirical reality (Rorty, 1979,
1989).

He insists that language foregrounds human existence and

understanding by contrasting

"metaphysicians" (Plato-K ant tradition)

with "ironists" (Derrida), and he illustrates the distinction between
reality being "discovered" and "invented" or created.
rem ark s:

Rorty (1989)
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Truth cannot be out there—cannot exist independently
o f the human m ind—because sentences cannot so exist,
or be out there. The world is out there, but
descriptions of the world are not. Only descriptions of
the world can be true or false, (p. 5)
Rorty thus focuses on the problematic o f "representation"; he
insists that reality is created, rather than out there waiting to be
discovered.

He strives to work on the nature and the status of

philosophic discipline.

Rorty warns us that the temptation to look for

criteria (in terms o f Habermas' "standards") is part o f the temptation
to think o f the world as possessing an intrinsic nature, an essence.
Rorty also argues that the human self is created by the use of a
vocabulary rather than expressed in a vocabulary.

He remarks

(1986a) that "what is true about this claim is just that languages are
made rather than found, and that truth is a property o f linguistic
entities, o f sentences" (p.3).

After announcing the dem ise o f all

foundational thought, he claim s that the desire for "vocabularies-aswholes" or "final vocabulary" is to keep the conversation going, on
which a sense of "solidarity" or "community" can be built (Rorty,
1982, pp. 376-377; 1989).

The claim to reason always entails a

"transcending power," remarks Bernstein.

For it is renewed with

"each act o f unconstrained understanding," and with "each moment o f
living together in solidarity" (Bernstein, 1985, p. 32).

Phenomenology

and

the

Rise of Post-structuralism

Modern French philosophers, post-structuralists in particular,
insist that the main problem of Western philosophical thought is
exactly, in various disciplines, the hegemony of language and the
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death o f subjectivity (D escom bes, 1986; Champagne, 1990).

The

"disappearance" or "death" o f man is one of the most important
claim s laid out by post-structuralists.

It is a critique of humanism as

the m etaphysics of subjectivity, a break with the indissolubly
humanist and dialectical philosophy of Hegel and Marx.

Luc Ferry

and Alain Renaut, in their French Philosophies o f The Sixties (1990),
remark that this non-hum anistic and non-dialectical culture had
appeared in Nietzsche and Heidegger, long before it is echoed in the
structuralist enterprises (as in Levi-Strauss, who practiced the death
o f the subject in the birth o f structures).
Phenom enology, as an investigative method, proposed by
Edmund Husserl, marks the starting point for contemporary critical
philosophy.

The task of phenom enology is to minimize deception, to

see things as they really are.

It starts with the return of philosophy

to scientific status, because scientists and em piricists sim ply rejected
philosophy and its foundation without any attempt to demonstrate
its validity.

For Husserl, it is the "Absolute," though degraded by the

historicist and relativist (m ainly N ietzsche), where the truth is to be
found (Husserl, 1962); in short, truth is to be found in transcendental
consciousness.

According to Robert Solomon (1988), Husserl's

phenom enology is "the clo se examination o f the essential structures
o f [transcendental] consciousness, with an eye to deriving
[describing] necessary and universal truths of experience" (p. 130).
It is Husserl, according to Foucault (1989a), who defined "the horizon
o f reflection" for generations to come (p. 41).
Martin Heidegger, a student o f Husserl, rejects his teacher's
"reactionary Cartesianism."

H eidegger insists, in Being and Time
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(1962), that we have lost our understanding of true "Being," for the
very language we use blocks understanding.

He sees that Husserl's

phenom enology is the means to undermine Descartes' dualism —mind
and body—and the mechanistic view o f the world and the self
enclosed illusion of self that it fosters.

Heidegger's theory of

interpretation and understanding aspires to reach the authenticity o f
Being itself.

Phenom enological approaches provide the most

powerful principle for sorting through the many issues o f meaning
that have emerged.

We all remember his famous dictum: "Thing

[shows itself] in itself" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 54).

Further, his

phenom enology is elaborated by Merleau-Ponty (1964):

"Back to the

things themselves" (p. 25).
Post-structuralists ow e much to N ietzsche and Heidegger, for
both can im plicitly be found in most post-structuralists' works
(Silverman, 1987).

Follow ing N ietzsche and Heidegger, against those

who characterize post-structuralism as a repudiation o f
phenom enology (D escom bes, 1986; Brodribb, 1992), I would argue,
though not at all in a chronological sense, that there are three
"opening" dimensions of phenom enological thought.

One is the

phenom enological "existentialism" advocated by Jean-Paul Sartre and
Maurice Merleau-Ponty; a second is the phenom enological
"hermeneutics" put forward by Hans-Georg Gadamer and Paul
Ricoeur; a third is the "reiterative," "transgressive" post
structuralism, proposed mainly by M ichel Foucault, G illes Deleuze
and Jacques Derrida.

I w ill focus this study on the latter.

Focusing on language as the starting-point for a new mode of
thought on politics and the subject, post-structuralists base their
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work on a new understanding of history as "discursive formations"
and "text," and o f writing (dcritu re ) as production and invention, not
merely representation.

They regard language as the scene o f our

finitude, the place where we confront with the limits or boundaries
of our subjectivity (M oi, 1986; M ichelfelder and Palmer, 1989).
Through these boundaries or lim its where the condition o f possibility
or the transcendental o f discourse is eluded the transgression of
meaning can account for a unique relation.

This relation, according to

Derrida (1978), "is not an access to the immediate and indeterminate
identity of a nonmeaning, nor is it an access to the possibility of
maintaining nonmeaning" (p. 268).

It is a transformation of the

relationship between difference and opposition such that, if it is true
that "thinking" and "placing" the object in a system of oppositions are
the same thing, there is "the possibility of thinking a relationship
without thinking it" (Lyotard, 1984a, p. 139).

Furthermore, argues

D eleuze (1986b), this relation no longer concerns "the reproduction o f
figures but the production o f a continuum o f intensities in a
nonparallel and asymmetrical evolution" (p. 13).

This notion o f serial

discourses, proposed by D eleuze, can account for heterogeneity, the
differences that "disappeared" as structures linked sim ilarities.
Like structuralists, post-structuralists present the practices o f
language as the bedrock for human sciences.

However, Foucault

em ploys the relation o f power and knowledge to shed light on
Saussure's language system; the system itself is contaminated with
hidden structures and thus reveals what has been excluded and how
it happened.

It is Foucault's (1972) contention that discovering the

margins o f history and its discontinuities makes human
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representation o f existen ce possible--"a theory o f discontinuous
systematization" (p. 231).
is formed.

In brief, an "episteme" of the modern era

For Derrida, language is a structure of material marks or

sounds which are in them selves "undecidable" and upon which
meaning has to be imposed (Derrida, 1978).

Following this line of

thought and in contrast to Hegel's idea that there is no thought
outside o f language, Rorty (1989) has warned us—by asking the
question: "What is the relation o f language to thought?"—that we w ill
fall into the trap o f either "the evident failures of reductionism" or
"the short-lived successes of expansionism" (p. 12).

Relatedly, Rorty

urges us to conceive o f efficiency in our usage of words, instead of
questioning whether our beliefs are contradictory.

Rorty's notion o f

edification can be characterized as an attitude interested not in what
is out there in the world, or in what happened, but in what we can
get out o f the world for our own uses.
Coinciding with Habermas and Rorty's critiques o f Enlightenment
rationality and their questions regarding the nature of philosophy,
post-structuralists recognize that there is a sense o f "crisis" in
philosophical thought.

They offer a different "diagnosis" of

contemporary philosophical discourses.

These post-structuralists

reject Habermas' preoccupation with "tradition" w hose different
"interests" of Reason would lead to universal communication through
his "universal pragmatics" or "inter-subjective reason."

Lyotard

argues that such a consensus im plies the elim ination of differential
intensity by legitim ation and "performative criteria" (Lyotard,
1984b).

Rather, he urges us to search for "dissension," which is

differential, im aginative and "paralogical," thus destabilizing and
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disturbing closures generated by self-regulated system s.

This

amounts to the continual openings transgression brings out,
constantly deferring any possible closure or totality (Lyotard, 1984b,
pp. 60-67).

Although different from Habermas' understanding of

"tradition," Rorty seems to want to have a master who says there is
no master, solidarity with what holds solidarity to be only a
contingent affair.

He then wants the lack of philosophical mastery to

be itself a tradition on which we can all come to agree.

Foucault

argues that the "we" is not, as for Habermas, the consensual "we" o f
practical reason, nor as for Rorty, the ironical one of liberal solidarity.
John Rajchman (1991), follow ing Foucault, points out that it is the
question o f the "we" o f the anonymity.

Succinctly he notes that:

It is rather a community of those who would
constantly expose their own thought to an experience
o f de-naturalization. And it is perhaps precisely the
possibility o f this anonymity and this denaturalization that lie at the heart o f fears and the
anxieties we so often encounter when the purity of a
nation or of its traditions is asserted or assumed, (pp.
18-19)

What is

Post-structuralism ?

Answering this question is not an easy task, even though many
have devoted extensive studies o f these modes o f thought

(Culler,

1975; Harari, 1979; M egill, 1985; Poster, 1989, 1990; Sarup, 1989;
Champagne, 1990).

Pecora notes that post-structuralism is, though a

quarter century has passed, still difficult to interpret and represent
in America.

It is partly assimilated into "deconstruction" and is
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largely adopted, says Pecora (1986), as "a style of literary criticism"
(p. 34).

In the context o f American pluralism or "America the

scrivener," noted by Gregory Jay (Jay, 1990, p. ix), post-structuralism
has no single unified meaning.

Some (e.g., Berman, 1988; Rorty,

1982) have identified "deconstruction," "textualism," or "genealogical
analysis" with post-structuralism.

Others (e.g., Harari, 1979;

Merquior, 1986; Harland, 1987; Frank, 1989; May, 1989; Callinicos,
1990) have deployed or appropriated post-structuralism as "arch- or
hyper-structuralism ,"

"anti-structuralism ,"

"superstructuralism,"

"antirationalism," "neostructuralism," a "contemporary form o f
anarchism," or the "successor o f modernism."

Even among post-

structuralists, nam ely M ichel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Jean-Frangois
Lyotard, G illes D eleuze and M ichel Serres, there is no unified theme.
Josue V. Harari has explicitly raised this question, in his T ex tu a l
Strategies: Perspectives in Post-structuralist Criticism (1979), and
provides this answer:
The question is less ambitious than it might appear; it
does not seek a clear or unified answer, but only
tentative answers that may perhaps be reduced, in the
end, to nothing more than a panorama only slightly
different from that offered by structuralism. For this
reason, am ong others, post-structuralism —like
structuralism—invites a plural spelling, (p. 27)
Post-structuralists reject the question "what /$?," in order to
understand what is embodied in the search for origin, essence or
foundation.
place.

Thus, questioning is exactly the problematic in the first

From this, we can understand why neither/nor logic runs

through most post-structuralists' works.
distort.

Simply, to define is to

Post-structuralism is paradoxical in nature.

In another
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sense, as soon as w e "name" or "designate" something or som eone, on
the condition that this be done with necessary precision and above
all the necessary style, we "denounce" as w ell (D eleuze, 1990, p. 284).
W e can recall that N ietzsche’s answer to the question "What is?"
would be "Which one?" and thus invites a "plural spelling."

In the

same manner, w hile defining the notion of "phrase," Lyotard (1984a)
points out:
There is no definition of a phrase because every
attempt o f this sort leads to the concept of a "wellformed totality." On the contrary, we must say rather
that "definition" is a fam ily of phrases, and its demand
for the "well-formed" corresponds to the universe it
presents and varies according to whether the
definition is logical, grammatical, linguistic or
analytical, (p. 314)
Another concern, the ethical aspects o f post-structuralism, as
Martin Jay (1989) points out, is related to the question o f moral
imperatives proposed and praised by Kant.

Jay claim s that post

structuralism is "often taken to mean a valorization o f impulse,
desire, and transgression, which sanctions an ethical 'anything goes'"
(p. 70).

David Carroll, in P araesth etics (1987), remarks that post-

structuralists' projects are to attest to the m ultiplicity underlying any
totality and to the possibility o f alternatives to any totality.

Jacques

Daignault (1990) proposes an "ethics without morals" which, he
insists, means that globalized understanding is not opposed to
localized interpretation and knowledge; on the contrary, it is the
"diagonal" sense between the global and the local, the universal and
the particular which makes human existen ce m eaningful.
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In discussing post-structuralist thought, it is my intention to
single out som e important post-structuralists' arguments or
problem atics, particularly those that can inform contemporary
curriculum studies.

Post-structuralist approaches begin with the

recognition that the epistem ological consequences o f structuralism
lead to an unraveling o f the empiricist presuppositions of the
Saussurean-based m odel—particularly because the original notion o f
the "signified" reflects a commitment to a form o f empiricist
"knowledge" that evaporates under scrutiny.

What any signifier

signifies can not be divulged except by using more words, more
signifiers.
observes,

This is regarded as the chain o f signifiers or, as Nietzsche
interpretation

o f interpretations.

For structuralists, language points to itself:
"texts."

What exist are

However, the idea of a "knowable" reality is rejected by

post-structuralists.

In post-structuralism, know ledge o f the world

derives from the interaction between a primary subjectivity and a
language that pre-exists the user, which generates the "self."

The

concept of self should not be confused with consciousness, ego or id.
The self is, Foucault (1988a) explains, follow ing A lc ib ia d e s. "to be
found in the principle which uses these tools, a principle not o f the
body but o f the soul. . . that is the principal activity o f caring for
yourself, not o f 'knowing' yourself. . . and not the care o f the soul-assubstance" (p. 25; em phasis added).

In brief, post-structuralist

strategies and forms of analysis focus on the philosophical issues o f
language, interpretation and "renunciation" of self; furthermore, they
attempt to dismantle or to "shake up" the conventional and stable
conceptions of meaning, subjectivity, identity and history.
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Mark Poster describes post-structuralist strategies succinctly in
The M ode o f Information (1990).

He says that post-structuralists

seek to abandon all forms o f reductionism , o f totalizing
interpretations o f texts.

He summarizes as follow s:

"For them [post

structuralists] texts are not hom ogeneous, linear bodies of meaning;
they are not expressions o f authorial intention or reflections of class
position" (Poster, 1990, p. 115).

Rather, texts separate the author

from the reader and insert an important space that allow s "acts of
meaning" (Bruner, 1990) or "festivals of interpretation" (Wright,
1990) to set aside the author-ity of the writer and permit one to
read the text as it is in writing.

Foucault (1984) succinctly makes

this point in his "What is an Author?"
For Derrida, meaning is inexhaustible (Derrida, 1978, 1981b).
Derrida insists that any specification of meaning can function only as
a self-defeating attempt to stabilize and restrain what he terms the
"dissemination" of the text.

The notion of subjectivity, for post

structuralists, tends to be not only the structuralist sense of
"displacement," but also to be com pletely localized and
desubjectivized.

The idea o f identity is not merely identity between

identity and difference, in terms o f the H egelian dialectic, but is
questioned further as the difference between identity and difference,
through difference itself (Derrida, 1978).

It is through post-

structuralism that the negative power o f the dialectic is called so
radically into question.

D eleu ze (1983a) remarks, in the subversion

o f dialectical tradition in contemporary critical thinking:
D ifference reflects itse lf and repeats or reproduces
itself. The eternal return is this highest power, the
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synthesis o f affirmation which finds its principle in the
will. The lightness o f that which affirms against the
weight of the negative; the game of the w ill to power
against the labor of the dialectic; the affirmation of
affirmation against that famous negation o f negation.
(p. 197)

Post-structuralist

Orientations

As w e have discussed in chapter one, the limits and problems
em bedded in structuralism are illum inated by post-structuralism .
W hile raising questions about structuralist approaches, post
structuralists provide insightful critiques and shed new light on the
way we understand those issues.
S u b je c tiv ity
Through Descartes' reflection, modern philosophy has becom e a
philosophy o f the subject.

The locus o f certainty and truth,

subjectivity is the first principle from which everything arises and to
which all must be reduced or returned.
or consciousness is an explicit assumption.

The primacy o f subjectivity
The concept of

subjectivity is first questioned and decentered by the structuralists,
m ainly Levi-Strauss and Ferdinand de Saussure, who reverse the
traditional perception o f subjectivity residing within consciousness or
inner mental im ages.

They regard the subject as the function o f the

w hole structure, on which the relation to each individual meaning is
founded.

Althusserian ideology o f self, derived from Marxism, is that

the sense of oneself is not individual but is, rather, the ideal image o f
oneself that ideology has influenced to accept as oneself.

Post

structuralists distrust the idea that structure has its center and origin
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beyond each individual's reach.

They em phasize that the movement

made by each individual, therefore the subject, is not only
decentered but rather "displaced" or "disappeared"; furthermore,
argues Foucault, the subject is not one but "split," not an absolute
origin but a "function ceaselessly modified" (Foucault, 1989, p. 61).
Lacan stresses the point that there is no subject except in
representation, but that no representation captures us com pletely.
Lacan believes that how w e present ourselves is always subject to
interpretation by others.

The Chinese philosopher, Chuang-tze,

points out:
There is nothing that cannot be seen from the
standpoint o f the “N ot-I.” And there is nothing which
cannot be seen from the standpoint of the “I.” If I
begin by looking at anything from the view point of the
“Not-I,” then I do not really see it, since it is “not I”
that sees it. If I begin from where I am and see it as I
see it, then it may also become possible for me to see
it as another see it. Hence the theory of reversal that
opposites produce each other, depend on each other,
and com plem ent each other. (Merton, 1965, p. 42).
There is no possible concept o f subjectivity, insists Derrida.

For

deconstruction should be subjectless and through which it can be
proclaimed "the death o f subject" (Derrida, 1978).

Derrida (1978)

insists that "the concept o f a (conscious or unconscious) subject
necessarily refers to the concept o f substance—and thus o f presence-out o f which it is born" (p. 229).

Discussing deconstruction, Paul

Smith states, in D iscerning the Subject (1988), that for Derrida, "there
can be no concept at all o f subjectivity without a partaking in the
metaphysics of presence and all its critical and decisive m oves of
interpretation" (p. 46).

However, Smith argues that there is
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inevitable existence of the agent or operator o f that processes of
interpretation through whom it passes.

Smith (1988) remarks:

What is established in this absence o f the “subject” and
its identity, and through the erasure o f its desire, is
then a machinery of language which more or less goes
on without us. In other words, if it is not “I” who
chooses, the machinery o f language and thought
chooses “m e,” and any “I” exist only as the passive
construct of a system of forces, (p. 48)
Similarly, A lex Callinicos (1990) argues from a Marxist point o f
view that the central project o f post-structuralists is the demotion o f
the subject from "constitutive" to "constituted" status.

Derrida insists

that the state or status of the complement w ill always be denied to
the interminable o f the "supplement."

D eleuze claim s that an

"intellectual theorist has ceased to be a subject, a representing and
representative consciousness. . . . there is no longer any
representation, there is only action, theory's action, the action of
practice in the relationships of networks" (Foucault, 1977, pp. 206-7).
One o f the main themes o f Foucault, found in M adness and
C iv iliz a tio n (1973), is how external imposition or control has been
replaced by internalization.

The birth o f the asylum can be seen as

an allegory regarding the constitution of subjectivity.

M adness

and

C iv iliz a tio n is an indictment of modern consciousness.
Identity and S elf
From the Aristotelian view , the law of identity serves as a
foundation of categorization and exclusive definition; in other words,
an entity is what it is precisely because it is not anything else.
V in c e n t D escom bes (1986) remarks that "identity cannot be thought

except as differing from the different.
identity to be itself" (p. 40).

Difference is what enables

Eagleton (1990) also remarks that the

notion of identity is "coercive."

It is the "ideological element of pure

thought" and was "installed at the heart of Enlightenment reason"
(pp. 45-54).
The problematic of the constitution of "self" is one of the central
themes in post-structuralism, and we shall see later, o f prominent
post-structuralists.

M ichel Foucault, in his three (the announced

fourth volume in the history of sexuality: Confessions o f the Flesh is
unfinished) volum es of The History of Sexuality (1978, 1985, 1986),
developed a theoretical strategy to investigate the self in early
centuries as an alternative to the phenom enological notion o f self as
consciousness and to the structuralist notion o f self as an object of
analysis.

His project would be a genealogy of how the self

constituted itself as subject.

In other words, Foucault (1988a)

focuses rather on "technologies o f the self."
In his Critical Theory and Poststructuralism (1989), Mark Poster
exam ines post-structuralism , m ainly Foucault's thought, in contrast
with critical theory as developed by the Frankfurt School, and
establishes a set of "rapproachments" in order to show

convergences

between the tw o and to consolidate post-structuralist themes.

His

intention is to incorporate post-structuralist interpretive strategy
into a social context, in terms of contextualizing its own position and
in beginning a critique of the present.

He then tries to integrate it

into critical theory and to offer an autocritique of its inscription of
reason for critical theory.

Poster (1989) summarizes Foucault's

developm ental characterization o f the self as follow s:
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A critique of the self as rationalist by a strategy of
reversal through madness vs. reason; (2) a critique of
the self as centered consciousness by a strategy of
displacement. The locus o f intelligibility shifted from
subject to structure; (3) a hermeneutics o f the self
using a strategy o f historicism. The emphasis fell to
the activity of self-constitution in discursive practices.
(p. 54)
The concept of self is contingent upon language.

The self is a

matter o f the continuity o f one's self-understanding, but this
continuity consists in constantly putting on eself into question and a
constant being-other.

We can see that the concept of self, as Rorty

(1986b, 1989) insists, is contingent upon conversation within
community.

The conversation he argues for is that we as community

members constantly work through dialogue or the mediation of
language and thus keep the conversation going.
Totalization

and Structure

The notion of "totalization" in structuralism is another important
problematic for Derrida, D eleuze and Foucault.

It is defined by

structuralists on the one hand as u s e l e s s , on the other as i m p o s s i b l e .
Sartre's idea o f "totalization" is related to his notion of history.

He

em phasizes that history unfolds its significance through a sw eep of
interpretive hindsight; conversely, history is dism issed by
structuralists as a wishful b elief in the wholeness and continuity o f
human experience.

Christopher Norris (1982) argues that the

socialization of c o g it o in Sartre's fashion is to "fall into the twin
Hegelian traps of 'individualism and empiricism"' (p. 78).
(1990) reasons that many of the concepts of totality are

Eagleton
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"objectionably hom ogenizing and essentialistic, superiorly excluding a
range o f crucial political struggles which they have decided, for one
reason or another, can hardly be regarded as 'central'" (p. 381).
The concept o f structure is another problematic raised by poststructuralists.

It is, for structuralists, regarded as a com plete, closed

system which en closes everything.

Structuralism decentered the

sovereign subject or c o g i t o , which remained unacknowledged since
Descartes, and it recognized that the subject as a function of
structures—social, m ythical, linguistic, and so on—was not as a
ground or source of know ledge.

Post-structuralists argue that

structuralism failed to escape the logocentric tradition that meaning
is determined and fixed within and by the system.

For D eleuze, it is

the epistem ological status of those impersonal structures that
regulate that subjectivity is in question.

Like Derrida (1978, 1981b),

D eleu ze (1987a, 1990) recognizes those structures and then
incorporates them into his philosophy of difference, or a theory of
"singular points," to decenter the very notion o f structure.

Deleuze

(1990) insists that "there is no structure without series (s i g n i f i e d
series and signifying se ries), without relations between terms o f each
series, or without singular points corresponding to these relations. . . .
without the empty square—p la c e without an occupant, which makes
everything function" (p. 51; emphasis added).

In addition, argues

Derrida, the very idea o f structure always presumes a center, a fixed
principle, a hierarchy o f meanings and a solid foundation, and it is
just these notions which the endless differing and deferring of
writing puts into question.

6 1

In his first essay of W riting and D ifference (1978), Derrida
asserts that structuralism, in the biological and linguistic fields,
above all insists on preserving the coherence and com pletion o f each
totality at its own level.

To be a structuralist, Derrida (1978) notes,

is to
concentrate on the organization of meaning, on the
autonomy and idiosyncratic balance, the com pletion of
each moment, each form; and it is to refuse to relegate
everything that is not com prehensible as an ideal type
to the status of aberrational accident, (p. 26)
The problem o f structure, Derrida (1978) sees, is from within:
nam ely, "the possibility o f concealing meaning through the very act
of uncovering it.

To

co m p reh en d the structure of a becoming, the

form of force, is to lose meaning by finding it (p. 26).
Texts by post-structuralists have becom e common in a variety o f
d iscip lin es—philosophy, lin gu istics and literature in particular—in
which they question the notion o f the "foundation" o f a theoretical
framework by interjecting concepts o f "discontinuity", "limit" or
"boundary", "difference or differance", "rupture", "threshold" and
"series" (Foucault, 1972).

The Western tradition of the history of

thought has been thoroughly examined by H egel, H eidegger and
N ietzsche.

However, according to Derrida, these philosophers are all

entrapped by the self-presence (self-assurance) o f a "metaphysics o f
presence" which stabilizes the "origin" o f their critiques and secures
their transcendental m etaphysical operation o f exclusion.

Derrida

(1978) argues that there is no original text: "everything begins with
reproduction" (p. 211).

Foucault (1970) stresses, in a different yet

related way, that the history of thought has been an exercise of
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exclusion and a structure o f domination.

Here, he provokes a

theoretical reorientation o f historical investigation, which calls for a
thematic o f "discontinuity" in the present social formation.
Post-structuralists raise the question that the problem o f "limit"
or "boundary" o f totalization has been excluded during the totalizing
processes.

They challenge the metaphysical presuppositions of

traditional philosophy and the representational mode of thought,
found in difference or "differance," that undermines the certainties of
W estern rationality.

Derrida (1978) argues, from the standpoint o f

the concept o f "play," that "if totalization no longer has any meaning,
it is not because the infiniteness o f a field cannot be covered by a
finite glance or a finite discourse, but because the nature o f the field-that is, language and a finite language—excludes totalization" (p.
289).

It is the interplay o f presence and absence in the language or

utterance that makes discursive practices possible.

This m ovem ent

o f play, conditioned by the lack or absence o f a center or origin, is
the m ovem ent o f "supplementarity"—which, Derrida em phasizes, is
the function o f "differance" in play.

Prominent

Post-structuralists

M ichel Foucault: Discourse and the Power/Knowledge Relation
M ichel Foucault has been studied by many scholars in all human
sciences.

Foucault's sudden death and the incom pleteness o f his

projects have provoked innumerable studies of his illuminating
thinking and elu sive strategies dealing with the social sciences
(Rajchman, 1985 & 1991).

Studies are entitled even under his name,
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M ichel Foucault, such as those by Meaghan Morris and Paul Patton et
al.'s (1979); Alan Sheridan (1980); Charles Lemert and Garth Gillan
(1982); Herbert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow (1983); Mark Cousins and
Athar Hussain (1984); J. G. Merquior (1985); G illes D eleuze (1988);
David Shumway (1989), and Didier Eribon (1991); others are Janies
Bernauer and David Rasmussen et al.'s The Final Foucault (1988);
Jean Baudrillard's Forget Foucault (1987); Jonathan Arac et al.'s A fter
F ou cau lt (1988), and Foucault L ive (1989).

He can be characterized

as one o f the m ost influential philosophers in contemporary thought.
M ichel Foucault was a student of Louis Althusser whose
"historical materialism" is considered a revision o f Marxist econom ic
determinism.

Foucault not only recognizes Althusser's notion o f an

"epistem ological break" to develop his own historical understanding
o f discontinuities within history, but he goes further to argue that
the silencing o f the "marginal" in history makes history itself possible
through demonstrating the relations between power and know ledge
(e.g., Foucault, 1972; Althusser, 1970).

Foucault's style and position

are most influenced by N ietzsche, whom he acknowledges; his
"archaeological" and "geneaological" analyses resem ble Nietzsche's
pessim istic notions regarding the status of man in the human
sciences (e.g., Foucault, 1970, 1972).

Edward Said (1988) identifies

Foucault as "the greatest o f Nietzsche's modern disciples" (p. 1).
The notion of "discourse" is exem plified in Foucault's (1972) own
writing.

He states that discourse is, first of all, "a possible line of

attack for the analysis o f verbal performances" (p. 121).

It refers to

any language system in which consistent patterns o f usage create
comm unities of discontinuities or pariahs.

D iscursive formation
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means to refer "neither to an individual subject, nor to some kind o f
consciousness, nor to a transcendental subjectivity" (pp. 122-123).
Rather, discourse is conceived as "a totality, in which the dispersion
o f the subject and his discontinuity with him self may be determined"
(p. 55).

Discourse is made of a group of "statements."

Statements are

not constituted by a formalization of what is possible based on
another possible as propositions; nor by a dialectic o f oppositions
which makes phrases possible.

According to Deleuze's F ou cau lt

(1988), statements are "necessarily tied to a law and an effect of
rarity" (p. 2).

Deleuze observes that it is the case of de f a c to and d e

j u r e , a logocentric order of argument, from local observations to
universal truth-claims.

These type o f statements making up any

given discourse do not cohere around unique empirical or
transcendental subjects.

Rather they are united by a set o f rules or

relations which provide a variety of subjective positions in relation
to a specific referential.

It is in this sense that the subject is

dissolved in discourse.
Foucault's goal is to establish a fundamental level o f description
at which thought can be seen to be organized in that formation which
he calls a "discourse."

As Alan M egill (1985) remarks, discourse for

Foucault, is "language from which all self-reference, all inner play, all
metaphysical distortion are eliminated" (p. 208).

And the function of

discourse is to serve as a transparent representation of things and
ideas standing outside it.

Whatever Foucault means by "discourse," it

arises out o f a reconstruction—archaeology—o f the analysis of
theoretical formation undertaken by his philosophical forbearers.
proceeds from making no promise about the continuity or mutual

He
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meaningfulness of the layers o f meaning it excavates.

His main

themes include the centrality o f language in understanding social
practices, the "illusion o f autonomous discourse," the discontinuity o f
history, and the central place of political power in what the
authorities prefer to present as scientific knowledge.
Discourse, in general, is understood as a "systematic set of
relations," as the embodiment o f power/relations within a system o f
statements, which is constitutive o f a group of discursive practices
(Foucault, 1972).

Foucault (1972) describes discursive practices as:

A body o f anonymous, historical rules, always
determined in the time and space that have defined a
given period, and for a given social, economic,
geographical, or linguistic area, the conditions of
operation o f the enunciative function, (p. 117)
From this perspective, w e can consider what "discursive
practices" are implicated in curriculum as a function to construct its
own "regimes of truth."

These discursive practices are, according to

Foucault (1977), "characterized by the delimitation of a field of
objects, the definition o f a legitim ate perspective for the agent of
knowledge, and the fixing of norms for the elaboration o f concepts
and theories" (p. 199).

These ensem bles of constitutive knowledge,

statements, and practices attribute to the formation of particular
discourse at a historically specific moment, which Foucault terms as
an "episteme" o f the modern era.

He proposes the self-constitution of

the critical theorist through a practice o f opposition to the dominant
discourses o f the present conjuncture.

Those dominant discourses

can be conceived as "regimes of truth," as general econom ies of
pow er/know ledge, or as m ultiple forms o f constraint.
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Power does not represent the ideas o f the founding subject.
Foucault rejects the tendency to recover a continuity of the past, a
totalization of subject or any form of global theorizing.

Foucault

insists, in the Foucault Reader (1984), that we need an "attitude" as a
mode of relating to contemporary reality which is both reflexive and
transgressive, a way o f thinking from within or without; in short, a
relation of belonging and presenting itself as its task, which he in
turn calls "the critical ontology of ourselves" (Foucault, 1984, pp. 4749).

Jacques Daignault (1990) argues that "local emancipation," as in

Foucault's localized truth, or in Serres' and Lyotard's "local
knowledge," or in Deleuze's "minor knowledge," is not opposed to a or
the universal truth, nor to claim s of a global, uniform and central
effort o f mankind, but attempts to reveal the m ultiplicity o f forces
behind a localized power regim e and the fragmentary nature of
historical forms (e.g., Foucault, 1972; Serres, 1983; Lyotard, 1984b;
D eleuze, 1986b).

These relationships, or rather passages, between

local and global, particular and universal, marginal and central are
intertwined in a disorderly fashion among statements.
(1 9 9 0 )

D eleuze

remarks:
Comparison betw een statements are therefore linked
to a mobile d i a g o n a l line that allows us, within this
space, to make a direct study o f the same set at
different levels, as well as to choose some sets on the
same level w hile disregarding others, (p. 3)

Discourse signifies a set o f relations that gather as "events" not
as "pure meanings."

Foucault (1977) held to a "principle of

singularity," which simply says "there are events in thought" (pp. 2130).

He wanted to open the space of a critical questioning that would
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be prior to who, at a time and place, we think we are.

This means

that he proposes to regard the discourses through which we think
and act as events o f a particular kind; starting up, again, the history
o f our own self-conceptions, to "eventualize" that history and to ask
again, "who are we today?" (Foucault, 1985)

Foucault tries to

"dehistoricize" history and points to his developm ent of a
discontinuous historiography, what John Rajchman (1985) calls
"historical nominalism."
The concept o f know ledge, for Foucault, is intertwined with the
power relations.

The know ledge that interests Foucault is

information im posed by a privileged few to exclude certain groups o f
people.

The tradition assum es that knowledge is logically

independent of power, since to be known seems to mean to be
acquired in conditions free from distortion and coercion.

However,

Foucault thinks that the interconnection among social institutions and
the growth o f certain forms o f knowledge becom es apparent,
rendering the idea of interest-free know ledge appear as the anomaly
instead o f the rule.

The unthought behind the acquisition and

communication of knowledge is not some a p r i o r i of communication,
such as Habermas' "ideal speech situation" as the counterfactual
condition of truth assumed in any discourse (Habermas, 1987).
Rather, Foucault insists that the unthought that conditions know ledge
is power.

In brief, the dilemma o f the educational enterprise,

observes Foucault, is intertwined with pow er/know ledge relation
and the constitution of self.
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Jacques Derrida: Text. Differance and Deconstruction
Derrida is probably the most renowned French thinker in recent
literary theory and criticism in the United States.
introduced to the United States by the Yale Critics.

He was first
One o f his main

projects or strategies—deconstruction— has been w idely received
and discussed in different disciplines (e.g., Jencks, 1987; Norris,
1988).

Books exclusively focusing on Derrida's deconstruction

include Jonathan Culler's On Deconstruction (1975), Christopher
Norris' Deconstruction: Theory and Practice (1982) and What is
D econ stru ction ? (1988), John Sallis et al.'s D econstruction

and

P h ilo so p h y (1987), and Hugh Silverman et al's Derrida and
D eco n stru ctio n (1989).

Derrida proposes an interminable

deconstruction o f the Western philosophical tradition, interminable
because the internal structure o f writing is trapped in an abyss of
Cartesian binary oppositions.

Deconstruction functions to dissolve

the unitary meaning o f texts.
Deconstruction, according to Derrida, targets an array of
representatives o f traditional m etaphysical

system s: phonocentrism ,

logocentrism (mainly H eidegger's "metaphysics of presence"),
phallocentrism and m im etologism .

Deconstruction is not, Derrida

(1978) insists, either a "method," a "technique" or a species of
"critique" (p. 24).

Christopher Norris (1987) characterizes

deconstruction as "the dismantling o f conceptual oppositions, the
taking apart of hierarchical system s of thought which can be
reinscribed within a different order o f textual signification" (p. 19).
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To deconstruct is to play the "reversal of hierarchies" in the
texts; it is ever incom plete.
"overturning"

and

There is a double movement--

"metaphorization"—involved

(Derrida, 1981a, pp. 6-10).

with

deconstruction

Deconstruction, on the one hand, is to

overturn hierarchical binary oppositions within texts, as Derrida
(1981a)

remarks:
We are not dealing with the peaceful coexistence of a
v i s - d - v i s , but rather with a violent hierarchy. One of
the two terms governs the other (axiologically,
logically, etc.), or has the upper hand. To deconstruct
the oppositions, first o f all, is to overturn the hierarchy
at a given moment (p. 41).

On the other hand, deconstruction im m ediately proceeds to the
next step to avoid the trap; warns Derrida (1981a), "the hierarchy o f
dual oppositions always reestablishes itself" (p. 42).

The point o f the

second stage is to keep process from degrading into structure.
process is involved with "reinscription" of writing.

This

Derrida reminds

us that there is a “perpetual double movement w i t h i n

the

oppositions so that the positively-valued term (e.g., 'civilization') is
defined only by contrast to the negatively-valued term (e.g.,
'barbarism') which continually threatens the former's sovereignty”
(Norris, 1987, p. 34).

In other words, separate, individual terms give

way to “a process where opposites merge in a constant undecidable
exchanges of attributes" (Norris, 1987, p. 35).

It is this process of

undecidability that underlies the m ovem ent o f m etaphorization with
its mutual crossings and im plications, making it a means o f textual
"transportation" by which the writer is carried along.

For Derrida,

any attempt to reduce deconstruction to "a concept in terms of
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method or technique," which is precisely deconstruction at work,
represents an arrest o f deconstruction (Norris, 1987, pp. 18-27).
Derrida insists that it is necessary to dismantle system s, to
analyze structures in order to view their processes, both when
system s work and when they do not, why structures do not manage
to close them selves off, and so forth.

He starts from the position that

our traditional ways o f thinking are structure-based and are
therefore incapable of revealing the nomadic and often paradoxical
character o f movement or process.

Derrida's project in

deconstruction is to reveal the am bivalences, self-contradictions and
"double binds" that lie latent in any text.
operation of deconstruction.

The text is the field of

For him, "deconstruction" is not at all

the first or the last word, and certainly not a password or slogan for
everything that is to follow (Derrida, 1981a, 1985).

This double bind

m ovement within the text, insists Derrida, is necessarily inevitable.
What is included and what is excluded are not only chosen by
chance.

Deconstruction is an event that does not await the

deliberation, or organization of a subject.

"It deconstructs it-self.

It

can be deconstructed. [£a se deconstruit.] The 'it' [Qa] is not here an
impersonal thing that is opposed to som e egological subjectivity"
(Derrida, 1988, p. 4).

Furthermore, deconstruction is in

deconstruction, is to lose its construction, is to deconstruct itself.
The difference, we recall from chapter one, in terms of
structuralist's
su b ject/ob ject,

binary

o p p o sitio n s--sig n ifie d /sig n ifier ,

nature/culture,

sp eech /w riting,

p resen ce/a b sen ce,

in telligib le/sen sib le, etc.--en tails the question o f "supplement," which
undermines the Western logocentric and m etaphysical thinking.

7 1
Logocentrism assumes the priority of the first term and regards the
second in relation to it, as a "complication," a negation, a supplement.
The notion o f supplement, insisted Derrida (1978, 1981a), is "always
already" present and, in fact, allow s the privileged term to be
constituted; in other words, it im plies that there is no origin and
nothing exists until it is supplemented (Crowley, 1989; H ayles, 1990).
In order to demonstrate the notion o f difference, undecidable,
and double-bind, Derrida uses "differance" to illustrate what the
interplay or "trace" o f presence and absence is and what those
"differing" and "deferring" traces are.
a displacem ent without reversal.

In short, "differance" suggests

Derrida (1976) notes:

There is no essence o f differance', it is that which not
only could never be appropriated in the as such of its
name or its appearing, but also that which threatens
the authority of the as such in general, o f the
presence o f the thing itself in its essence. That there is
not a proper essence o f differance at this point,
im plies that there is neither a Being nor truth o f the
play of writing such as it engages differance. (pp. 2526)
Derrida's main goal is to deconstruct the m etaphysics of
presence, m ainly H usserl's transcendental phenom enology and
Heidegger’s the truth o f Being.

In doing so, he calls for a "writing," a

new concept of writing which he terms "grammatology" (theory of
writing), which would undo its heretofore silent role in history.
Furthermore, to give a voice to writing, as it were, would be to undo
history itself.
that:

Such a m ove cannot (yet) be thought.

Derrida insists
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A science o f writing runs the risk of never being
established as such and with that name. Of never
being able to define the unity o f its project or its
object. O f not being able either to write its discourse
on method or to describe the limits of its field, (cited
in Crowley, 1989, p. 17)
The concept or "non-concept" of "differance" is the main theme
o f Derrida's entire project.

In Margins o f P hilosophy (1982), Derrida

devotes one chapter to explicate "differance" through Freud's analogy
o f the unconscious with "Mystic Pad"; it can be said as erasure of
erasures, trace of traces.
sort

o f m ethodological

notion that meaning
origin.

The notion o f "always already" is Derrida's
strategy to im ply, then to undermine, the

is fixed; or, in other words, that there is an

In fact, Derrida argues, the very idea of origin is an illusion.

As Katheleen Hayles (1990) has shown us, d ifferan ce :
[A ck n o w led g es a before and after—that is, a
constituting d ifferen ce—but defers ind efinitely the
moment when the split occurred. N o matter how far
back we go into signification, we never come upon the
originary difference that could act as ground for the
chain o f signifiers. (p. 179)

G illes Deleuze: Difference and Sense
The concept o f "difference" has been interpreted and
reinterpreted by many scholars, post-structuralists in particular.
Post-structuralists' contention is to denounce the Platonistic concept
o f presupposed resem blance, sim ilitude and identity.

Rather, they

advocate a celebration o f "difference" and "aconceptual concept" or
"non-concept" that undermines the certainties of Western rationality
(D eleuze, 1990).

In Deleuze's view , it is through the play of

"difference"—as the only alternative to a deadlocked dialectical
tradition (to reason itself) as reason tries in vain to overcome its
oppositional nature—at the origin o f values—that new light can be
cast on a way of life.

Pecora (1982), commenting on Deleuze, states

that "the history of reason in the W est becom es, not the dialectic of
pure conception, or pure representation, with an objective 'reality,'
but instead the dialectic o f reason a s power" (p. 46).
D eleuze's (1983a) philosophy o f difference is interrelated to
Nietzsche's notion o f an "affirmation o f affirmation" and can be
briefly put as "only difference(s) can resemble each other."
contrasted to "only that which resem bles differs" (p. 74).

It is
There are

two ways o f making difference: says D eleuze, affirmative and
negative.

He insists that it is not the reproduction o f the same, but

rather the repetition of the different which is important.
(1988) succinctly puts it:

D eleuze

"Resemblance then can only be thought as

the product of this internal difference" (pp. 262-263).

This internal

difference is exactly where the world o f simulacra are built.

The

simulacrum is regarded as the copy o f a copy, in terms of Rousseau's
model and copy (see Derrida, 1981a, p. 86; 1981b, pp. 206-207).
D eleuze’s philosophical thought adopts Nietzsche's notion of
relation between knowledge and life.

In N ietzsche and Philosophy

(1983a), D eleuze insists that N ietzsche puts knowledge into action,
not as itself an end, but as a simple means of serving life.

And he

warns us that "the opposition between knowledge and life and the
operation which knowledge makes itself judge of life are symptoms,
only symptoms" (p. 96).

Furthermore, he avers that "knowledge is

opposed to life, but because it expresses a life which contradicts life,
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a reactive life which finds in knowledge a means of preserving and
glorifying its type" (p. 100).

When thought is subjected to

know ledge, know ledge becom ing the legislator, D eleuze remarks that
"knowledge is thought itself, but thought subject to reason and to all
that is expressed in reason" (p. 101).
In his interpretation o f reason, D eleuze (1983a) depicts "reason,"
follow ing Kant’s definition, as "the faculty o f organizing indirect,
oblique means," contrary to culture (p. 99); doubtless the original
means react on the ends and transform them, but in the last analysis
the ends are always those of nature.

Reason, states D eleuze,

som etim es dissuades and som etim es forbids us to cross a certain
lim it or boundary.

Because to do so is useless, would be evil, and is

im possible—there is nothing to see or think behind the truth.

He

questions the notion by asking, "Does not critique, understood as
critique of knowledge itself, express new forces capable of giving
thought another sense? A thought that would go to the lim it o f what
life can do, a thought that would lead life to the limit of what it can
do?" (D eleuze, 1983a, p. 101).

Deleuze agrees with the Stoic saying

that reason is a body which enters, and spreads itself over, an animal
body.
W hile w elcom ing structuralist's dethroning the subject or
attacking on the c o g it o , D eleuze questions the status o f impersonal
structures that confine subjectivity.
structural m odel—Saussurean

analysis

He thoroughly problem atizes the
o f lin guistic

stru ctu re-

through a theory which em phasizes "singular points," "planes of
consistence," "nomadic distributions," and his philosophy of
difference.

D eleuze (1990) argues that structuralist approaches may

75
have no essential point in common other than "sense," regarded not
at all as appearance but as "surface effect" and "position effect," and
produced by the circulation o f the "empty square" in the structural
series (the place of the dummy, the place of the king, the blind spot,
the floating signifier, the value degree zero, the absent cause, etc.).
D eleu ze (1990) remarks:
Structure is in fact a machine for the production o f
incorporeal sense (S k i n d a p s o s ). But when
structuralism shows in this manner that sense is
produced by nonsense and its perpetual displacem ent,
and that it is born o f the respective position of
elem ents which are not them selves “sign ifying,” we
should not at all compare it with what was called the
philosophy o f the absurd, nonsense is what is opposed
to sense in a simple relation with it, so that the absurd
is always defined by a deficiency o f sense and a lack
[there is not enough o f it], (p. 71)
Follow ing D eleuze, we can see not only that nonsense "makes"
sense, this sense being precisely that it has none, but more
importantly that the relation between sense and nonsense should not
be based on a relation of exclusion.

Rather, suggests Deleuze (1990),

it should be considered "an original type o f intrinsic relation, a mode
o f co-presence" (p. 68).

It is an orientation that is not simply an

alternative but a possible com plem ent, conjugation or coexistent
in tera ctio n .
U nlike many deconstructionists, D eleuze's notion o f meaning
(sense) can be expressed in a sentence, but that meaning can only be
designated in a second sentence, whose meaning must be designated
in a third, and so on.

This paradox of indefinite regression attests to

the weakness o f the speaker, but "the impotence o f the empirical

consciousness is here like the 'nth' power of language, and its
transcendental repetition, the infinite power o f language to speaks of
words themselves" (Bogue, 1989, p. 64).

In Deleuze's view s, meaning

is a s i m u l a c r u m , a paradoxical, contradictory entity that defines
common sense.

Roland Bogue (1989) elaborates on it as follow ing:

It is always expressed in language, but it can only be
designated by initiating a process of infinite
regression. It seem s to inhere [subsist] in language,
but to appear in things, (p. 73)
The understanding o f "sense," D eleuze emphasizes, in Logic of
S e n se (1990), is that words express things, but that which is
expressed is an attribute o f things (i.e. an event).

Meaning and

events form a single surface with two sides, events only emerge
within words, but that which emerges pertains to things.

This

surface o f m eaning/events forms the surface between words and
things and functions as "the articulation of their difference" (p. 37).
In another book, Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature (1986b),
D eleuze regards Kafka as important because he invented a mode o f
w r itin g -m in o r literature --that allow us to account for the different
"machines" that condition our actual relation to the world, to the
body, to desire, and to the econom y o f life and death. This can be
portrayed through their understanding o f art.

Art, in modern sense,

D eleuze and Guattari (1987a) perceive, is no longer an art that
proposes to "express" (a meaning), to "represent" (a thing, a being), or
to "imitate" (a nature).

Reda Bensmai'a (1986) notes:

It is rather a method (o f w riting)--of picking up, even
o f stealing: Of “double stealing” as Deleuze sometimes
says, which is both “stealing” and “stealing away”—that
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consists in propelling the most diverse contents on the
basis o f (nonsignifying) ruptures and intertwinings o f
the most heterogeneous orders o f signs and powers, (p.
x v ii)
The notion of "becoming" is a pivotal point for Deleuze's (1987b)
philosophical thinking; for him, in becoming there is no past nor
future—not even present, there is no history.
matter o f "involuting" (p. 29).

This means that it is a

It is neither progression nor

regression; to become is to becom e more and more restrained, more
and more sim ple, more and more deserted and for that very reason
populated.

D eleuze (1987b) explains:

This is what's difficult to explain: to what extent one
should involute. It is obviously the opposite of
evolution, but it is also the opposite of regression,
returning to a childhood or to a primitive world. To
involute is to have an increasingly sim ple, econom ical,
restrained step. (p. 29)
To become is to reach a process whose synthetic principle is
"complication," which "designates both the presence o f the multiple
in the One and o f the One in the multiple" (Deleuze, 1972, p. 44).

To

com plicate the sign and the meaning is revealed in essence, not
created by essence.

D eleuze (1987a) remarks:

M ultiplicities are

made up of "becomings" without history, of "individuation without
subject" (pp. 239-254).

D eleu ze thus embraces Nietzschean

perspectivism and aestheticism , arguing that all thought presupposes
evaluation and interpretation, and that truth is created rather than
d isc o v e r e d .
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Jean-Franyois Lyotard: D i f f e r e n d . Metanarrative and the Post
m o d e rn
Jean-Frangois Lyotard is the most obvious advocate of post
modernity among post-structuralists.

His The Postmodern

Condition:

A Report on K nowledge (1984b) is one o f the best representatives of
the literature about the postmodern condition.

He defines, in a

sim ple term, the condition o f postmodern as distrust toward "meta
narrative."

According to Lyotard, the postmodern condition is

characterized by the m ultiplicity o f "little narratives."

He argues that

the master narrative (meta-narrative) has lost its credibility,
regardless o f whether it is a scientific or a non-scientific narrative.
He sees that the decline o f the unifying and legitim ating power of the
grand narratives o f speculation and emancipation as an effect o f the
advancement o f technologies, which has changed emphasis from the
ends o f action to its means.

Madan Sarup (1989) asserts, follow ing

Lyotard's argument, that the attention from ends o f action to its
m eans, from truth to "perfomativity," is reflected in contemporary
educational policy (p. 124).
M odernity, writes Lyotard (1988), is "not an era in thought, but
rather a m o d e of thought, of utterance, of sensibility" (p. 314).

The

challenge o f postmodernity to the modern one lies precisely in its
power to upset the form, content, and cultural representation of
know ledge.

N ot only are the distribution, organization, and the

presentation o f know ledge reified and naturalized, but know ledge
itself is prescribed as something that exists transhistorically and
outside o f human praxis.

Fredric Jameson (1981) has observed that
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the great meta-narratives may have passed underground, and still
be affecting us unconsciously.

He insists that "the political

unconscious" expresses itse lf in the persistence to undermine master
n a r r a tiv e s.
Lyotard (1988) has remarked that "to judge is to open an abyss
between parts by analyzing their d i f f t r e n d " (p. 326).

The

differends—phrases in dispute, proclaim s

Lyotard, are not like

litigations which are "disputes where all

of the conflicting parties

recognize that certain criteria obtain which allow for the adjudication
o f their disputes," rather differends are "disputes where such criteria
do not exist" (Fritzman, 1990, p. 376).

Lyotard (1988) suggests that

a reality would be describable as "the consensus of all the libidinal
regions about an intensity" (p. 62); but precisely this (the operation
o f an equilibration o f charges and investment) is the object of
Lyotard's consistent suspicion.

Such a consensus im plies the

elim ination of differential intensity on the libidinal band, and a
necessary concealm ent of the event in the construction o f a reality.
Lyotard's argument, in The Postmodern Condition (1984b), is
that a discourse bound to the truth of its referent cannot presuppose
the validity o f its own access to that truth (which would amount to
not respecting, "in dispute," the referent at all, but merely its own
internal discursive formation).

It needs to have a recourse to a

different type of

discourse to provide it with a grounding.

Lyotard (1984b)

sees the problem;

As

Scientific know ledge cannot know and make known
that it is the true knowledge without resorting to the
other, narrative, kind of know ledge, which from its
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point of view is no knowledge at all. Without such
recourse it would be in the position o f presupposing its
own validity and would be stooping to what it
condemns: begging the question, proceeding on
prejudice, (p. 29)
In analyzing the conditions of the legitim ation o f knowledge in
contemporary scien ce, Lyotard (1984b) defines postm odernism as
"incredulity toward metanarratives" (p. xxiv).

He argues that we do

not establish stable language elem ents, the relation between
narrative and know ledge, and there are many different language
games, "a heterogeneity o f elements," which only give rise to
institutions in patches, i.e. "localized knowledge" (Lyotard, 1984b, pp.
61-66; Geertz, 1992).

Lyotard (1984b) remarks:

Consensus does violence to the heterogeneity of
language games. And invention is always born of
dissension; it refines our sensitivity to differences and
reinforces our ability to tolerate the incommensurable.
Its principle is not the expert's hom ology, but the
inventor's paralogy, (p. xxv)
In other words, Lyotard's paralogy focu ses on constantly
introducing new perspectives into the discourse that disagree with
the existing ones, producing a focus upon "dissensus" rather than
c o n se n su s.

M ichel Serres: Science. Literature and Philosophy
M ichel Serres is perhaps the least known post-structuralist to
readers in American institutional academic circles (Daignault, 1989).
Serres' connection of science and literature, and his description o f the
parallel developm ent of scien tific, philosophical, and literary trends,
in my view , foresees the future direction for both the natural and
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social sciences.

He succinctly "translates" the passages between exact

science on the one hand and the human sciences on the other.

He

identifies the "evolution" o f modern know ledge through the "points
o f exchange" and the "conditions o f passage" that separate scientific
know ledge and humanistic cultivation (Serres, 1983, 1989a).
Serres' provocative thinking, especially regarding the "parasite"
or "the excluded third," is most important to rethinking our living
and lived world.

Serres' work challenges us to think otherwise.

The

parasite violates the system o f exchange by taking without returning;
it introduces an elem ent o f irreversibility and thus marks the
comm encem ent of duration, history, and social organization.
(1 9 8 2 )

Serres

states:
The parasite invents something new.
It intercepts
energy and pays for it with transformation. It
intercepts roast b eef and pays for it with stories.
These would be two ways o f writing the new contract.
The parasite establishes an agreement that is unfair, at
least in terms o f previous accounting methods; it
constructs a new balance sheet. It expresses a logic
that was considered irrational until now, it expresses a
new epistem ology, another theory o f equilibrium, (p.
51)

The appearance o f parasite elicits a strategy o f exclusion.

In the

beginning, the parasite enters as an irritable addition that it would
be best to expel.

However,

integral part o f the system .

it is the fact that the parasite is an
By exercising a perturbation and

subsequently integrating it,the system passes
more complex stage.

Harari

from a simple to a

andB ell, in their introduction to H erm es:

Literature. Science. P hilosophy (1983), note:
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By virtue o f its power to perturb, the parasite
ultimately constitutes, like the c l i n a m e n and the
demon, the condition o f po ss ibility o f the system. In
this way the parasite attests from within order the
primacy o f disorder; it produces by way o f disorder a
more com plex order, (pp. xxvi-xxvii)
Serres (1982) promotes a new comm unication as an intersection
o f social forms, and it is at those intersections of communication,
individuals realize that "order is not the norm, but the exception" (p.
85).

Such a conception of edge-breaking with conventional transitive

communication does shed light on the dynam ics o f classrooms.
Enacted in every pedagogy is the tension between the unified and
system atic know ledge as w ell as the comparative and pluralistic
epistem ology o f the journey.

Such transportation o f relationship

entails m ultiplicity o f local fragments in the space o f knowledge.
Serres also introduces a new mode o f thought—"dialogue" or
"translation"—to the effort to understand literature and science.

The

notion of dialogue, in Serres' (1983) mind, does not establish a
dialogue between two sym metrical ontologies but rather functions
"to rethink the relations between order and disorder in such a way
as to show how everything begins, ends, and begins again according
to a universal principle o f disorder" (p. 100).

To hold a dialogue is,

Serres (1983) em phasizes:
To suppose a third man and to seek to exclude him\ a
successful communication is the exclusion o f the third
man. The m ost profound dialectical problem is not the
problem o f the Other, who is only a variety o f—or a
variation—o f the Same, it is the problem of the third
man. (p. 67)
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The notions o f passage and noise have significant im plications
for curriculum studies and practices, as we shall see in the next
chapter.
dialogue.

They are entangled with the processes of translation or
On the one hand, the meaning of a passage takes shape

only against a background noise.

On the other hand, it needs to

exclude com pletely what needs to be included—background noise.
Often, teachers try to convey a m essage or transmit knowledge to
students; inevitably, there are interruptions, extractions or
something out o f the conditions o f the process, even in Lyotard's
sense of d i f f e r e n d (irresolvable contradictions), which are, perhaps,
felt and not known.

These gaps or ruptures, where no one "can

speak any longer, and w e have the irrational or the unspeakable—
the incommunicable, to be very precise" (Serres, 1983, p. 50), need to
be connected, linked, or "dialogued" by teacher and students
together.

These processes o f linkage are where pedagogy is at work,

as Daignault for instance, insists.
In Serres’ (1983) view , it is necessary for us to bring out the real
world in its multiple forms, uneven structures, and fluctuating
organizations.

He warns us:

N o, the real is not cut up into regular patterns, it is
sporadic, spaces and times with straits and passes . . .
Therefore I assume there are fluctuating tatters; I am
looking for the passage among these complicated
cuttings. I believe, I see that the state o f things
consists o f islands sown in archipelagoes on the noisy,
poorly-understood disorder o f the sea, . . . the
em ergence o f sporadic rationalities that are not
evidently nor easily linked. Passage exist, I know, I
have drawn some o f them in certain works using
certain operators. . . . But I cannot generalize,
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obstructions are m anifest and counter-exam ples
abound, (pp. 23-24)

Post-structuralism

and

Controversy

Many debates about and around "post-structuralism" have
occurred since it was introduced into various disciplines. (Graff,
1984; D ew s, 1987; Jay, 1989; May, 1989; Habermas, 1990; Watts,
1991)

Even among those people who are claimed to be

"representatives" o f this m ode o f thought (post-structuralists never
claim them selves as representatives), stresses and tensions are
evident.

I do not wish to m inim ize these substantial differences;

however, the differences among them w hile serious are much
in te r r e la te d .
B asically, debates about post-structuralism or critiques o f post
structuralist thought are abhorred by critical theorists, som e
fem inists, and neo-M arxists, for post-structuralists want to extol
everything that has been left out in the totalizing theories and
processes these groups expound.

In so doing, post-structuralists

focus on the marginal, the excluded, on the boundary or lim it itself
which thus makes totalization possible.

The question raised is how

long can a group or m ovement stress the marginal without becoming
marginal itself?

Can the theoretical subject generate a discourse that

represents the real, unmasks domination in the real, without itself
introducing new forms of domination?

Peter D ew s (1987) states that

the post-structuralist assumption that "the concept o f the subject
im plies an im m obile, self-identical, and constitutive center of
experience seriously underplays the com plexities and subtlety of the
ways in which subjectivity has been explored within the Western
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philosophical tradition" (p. xv).

In short, he questions the dissolution

o f the subject, as well as the post-structuralist suspicion o f the
concept o f truth.
Manfred Frank argues, in his book entitled What is
N e o str u c tu r a lism ? (1989), that neither hermeneutics nor
"neostructuralism"

(his replacement for post-structuralism) com e to

grips with the claims o f individuality.

He claims that human agency,

individuality, is the central issue for human conceptualization.

He

insists on the notion o f "the constitutive role o f subjectivity as the
primary factor in meaning" and o f history by asking the question:
"How can one redeem the fundamental idea o f modern humanism
which links the dignity o f the human being with his use o f freedom"
and "do justice to the fundamental fact that subjects can only form
them selves, in linguistic, social, cultural, and historical orders?"
(Frank, 1989, p. x)

Locating knowledge, meaning, or understanding

o f self and the world in a utopian project of the ultimate individual is
exactly what the post-structuralists are trying to undermine.
Post-structuralism has been criticized or charged as "nihilistic,"
"morally deficient" or "politically bankrupted" (e.g., Merquior, 1986;
Jay, 1989; Crowley, 1989).
Habermas,

1990) view

Some (Giddens, 1987; Dews, 1987;

post-structuralism , particularly

deconstruction, as a reanimation o f self-defeating relativism in the
late twentieth century.

As Martin Jay (1989) remarks, "post

structuralism is often taken to mean a valorization of im pulse, desire,
and transgression, which sanctions an ethical 'anything goes'" (p. 70).
Its political im plications or ethics without morals make many people
uncomfortable.

Anthony Giddens (1987), among others, claim s that
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structuralism and post-structuralism have failed to fu lfill their
proclamations, and warns us that they are "dead traditions of
thought" (p. 75).

A lex Callinicos (1990) embraces, from a Marxist

standpoint, Andreas H uyssen's claim that "poststructuralism is
primarily a discourse of and about modernism" (p. 69).

Not

surprisingly, Giddens and others find post-structuralism threatening,
not because it lays a claim to authority—claim ing to know what the
text means in a direct challenge to established understanding—but
because it denies the fundamental convention o f meaning as
p ro p erty .
Post-structuralism

introduces unconventional yet critical thought

into philosophical thinking by challenging the questionable tradition
o f metaphysics of presence and the age of Logocentrism in the W est.
Furthermore, as an attack on m etaphysical thought, post
structuralism has firm ly and consistently recognized the importance
of representations and the mediation of discourse in building the
social and in the formation of subjectivity.
remarks that

"arch-poststructuralist"

Paul Smith (1990)

discourse,

nam ely

deconstruction, has led to a number of severe critiques o f idealism
and m etaphysics in all their dispositions (p. 43).

Remarks
This chapter has attempted to introduce post-structuralism ,
which in the next chapter I will connect with curriculum discourses,
to shed light on a new direction for curriculum studies.

Curriculum

theory and practice have been dominated by structure-minded or
modernist approaches since World War II.

The central concerns
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have been predictability, order and system atic control, all operating
to achieve predefined goals.

Such a scheme of curriculum

developm ent brought forward m assive productivity, as w ell as
savage inequality, to the educational enterprise.

Structuralist

analyses and applications supported many adm inistrative educators
view o f schooling as a factory.

However, educational reform reports

during the 1980s echoed the ongoing discontentm ent o f students'
educational performance and achievem ent.

These proposals for

reform argued that present schooling is failing to provide essential
knowledge needed for understanding o f the problems we face (A.
Nation At Risk. 1982; Paideia Proposal. 1982; A Place Called School.
1984; Cultural Literacy. 1987; The Closing o f American M ind. 1988).
The problem is not the insufficient effort put into reform, nor the
direction toward educational "excellence" those reports advocate;
rather what is at stake is what we want to do as students, teachers,
administrators and parents, what kind o f "educated" citizens w e
expect pupils to be, and what kind of curriculum should be
communicated to each student.

An advance in intellectuality is not a

fulfillm ent o f the wish to know but of the wish to think.

Post

structuralist thought may help us rethink the conventional categories
regarding education and provide us with a critical perspective
uncovering the underlying "structure" o f educational reality.

Lyotard

(1990) describes "the desire o f the W est as a wish to know, and the
wish to know as an avoidance of responsibility, as a flirtation with
the known in which the knowing subject 'never gets his fingers
burned'" (p. 99).

In a world o f pluralistic perspectives, traditional

W estern standards are deplorable from certain vantage points and
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parochial from others; the need to include or explore the silenced
v o ice s—in terms of class, gender, and race/ethnicity issues in
curriculum —is inevitable toward understanding the world we all liv e
in and the ways we are.
Post-structuralism declares meaning to be the property o f one
and each one, it restores to the text its own authority as an endless
system and event; textuality constitutes texts in the form o f history.
Post-structuralism continues to be reexamined and debated; at the
same time, it challenges us to rethink our present condition.

Our

sense o f past and future must necessarily be constructions of present
discursive formation and the epistem e o f modern era.

The conditions

o f possibility and im possibility are illuminated.
Chapter three w ill focus on contemporary curriculum discourses.
W e w ill explore the possibility that post-structuralism can shed light
on curriculum studies, in part by an analysis of the prevailing
structuralism in present curriculum

studies.

CHAPTER THREE
PO ST -STR U C TU R A LISM IN C U R R IC U LU M STUDIES:
B E G IN N IN G S
The embodiment of knowledge and knowing in the
human se lf led--for som e—to autobiography, an
interest in telling stories of life history in order to
reconceive the relation o f self to knowing, a relation at
the center o f curriculum understood as 'currere,' the
running of the course. (Pinar and Grumet, 1976, p. 53)
To be
would
which
would
1986c,

C o n te m p o r a r y

sure, children don't live as our adult memories
have us believe, nor as their own memories,
are alm ost simultaneous with their actions,
have them believe. (D e le u z e and Guattari,
p. 79)

C u r r ic u lu m

D isc o u r se

The historical developm ent o f the field of curriculum studies has
been ideological and full o f conflict (e.g., Franklin, 1986; Kliebard,
1986; Kridel, 1989; Tanner and Tanner, 1990).

Many stories have

been told, stories of and about developing and organizing the
curriculum field, by various scholars from their own interests and
ideologies (Pinar, 1988b, 1992).

Cleo Cherryholmes (1988) asserts

that curriculum history is:
marked by repeated turmoil and conflict, because it is
always possible to question its purposes, beliefs,
values, assum ptions, metaphors, and orientations that
fix its purpose and meaning, (p. 131)
Curriculum discourses have emerged from various and diverse
disciplinary approaches and m ethodological orientations.

89

Historical
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awareness might release us from the prisons of our current
conventions

o f understanding.

At present, traditionally, the problems of curriculum have been
uneasy and com plex ones, their conceptualization has been based
upon scientific efficien cy, technical rationality, predictability, order
and control (e.g., Cherryholmes, 1988; Lather, 1991; Doll, in press).
The issue at stake is that the concepts o f predictability and control
are enhanced by a determ inistic, technocratic and scientific
"structural"

approach—im plying p r o c e d u r a l neu trality.

The

closedness o f this approach deprives pedagogy o f meaning and
fragments the processes o f teaching and learning.

The concept of

know ledge has been lim ited to certain discrete inform ation-givens
and memorizations; it is based upon complementary conceptual
m odels, such as Tyler's rationale and Bloom's taxonomy advocate.
Since 1969, when Schwab announced that the curriculum field was
"moribund," there have been diverse yet significant shifts and
m ovem ents towards the rethinking o f curriculum (Huebner, 1976).
Many curricularists, such as M ichael Apple (1979, 1986), Elliot Eisner
(1979, 1991), W illiam Pinar (1975, 1988b), Henry Giroux (1981,
1989), Herbert Kliebard (1986, 1992), Jacques Daignault (1984,
1992), Ted Aoki (1983, 1990a), to list but a few , continuously strive
to reconceptualize curriculum field.

These scholars contribute

intriguing theses to the curriculum field and provide new "meaning,"
substantial arguments, and different approaches to the field.
W illiam Pinar remarks, in Contemporary

As

Curriculum D iscourses

(1988b), the "reconceptualization" of the curriculum field has
occurred and continues to proceed.

It is on the shifting grounds of
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transforming know ledge that curriculum

undergoes dramatic

alterations in its representations o f socio/historical production.
N ew possibilities in curriculum thought, such as poststructuralism, im plicitly suggest even deeper senses of what the
nature o f curriculum might be, and provide us with ways of asking
pertinent questions about the very purpose of curriculum studies.

In

education, particularly curriculum, post-structural criticism and
analysis challenge the prevailing structuralist approaches and
question the fundamental assum ptions upon which these approaches
rest (e.g., Daignault, 1984; W exler, 1987; Cherryholmes, 1988; Pinar,
1988a, 1992; D oll, 1991; W hitson, 1991).

A key assumption of

structural approaches is that all phenomena are constituted by an
underlying, organizing and originating structure, an assumption o f
the Tyler rationale and B loom ’s taxonomy (Daignault, 1986;
Cherryholmes, 1988; Pinar, 1988a; Lather, 1991).

To understand this

underlying structure is to understand the scientific-technocratic
tradition.

These structural assumptions, often scientific in principle,

remain unproblematical and thus imm unized against criticism ;
rather, they are incorporated into preferred structural analyses,
interpretations, and organizations promoted by the promise of o r d e r
and r a t i o n a l i ty .

The notion of "rationality"—scientific or instrumental

in essen ce—has been the dominating force o f curricular planning and
developm ent for several decades.

The problem is not only that

reason (or scientific observation) has turned into domination, but
that we do not fully recognize its domination and exclusion.

Not only

has post-structuralism given us a new theoretical approach for
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transforming curriculum phenomena, it also show s us new ways of
being, thinking and doing.

Post-structuralism

and

Curriculum

Post-structuralism has had a growing impact on critical
curriculum studies (e.g., W exler, 1987; Cherryholmes, 1988; Lather,
1991; Pinar and R eynolds, 1992).

Post-structuralism provides

curricularists with new m odes of thinking.

Foucault offers a kind of

thinking o f "threshold," "boundary," "transgression," or "rupture,"
which means to think the conditions o f the possibility which are
unrepresentable; in other words, to think through the unthinkable or
what is unthought.

Derrida (1976) challenges us to subvert and

destabilize where w e are and what we do.

This attitude can be

described and comprehended as deconstruction o f texts, im plied in
his well-known phrase:

"There is nothing outside the text" (p. 227).

The separation o f "world" and "consciousness," embodied in the form
o f hermeneutics, leads to the crippling dehistoricization o f both the
subject and the world.
and subjects.

This leads to the destabilization o f structures

The process of destabilization is crucial to the post-

structuralist project.
characterized by

In curriculum, the destabilization is

provocative questions—raised by the students and

the teacher—that m ove from exhausted predestinations to the
unanticipated.

It is opened during times o f spontaneity,

im provisation, interpretive risks, crises, when one reflects upon
taken-for-granted ways o f knowing.

Contrary to totalizing critical

theory, it m oves away from the grand dream o f interpretive
mastery, the desire to gain control and to stabilize.

Instead, it leads
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to localization, particularity, and non-discursive formation.
Therefore, any "meta-narrative" is under suspicion and thus rejected
(Lyotard, 1984b, p. xxiv).
Let us recall related post-structuralist analysis and criticism .
Foucault attempts to discern how the paradoxes of "excess" and "lack"
presented in exegetical hermeneutics follow s from a notion of
signification still linked to the dialectical play o f "signifier" and
"signified"—such as structural binary oppositions.

The

"commentator" is unable to m ove out of this space of signification
into the exterior fact o f the "historical appearances o f discourses,"
because his/her own humanism is caught up in the autonomy o f this
mode of signification.

This sense o f autonomy has been already

produced, sanctioned and valorized by the humanism that gives
status as "meaning-maker."

In m oving away from such a critical

posture, Foucault identifies his mode o f analysis as directed to the
discovery o f "discursive structures," and in identifying the rules of
objectification that make these structures possible.
Derrida presents us a shifting and, at times, distorted image of
the world, and thus breaks the m olds, conventions, and routine
patterns which fossilize both our world and ourselves.

It is up to us,

the reader, to decipher what he tells us about our world; what he
brings to light through metaphors and sim iles, or through
contradictions and absurdities; and what he tells us about the
possibilities of changing our world as w ell as changing ourselves.

He

makes it inevitable for us to question our own assumptions, and thus
com e to a better understanding o f our own beliefs.

However, this is

but one approach to Derrida's te.w., one among many, for there are
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"as many images of the object as eyes to contemplate it, as many
im ages o f essence as minds to understand it" (Herbert, 1964, p. 13).
As beliefs in long-standing traditions o f understanding and objective
knowledge fall apart, the critical issues of curriculum stand to be
tra n sfo rm ed .
Derrida also begins his "Exergue," in O f Gramm atologv (1976), by
focusing the reader's attention on the "ethnocentrism which,
everywhere and alw ays, has controlled the concept o f writing" (p.
64).

Although the Newtonian positivist theories and traditional

science, m ostly concerned with closed system s and linear
relationships, were challenged by developm ents in areas such as
relativity, non-Euclidian geometry or quantum theory, the domain o f
the humanities appeared much slow er in accepting "those aspects of
reality which seem to characterize today's social changes:

Disorder,

instability, disequilibrium, nonlinear relationships . . . and
temporality" (Prigogine, 1984, pp. xiv-xv).

If w e accept instability, if

w e seek to remain "[open]

to surprise, puzzlement, confusion," in

order to function efficiently

in "chaos," a whole new set of skills is

needed, based as much on the non-rational as on the rational (Schon,
1983, p. 66).
Like post-structuralists' attention to "difference," critical
curriculum scholars and educators raise the issues of diversity,
exclusion, and marginalization.
of what each person wants
social construction.

N ot only

D ifferences are not merely a matter

to believe.

Furthermore, meaning is a

is each individual's perspective

informed by interaction with others, but such also reflects the
perspectives o f an individual's broader historical and sociocultural
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understandings.
in-the-world.

In such a way each person constructs one's beingHence, finding many voices and creating more spaces

within curriculum understandings, in terms of Bakhtin's
"heteroglossia," is crucial to curriculum discourse (W hitson, 1988;
M iller, 1990).

Therefore, curricular meanings are embodied in the

com plexity of classroom life and the m ultiplicity o f identities elicited
by the discourses.
However, the goal is not just to silence another voice and replace
it, nor to integrate it into a "universal" voice.

Instead every voice

stands on its own and speaks for itself; more importantly, it is to
"translate" voices into one another.

Here is pedagogy at work.

Pedagogy refuses to achieve the sublimation of oppositions, but
instead exhibits the process and thereby makes sense, or "translates,"
as M ichel Serres (1983) would say.

Harari and B ell (1983) explain

Serres' project as the follow ing:
To translate the several voices o f the “language” o f the
world's disorder into different languages, to translate
one language into another, to pass from one
vocabulary to another, and thus to establish a worldencom passing network of comm unication, (p. xxiv)
And, as the teacher is asked for answers to educational
problems, teaching is pressed into developing a more differentiated
and expanded vocabulary.

A plurality o f voices searches for the

right to reality—to be accepted as legitim ate expressions o f the true
and the good.

The point is not how to keep up with an incessant flow

o f passing voices, but rather how to sustain a valued h eritageunderstanding of difference itself.
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K now ledge and Curriculum
This shift away from the traditional use of writing and books has
strong im plications for instructional methods, especially if we
consider the particular status and function within which language
has been vested throughout the history of formal schooling.
Education has often appeared as a powerful device for control.

Its

aim has traditionally been to "reproduce the dominant values of
society and to legitim ize the authority of the State" and the class
structure.

It has been accused of being an "instrument o f class

power" (Anyon, 1979, pp. 317, 341).

Derrida's "step beyond" may be

applied to curriculum, encouraging educators to go "beneath"
conventional pedagogy and to devise new approaches better fit for
an era o f informationalism (Poster, 1990).

The responsibility is the

teacher's to understand the system o f transmission o f ideas between
and among students and teachers.

At issue here are the modes of

transmission of ideas, of instructional m odes in post-structuralist
epistem ology, and o f the teacher as model and authority keeper and
perpetrator o f the "truth."

Our educational curricula are mostly

controlled by those who know; the educational system operates to
sustain the existing structure o f power.
In A pplied

G ram m atology (1985), Ulmer suggests that "the

problem of the 'preface', discussed by Derrida in 'Outworks,' is
identical with the problem of pedagogy in general" (p. 161).

It is a

problem o f comm unication between the supposed keeper of
know ledge (teacher) and those who believe they are to learn from
him/her (students), thus becoming the teacher's "disciples."

Ulmer

draws a parallel between the position of the teacher as a text's
preface, each of whom "knows" the text, and o f the students and
readers, who depend on the former to be introduced to that
know ledge.

Derrida's (1982) comments apply the preface directly to

the relation between students and teacher:

"To seek to know before

we know is as absurd as the w ise resolution o f Scholastics, not to
venture into the water until he had learned to swim" (p. 47).

It also

underlines the roles o f dialectic and rhetoric, and the fact that
pedagogical exposition, just like every reading, adds something to
what it transmits, a "supplement."

Derrida (1981a) notes:

Grammatology must deconstruct everything that ties
the concept and norms o f scientificity to ontological,
logocentrism , phonologism . This is an immense and
interminable work that must ceaselessly avoid letting
the transgression of the classical project o f science fall
back into a prescientific em piricism . This presupposes
a kind o f double register in grammatological practice:
[I]t must sim ultaneously go beyond m etaphysical
positivism and scientism , and accentuate whatever in
the effective work o f science contributes to freeing it
o f the metaphysical bounds that have borne on its
definition and its m ovem ent since its beginnings, (pp.
3 5 -3 6 )
K nowledge, Sharon Crowley insists in her A Teacher's
Introduction to D econstruction (1989), is necessarily contextualized:
that is, "no object o f perception can be altogether known when it is
studied in isolation from the system that gives its meaning, from
other objects that are both related to it and different from it, both in
space and time" (p. 11).

Knowledge is also interrelated with the

constitution of power relations.

Power and knowledge, according to

Foucault (1980), are fused in the education practices that comprise
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history and that discourses partake of power, not know ledge alone.
The issue is the relationship between claim s to truth and the
distribution o f power in discourse.

Foucault (1980) insists that "we

are subjected to the production of truth through power and we
cannot exercise power except through the production o f truth" (p.
93).

Cherryholmes (1988) argues, from Foucault, that knowledge

exists in relation to the constitutive interests that lead to its
production.

K nowledge, W exler (1987) remarks, which is "elusive,

associational, and com p lexly connotative enables the fragmented
decentered subject to push forward, interiority, toward realizing a
residual desire for integration" (p. 103).

Objective knowledge,

accumulated throughout a given time, is dependent upon a particular
perspective, in terms o f Kuhn's (1970) "paradigm."

What counts as

objective truth is not the result of rationally subjecting hypotheses to
empirical test, but emerges from a network o f social agreements, a
network o f power relations.
Compounding the problem of delay between em ergence of
knowledge and access to that knowledge in a pedagogical setting are
the traditionally conservative characteristics o f the educational
system.

Derrida (1978) believes that the practice of education

should catch up with contemporary epistem ology, and that the
epistem ic breaks o f grammatology aim to help pedagogy do just that.
These breaks challenge the dominant epistem e and offer the
possibility o f displacing that episteme.

One o f post-structuralism's

central subjects is an interrogation o f the production o f knowledge as
a com plex contextual activity.

Curriculum should not be a matter o f

replacing one "poor" with another "superior" knowledge.

Curriculum
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should be a dialogue, in which all sub-discourses may benefit from
the discourses of their neighbors.

As Grisoni (1976) remarks:

"Every

university puts language in this position of delay or derivation in
relation to meaning or truth" (P. 62).

In other words, knowledge is

contextual and relational.

Curriculum Praxis
Tony W hitson, in "Post-structuralist Pedagogy as Counterhegem onic Praxis" (1991), insists that "post-structuralist principles
are needed now for an effective counter-hegem onic praxis" (p. 78).
However, warns Whitson (1991), there is a danger of being simply an
oppositional discourse, therefore, reintegrated into a hegem onically
dominated social order.

He explains:

The distinctive character o f hegemony as a mode of
dom ination achieved precisely through the structural
articulation o f diverse interests, which functions partly
by incorporating oppositional interests into articulated
structuring (or m eaningful “jointing together”) of
disparate elem ents within hegem onic order itself, (pp.
7 9 -8 0 )
Thus hegemony, argues W hitson (1991), can be seen to "operate
through articulation o f conflicting elem ents by putting opposition
into a supportive place within the structure" (p. 80).

This can be

achieved through deconstruction to shake up or dismantle the
structure.

However, the reversal o f the hierarchy

(dom inant/marginal or oppressor/oppressed) is neither an exchange
o f position, nor a sublation o f contradiction into som e superior entity.
It is in the ways in which teachers and students interact with
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know ledge and the m eanings produced by such interactions which
reveal something about what actually happens to school knowledge
when it is acted upon.

Traditional (the Enlightenment) epistem ology

which defines know ledge in terms o f absolute truths that are
acquired by individual autonom ous subjects recedes from view .
Foucault situates all discourse on the surface of a
pow er/know ledge relation and treats discourse as a form o f action,
as a movement within a field of forces.

The question of the origin or

foundation (or lack of) o f discourse seems to have little relevance
when the principal questions being asked of discourse are how it
performs and what its effects are.

Instead Foucault is interested in

exploring the different discursive formations o f know ledge and how
these discourses have been deployed at different historical periods.
Each discourse represents a different deploym ent o f know ledge and
p o w er.

Reading and Curriculum
Reading is always involved with interpretation and rereading.
In deconstructive terms, reading is "rewriting" the text and of
ourselves (Lyotard, 1987; Crowley, 1988; Scholes, 1990).

Roland

Barthes' definition o f reading is suggested:
W e never stop adding to the “Search,” we never stop
writing it. And no doubt that is what reading is:
rewriting the text of the work within the text of our
lives, (cited in Scholes, 1990, p. 10)
Here, we can understand that reading is rewriting.

Reading

means not simply literal translation of sym bols, nor the destructive.
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On the contrary, it is through such a reading, as Sharon Crowley
(1989) puts it, looking for "places in the text where a writer's
language m is-speaks her, where she loses control o f her intention,
where she says what she did not 'mean' to say" (p. 7).

What is

present (said) is always "implied" in what is absent (not said).

As

Paul Ricoeur (1974) remarks, "what is gain from one point of view is
loss from the other" (p. 291).

A lso reading in such a way is neither

"author-centered" nor "reader-centered," but centered in terms of
hermeneutic understanding and Derrida's "protocols o f reading"
(Derrida, 1981a, p. 63; Scholes, 1990).

Rewriting means to write

what we have read, in a sense o f "creativity," not sim ply text upon
text or going back to the origin.

Rewriting is also a "working

through," argues Lyotard (1987), "a task o f thinking the meanings or
events that are hidden not only in prejudices, but also projects,
programs, prospects and the like, that are concealed even in the
propositions or purposes o f a psychoanalysis" (p. 4).

D eleuze (1983b)

in sists:
Reading a text is never a scholarly exercise in search
o f what is signified, still less a highly textual exercise
in search of a signifier. Rather, it is a productive use
o f the literary machine, a montage of desiring
machines, a schizoid exercise that extracts from the
text its revolutionary force, (p. 47)
Reading curriculum can be understood as working through its
interweaving "textuality" (Scholes, 1985; W hitson, 1991).

Curriculum

practices, mainly in bureaucratic organizations, were organized and
structured via scientific rationality.

The objective o f scientific

rationality is to gain control and mastery over the physical and social
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environment.

Scientific rationality focuses on means but not on ends.

Instrumental reason can not help us to live our lives.

Foucault

(1989) reiterates this by saying that science uncovers the m ythology
in the world; but science itself is a myth which has to be superseded.
As noted earlier, "scientific knowledge has brought about a
disenchantment with the world" (Sarup, 1989, p. 76).

What is

important about this one-dim ensionalizing, or desocializing of
kn ow led ge--instru m en tal/techn ical

ration ality--is

that

it

displays

how the redefinition o f know ledge is mediated institutionally
between m icro-classroom production and macro-integration o f social
regulation and interlocking networks of discipline and control.
Philip W exler (1987) points out that structuralism view s the
curriculum as a set of rules or sym bolic practices, and structuralism
avoids "reducing knowledge to a static representation o f social
process" (p. 108).

However, he argues that the centering o f the sign

o f structuralism "returns language to being rather than signifying.
Centering stabilizes the structure, allow ing its predictive
generalizability" (W exler, 1987, p. 137).

In view o f school knowledge

and its meaning, W exler sees that the presence o f some foundational
essence becomes the target o f deconstruction.
theory of meaning.

Deconstruction is not a

N evertheless, Derrida is much concerned about

meaning; his claim about meaning is to present a conception of
meaning where the conditions of possibility for meaning are to be
found in iteration rather than contextualization.

Deconstruction

always involves both a reversal and an intervention.

It does so not

by passing from one concept to another, but by overturning the
conceptual and nonconceptual order which is undecidable.

The

103
undecidability of a word or utterance has a twofold meaning of
presence and absence alw ays at play within any specific determinate
sig n ification .

P ro b lem a tics
In the structural analysis of curriculum, questions often com e in
pairs, im plying binary opposition, contradiction, and tension.
Exam ples of binary distinctions that structure curriculum include
theory/practice,

fact/valu e,

c o g n itiv e /a ffe ctiv e ,

m ethod/m anner,

prescrip tion /d escrip tion ,

teaching/learning,

action /th in king,

centered learning/learner-centered learning, etc,.

subject-

Som etim es, these

distinctions are either dism issed as unproblematical or sim ply takenfor-granted.

In addition, they are individualized into a problem of

am bivalence,

not regarded as a structurally induced dilemma.

Foucault (1986b)

remarks "perhaps our life is still

As

governed by a

certain number o f oppositions that remain inviolable, that our
institutions and practices have not yet dared to break down.
are oppositions that we regard as simple givens" (p. 23).

These

All o f which

are, according to Daignault (1984), necessarily embedded in the
problematical relation between "what is"--what is described and
"what ought to be"—what is prescribed (pp. 6-14).
elsew h ere

Daignault (1982a)

remarks:

The curriculum field is full of many competing
definitions or ideas, each one proclaiming to be the
best one (what ought to be). . . and finally it decided to
look
for consensus or to accept relativism because no
agreement seem s possible, (p. 178)
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However, to address these problematics is not to achieve the
sublimation or Hegelian "aufhebung" o f these oppositions; instead it
is to identify and to create (in terms o f transgression) rather than to
resolve.

Cherryholmes (1988) claim s that the strategic approach of

critical discourse is not "turning the search for truth into a conflict or
competition. . . . The pursuit o f the best argument is what is sought"
(p. 89).

An example of the subversion o f structural dichotom ies

within curriculum is the work of M adeleine Grumet (1988), Philip
W exler (1987), and James A. Whitson (1991).

Grumet studies

extensively the relation and constitution o f private and public
knowledge; W exler (1987) analyzes the polem ics between
technological know ledge and cultural formation; W hitson (1991)
argues for truly "counter-hegemonic" pedagogy to enable us to
disrupt the structure —"hegemonic order" itself (p. 80).

My intention

here is to engage in problematization itself and to make connections,
in order to create more senses.

I also hope to make sense m yself.

A

Zen master once said:
How to overcome the "dualist" world, in terms of
subject-phenomena? The answer is to forget the
question. For example, I am doing what I am doing,
nothing else, (personal translation o f U n d e r s t a n d i n g
Zen in Yuanwu, 1969, p. 26)
The above passage at first may seem to be nihilistic or
relativistic.
"doing."

The issue concerns, I would argue, one's "forgetting" and

It can be argued that this is not simply believing in nothing,

nor an overture to conformism; rather, adopting N ietzsche's
perspective of "active nihilism"

or "cheerful nihilism," it im plies a

challenge to the causes and effects of disintegration by speeding up
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the process (Pefanis, 1991, p. 91).

This also can be understood

through Derrida’s concept o f desire.

Derrida (1985) remarks:

The desire for the intact kernel is desire itself, which
is to say that it is irreducible. There is a prehistoric,
preoriginary relation to the intact kernel, and it is only
beginning with this relation that any desire
whatsoever can constitute itself. Thus, the desire for
the p h a n t a s m o f the intact kernel is irreducible-despite the fact that there is no intact kernel, (p. 115)
Here, Derrida opposes desire to necessity, to "ananke" (p. 116).
The ananke is that there is no intact kernel and there never has been
one.

That is what one wants to forget, and to forget that one has

forgotten it.

It is not absence instead of presence, but a trace which

replaces a presence which has never been present, an origin by
means of which nothing has begun.

Derrida means to define trace as

that which always escapes, is deferred in the attempt to define
absolute knowledge as presence.

The thought of the trace is the

radical other within the structure of "differance," always escapes the
binary system that is the hallmark of the being of presence.

Deconstructive

Pedagogy

As noted in chapter two, "deconstruction" has been a fashionable
word in various disciplines and studies.

As a leading figure in this

m ovem ent, Derrida and his deconstructive strategies have been fully
recognized and abruptly applied in educational discourses.

Several

have paid extensive attention to the concept of deconstructive
teaching (e.g., Yale French Studies. 1982; Scholes, 1985; Crowley,
1989).

Som e curricularists embrace Derrida's concept of

deconstruction in part, in order to question and then to undermine
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our deeply embedded normative assum ptions in curriculum (Ulm er,
1985; W exler, 1987; Cherryholmes, 1988; Crowley, 1989; Pinar,
1 9 8 8 a ).
Derrida's involvem ent with the Group for Research on
Philosophic Teaching (GREPH) has been the best exemplar of
deconstructive pedagogy.

In his essay "Deconstruction and

Pedagogy" (1985) Vincent Leitch cites deconstructive thinking for
suggesting a certain strategic stance and practice for pedagogy.

He

remarks that the process of "depropriation" in deconstructive
teaching would be necessary to suspend our ordained and
naturalized belief and its own critiques.

In order to succeed in this

teaching, Leitch (1985) insists, the notions o f "suspicious, critical,
discriminating and optimistic" must be passed on to students.

He

points out that the classroom is always a problematic field, and he
proposes ways of achieving a pedagogical project:
Uproot the frozen text; break down stereotypes and
opinions; suspend or baffle the violence and authority
o f language; pacify or lighten oppressive paternal
powers; disorient the law; let classroom discourse float,
fragment, digress; seek ascetic or libidinal
abandonment of the teaching body-self. (p. 21)
Further, a deconstructive pedagogy treats the "writing" process
as it occurs always and everywhere.
repetition, but differentiation.

The writing process is not

The notion o f writing, in

deconstructive terms, Leitch (1985) claim s, im plies that everything
that w e know is written; or, in other words, "Writing
our knowledge" (p. 23).

produces all

As Silverman (1987) noted, follow ing

Sartre's ideas, to write is to be free, to be "engaged"; he remarks that

"being is acting and writing (to write, t c r i r e ) is to act" (p. 238).
"Writing" for Derrida, according to Gregory Ulmer in A p p lied
G ra m m atology (1985), is the "i n v e n t i o " of a new rhetoric, with
"invention"—creativity—being the "mana" word o f the new pedagogy
associated with writing.

The function of notion, like "mana," is to be

opposed to the absence o f signification, without entailing by itself
any particular signification (pp. 163-165; see also Derrida, 1978).

In

other words, pedagogy is based upon a notion o f invention or
creativity.

Thus pedagogy should be committed to change rather

than to reproduction, and the classroom should becom e "a place of
invention rather than o f reproduction" (Ulmer, 1985, p. 162).

We,

students and teachers exist in a state of continuous construction and
reconstruction; it is a world where anything that can be negotiated
can occur.
The obstacle, Ulmer (1985) observes, that Derrida wishes to
remove, is the conception of the "exteriority" o f writing to speech and
speech to thought—the view that language is an instrument o f
thought, and writing only "the extension of an instrument
(supplement)" (p. 79).

As signs com e into existence, independent of

the intentions and temporality o f the founding consciousness, and
exterior to self-contained system s posited by structuralism, the
event is always on the "exterior."

Derrida wants to illustrate his own

"grammatology," the practice o f a mode of writing which is no longer
subordinated to speech and thought, a writing no longer functioning
as a representation of speech, a practice in which the hierarchy of
thought, speech, and writing is collapsed.

In this sense, there is
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neither inside nor outside, neither originary nor supplement, but
"differance" itself (Derrida, 1976, 1978).
Grammatology, applied by Ulmer (1985), cuts across the old
divisions o f knowledge, being concerned with all manners o f
inscription, with the question of how any form o f knowledge or mode
o f knowing relates to writing.

Through deconstructive criticism o f a

structural view o f meaning, Cherryholmes (1988) focuses on written
text, and demonstrates that text speaks with many voices; he insists
that "the meaning of what is present depends upon what is absent"
(p. 61). In
not

other words, texts include traces of words and concepts

present, and that which is not present makes possible that

is present.

which

Meaning, according to Derrida (1978), is in a legal sense

subjectless, yet a conceptual necessity.
Meaning is determined by a system o f forces which is
not personal. It does not depend on the subjective
identity but on the field of different forces . . . . N o one
is free to read as he or she wants, (p. 22)
Robert Scholes (1985) suggests that teachers need to bring to
students knowledge and skills that "will enable them to make sense
o f their worlds, to determine their own interests" (p. 15).

The

pedagogy which Scholes envisages seems to consist in a conscious
attempt to empower students by letting them bring their own values
and experience to bear on a text, and by illuminating the social and
historical components of the text.

Similarly, Ulmer relates Derrida's

notions of deconstruction and writing to provoke a pedagogy, which
recognizes that knowledge in and of humanities is precisely a
knowledge of "enframing," o f "media and mise i n seine" (Ulmer,
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1985, p. 183).

In such way, stresses Ulmer, knowledge is understood

not as a representation of something else but as itself a mode of
action in the cultural world.

Selected

Contemporary

Curriculum

Theorists

Peter Taubman: De-gendered Curriculum and the
Student/Teacher

R elation

In his 1979 doctoral dissertation, entitled Gender and
Curriculum: Discourse and the Politics of Sexuality (published in
1982), Peter Taubman em ployed Foucault's m ethodology to
illum inate gender and fem inist issues in curriculum studies.
Taubman (1979) observes and analyzes the shifting m ovem ents of
"sexual politics" through their discursive constitution within our daily
lives.

He proposes a "de-gendered" society as necessary to the

transformation o f curriculum (pp. 162-176).

The underlying politics

o f selection (or exclusion) are typically obscured through the ways
know ledge and curriculum are presented and organized.

Curriculum,

as a consequence of selection, distribution, and interpretation,
sym bolizes not only what is privileged as "formal" or real knowledge,
but conditions the discursive practices that infuse this knowledge
with power.
A decade later, he remarks, in "Achieving the Right Distance"
(1990), that it is significant to develop a psychoanalysis of
relationship between student and teacher, more importantly, a
relationship between the teacher and his or her self-identification.
Many believe anyone can teach, for it is easy to be the teacher and
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anticipate her or his practices.

We teach the way we are taught.

The

issue at stake here is the taking up of an identity (public image)
which requires suppressing aspects o f the self.

To becom e a teacher

thus means to becom e som eone you are not. Taubman explicates the
experience o f coming to teach

him self autobiographically. There

is a

contradiction involving in the distance between student and teacher.
On the one hand, Taubman (1990) notes:
To compensate for the unconscious and forever
unsatisfied need, the student, know ledge and the
privileged position as the one who knows are
substituted. . . . The desire to be, to know, to have is an
unending desire that works in the direction of
increasing distance between teacher and student, (p.
121)
On the other hand, reiterates Pinar (1988a), "intimacy with
students would require [a teacher's] dissolution o f identity" (p. 127).
The "right" distance between student and teacher, suggests Taubman
(1990), lies "in the middle, at the midpoint" (p. 131).

This midpoint

can be related to the paradoxical instance found in post
stru ctu ra lism .
This process o f "achieving" the right distance, I think, is the focus
to which pedagogical meaning aspires.

In discussing this process, it

should address the discursive formations o f producing know ledge
and the ways for interpreting the know ledge that can and cannot be
produced.

Taubman rightly notes that the assumption o f particular

forms o f cultural authority has been m ystified, in the realm of
Lacan's the "imaginary."
o f itself (Taubman, 1990).

He remarks: knowledge is instructive in and
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C leo Cherryholmes: Post-structural Investigations
Cherryholmes, in his Power and Criticism (1988), took the task
as "an interpreter of post-structuralism" (J. F. Soltis in Foreword) to
dem onstrate contem porary
application to curriculum.

post-structuralist thought and its
He provides a clear and convincing

introduction to post-structural approaches to the curriculum field; he
asserts that the analytic tradition has influenced many educators,
preventing them from accepting a less orderly, less controllable, less
accountable framework.

Cherryholmes (1988) offers his own view o f

"critical pragmatism" w hich incorporates post-structuralism into
traditional Am erican analytic philosophy (pp.

141-149).

Cherryholmes (1988) invites readers to "rethink" present
structural educational discourse-practices (pp. 1-13).

Through post-

structural analysis and criticism , mainly Foucault's "discourse" (which
he terms "interpretive analytics") and "power arrangement,"
Derrida's "text" (which he terms "deconstruction") and "meaning in
play," coupled with speech-act theory, Cherryholmes (1988)
insightfully criticizes structuralist analyses that have been
deterministic and uncritical (pp. 33-40).
three influential

He outlines and questions

structuralist-m inded approaches in education:

Tyler's (1949) rationale, Schwab's "The Practical 4" (1969) as an
extension and application o f Tylerian rationale, and Bloom's
taxonomy.

He asks of Tyler's rationale—under what conditions can it

be operative?

He questions how w e can make decisions about

curriculum and instruction when these are socially embedded and
determined by political, historical, cultural, econom ic, and linguistic
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settings.

He regards the most troublesome characteristic of the

structuralist approach as "value neutrality."
To the question of meaning, Cherryholmes (1988) draws on John
Austin and John Searle's speech act theory to show that meaning is
socially constructed and context dependent.
writing makes speech possible.

At Derrida's insistence,

Cherryholmes then explicates this

notion of absence of textual formation into the school's "hidden
curriculum," arguing that the awareness o f critical thinking needs to
be raised.

He points out: "Deconstructive analysis suggests that texts

are never what they seem" (p. 61).

This absence parallels the

"noise," in Serres' (1982) "the parasite," as background signifying the
presence and the m essage.
Cherryholmes (1988) recognizes that critical discourse or
"pragmatism" is necessarily paradoxical in nature itself.

He states

that it "cannot elim inate structural conditions necessary for its own
constitution. . . the desire to eliminate distortions is also a normative
commitment" (p. 92).

In addition, Cherryholmes suggests an attitude

o f playfulness to approach deconstruction.

It is in this notion of

playfulness that one can seek beyond what is in the text, that one
can connect between words, utterance, or discourses and what is not
th ere.
Cherryholmes basically demonstrates a circular triplet—
construction, deconstruction, subsequent criticism —in his analyses o f
curriculum.

In these analyses inheres a radical definition o f the self,

which in Europe has Marxist underpinnings, that Cherryholmes and
others, who seek to "liberate" the self, find unappealing.

He attempts

to incorporate speech-act theory into post-structuralism, as if this
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m ight remedy the post-structuralism with which, in fact, speech-act
theory is incompatible.

He, and other deconstructionists, customarily

ignore post-structuralist epistem ology and focus on the analysis and
interpretation of literary work.

Such analysis is a project of

description of the content of a poetry not subordinated to
propositional

truth.

Philip Wexler: After the New Sociology o f Education
Philip Wexler, in his Social Analysis o f Education (1987),
reapproaches the social analysis o f education through a postmodern
lens.

He focuses not only on historical analyses of educational

change, but also reconceives education by view ing school knowledge
as "processes of decom position and dereification" (p. 83).

He asserts

critically that knowledge has been sim ply regarded as "skill and
information," that a culture o f scientism , heroic, self-centered and
psych ological, has been expressed through contemporary schooling.
He also rejects the concepts o f "reproduction" and "resistance,"
adopted by the so-called new sociology of education, as able to
account for the social function of schools and society.

He then

introduces a synthesis o f post-industrialism and post-structuralism
into his "social analysis" of education.

He claims that education has

been distorted, that the contradiction of education (like that o f the
sociology of education) is that "it is at once a discursive blockage
against realizing and articulating knowledge," which '"contains1—both
includes and constrains—the most powerful, though diffused and
fragmented, cultural resources of historical knowledge" (W exler,
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1987, p. 13).

W exler claim s that representation is already an

"audacious act against the autonomy o f the subject" (p. 101).
W exler (1987) stresses that the conceptual formation from
ideology to reproduction/resistance has functioned in a binary
fashion--"individual-society,"

"structure-agency,"

that it presum ably

has a cultural autonomy similar to what it is criticizing.

This cultural

autonomy, W exler observes, that is "linked to obscure the possibility
o f a collective historical understanding o f social life" (p. 43).

Wexler

still believes the dialectic o f the "commodity" is where the disruptive
diffusion and decentering current at play in social and literary
modernism.

He argues that those abstract cultural m ystifying

processes which once were hidden, congealed by post-industrialism ,
are now unravelled in the ordinary practices o f social production.
remarks that

He

"the deconstructive decom position o f the sociocultural

relations o f production is now both a requirement o f advanced
production, and secondarily, in the capitalization o f information, an
additional means o f

profit" (p. 14). For W exler, the "subject" is

som etim es assumed

by the term "socialization"

and it "ruptures the

apparent naturalness o f the system atic objectifying pacification o f
self-consciou s subjective identity and intentional action" (p. 115).
A lso she/he is a "self-parody," "multidimensional, decentered, and
decentering" subject (p. 115).
W exler (1987)
"not only regresses

further remarks that the centering o f structure
toward essentialism , toward

the view o f symbols

as 'expressing' some prior unitary being or thing, but also stops the
m o v e m e n t that inheres in language" (p. 137).
o f signs lim its structuralism itself.

The relational system

He further explains that "the aim
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o f decentering is to release the refined energy o f textuality, and to
offer an enlightenment not of reason, but o f movement" (p. 139).

He

is proposing that the free energy, informal culture o f social
interaction, perform ance-oriented

rationality,

em itted

from

textuality is also what conditions know ledge production taking place
in the schools.
The discourse is secondary to the centered m etaphysics of
structuralism.

The power o f discourse, claims W exler (1987), is not

"an expression or representation o f anterior objects" (p. 141).

On the

contrary, it is discourse, the socially constructed and regulating
practices o f that "dispersed plane of know ledge, the epistem e, that
forms the object, referent, and being o f last appeal, the subject,
'man'" (p. 141).

W exler stresses that the production o f knowledge is

not only the o b j e c t o f practice but also the social relationships it
inscribes.

As Foucault (1972) puts it:

"Every educational system is a

political means o f maintaining or o f m odifying the appropriation o f
discourse, with the knowledge and the powers it carries with it" (p.
227).

The point is not to dissolve relations of power in the utopia o f

a transparent communication, but to give one's self the rules o f law,
the techniques of management, and the eth ics—the e t h o s --th e
practice of self, which would allow these games of power to be
played with a minimum o f domination.
However, W exler (1987) is skeptical o f post-structuralism and
regards it as "a form of cultural life as internal exile" (p. 15).

In an

essay "Curriculum in the Closed Society" (1989), he notes that post
structuralism is a "literary face" o f postmodernism (p. 10).
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R ebecca M artusewicz: Post-m odern Fem inist Critique
Those of us stand outside the circle of this society's
definition of acceptable women; those of us who have
been forged in the crucibles o f differences. . . know
that survival is not an academic skill. It is learning
how to stand alone, unpopular and som etim es reviled,
and how to make common cause with those others
identified as outside the structures in order to define
and seek a world in which w e can all flourish. It is
learning how to take our differences and make them
strengths. For the master's tools w ill never dismantle
the master's house. (Audre Lorde, Sister Outsider i n
Barbara Johnson, 1987, pp. 1-2)
The fem inist m ovem ent has had enormous influence on
curriculum since the late 1970s.

Fem inist criticism , according to

Vincent Leitch (1988), started along with hermeneutics, literary
criticism and sem iotics and post-structuralism to "expose patriarchal
prem ises and prejudices; to promote the discovery and revaluation o f
literature by women; andto scrutinize
contexts o f literature and

the social and cultural

criticism" (p. 307).

Gender in education has

always been an important issue in all levels o f policy-m aking and
everyday practices, esp ecially since the women's m ovem ent in the
1960s.
M artusew icz details a post-m odern or post-structural fem inist
perspective o f curriculum field in her Ph.D. dissertation, The W ill to
Reason: An Archaeology o f Womanhood and Education. 1880-1920
(1988).

She attempts to lay bare the claim o f "the reason of the

other" to account for the

dism issal or "neutralization" o f women's

discourse by patriarchal domination

(M artusewicz, 1988, p. 46).

This

word "Other," insists Derrida (1978), is "circumscribed in silence by
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the capital letter which ever increases the neutrality o f the o t h e r ,
and which w e use so familiarly, even though it is the very disorder
o f our conceptuality" (p. 105).
of "a priori

A lso reason is, in the Deleuzean notion

other," the idea of neither presence nor absence, of other

defining initially a certain way o f treating the concepts of
understanding--"a concept being given, reason seeks another which,
taken in the totality of its extension, conditions the attribution of the
first to the object to which it refers" (Deleuze, 1990, p. 294).
Woman's acquisition of power of voice thus grows not out o f her
identity but out of her division into the inside and outside o f reason.
M artusewicz (1988) depicts the discourses of women during the
period from 1880 to 1920, which had tremendous impact on fem inist
theory to date.

For instance, she argues that "the female body

became the object o f scientific gaze and the 'truth' of woman's nature
was asserted, backed up with hard evidence" (p. 48).

Woman's

relation to knowledge is that the place o f the "facilitator" of
know ledge as mother and as teacher, servicing the knower but
distant from and incapable o f becoming the knower herself.

Drawing

on Foucault, she challenges dualistic, male-dominated ways of
thinking, reproducing androcentric bias at the groundwork, not
merely presupposing them.

She questions the relation between the

historical production of knowledge and woman as a social form and
subjective position.

For the subject is not the source o f meaning;

rather, Foucault (1980) asserts meaning and subjectivity are
produced through a com plex system of differences, through language
and the wider sym bolic system that we understand to be culture.
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Regarding the question o f knowledge production and o f identity,
M artusewicz (1988) raises the follow ing:
First, many are interested in what women should be
learning, what forms o f organized know ledge would be
beneficial to a woman's life. But, in order to com e to a
decision about such curricular matters, there would
first have to be agreement about what constitutes true
womanhood, (p. 4)
M artusewicz (1988) argues that the discourse on the body was
"articulated within a broader discourse on reason. . . women
strategically emulated to justify their positions in the maledominated world o f knowledge production" (p. 144).

She claim s that

reason legitim ates women's exit from the private w hile ensuing the
reproduction o f woman as inferior "Other," as woman struggles to
have what man has.

She then asks the question, raised first by

Adrienne Rich (1976), of "whether women cannot begin, at last, to
think through the body, to connect what has been cruelly
disorganized" (p. 284).

"Thinking" is an active and expanding

process; "knowing" are recapitulations o f past processes.

Our

thinking bodies are intertwined with our lives and our deaths.

In

doing so, women "produced knowledge about their body, in
particular about the fem ale body and its regulation, about the fem ale
mind, and about the educated woman" (M artusewicz, 1988, p. 144).
She is suggesting a deeper understanding that reconceptualizes
educational history and has the potential to problem atize the takenfor-granted categories which produce know ledge and identity.
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W illiam Doll: A Post-Modern Perspective
N otions o f postm odernity or postm odernism have stimulated
vigorous debate for two decades (Arac, 1986).

Nietzsche, Heidegger,

Habermas, Foucault, Lyotard, Rorty, and Jameson, among others, have
variously discussed the project o f modernity in detail.

Each has

follow ed the tradition o f Enlightenment and moved in his own
direction.

Postm odernism , started in Art and Architecture, has

becom e a self-evident historical "category," an interdisciplinary
specialization (Rajchman, 1991).

It is generally accepted as an

umbrella term for referring to the processes, changes and
transformations that "come after" what before were generally
hom ogenized, reducible, controllable, or predictable discourses.
In curriculum, postmodern approaches and analyses start to
emerge follow ing different traditions.

Burbules and R ice (1991)

characterize three ideas o f postmodernism in educational studies.
They are "the rejection o f absolutes," "the perceived saturation o f all
social and political discourses with power or dominance," and "the
celebration o f difference" (pp. 395-396).
Stanley Aronowitz and Henry Giroux (1991) approach the
postmodern from a critical—neo-M arxist, Gramscian, W eberian—
philosophical orientation; and they observe that what is at issue in
education is the legitim acy claim s o f marginal discourses, the
diversity of producing knowledge and its validity.

Carol Nicholson

(1989) points out that a postmodern fem inist pedagogy is not to
"destroy tradition but to give students the opportunity to reinterpret
it for them selves in the light of new problems and perspectives" (p.
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204).

Fritzman (1990) advocates a postmodern pedagogy, embracing

Lyotard's paralogy, which instead o f constructing a curriculum based
on the ideal of a social consensus, teaches students "to be sensitive to
the inevitable presence o f differends" (p. 379).

In other words, the

emphasis is on "dissensus" rather than consensus.
W illiam Doll (1989, 1991) sets forth a "post-modern" view of
curriculum, drawing heavily on post-quantum scien ce and post
positivist philosophy as a way to reinterpret Piaget, Bruner and
D ew ey, and as an alternative to the present prevailing modernist
paradigm.

He proposes a four R's curriculum inquiry, which are

"richness, relation, rigor, and recursion" (D oll, in press).

This

approach suggests a different realm of pedagogy and practice.
D oll (1989) approaches the problem atic—determ inistic
orientation—of curriculum through a post-m odern perspective, which
he contrasts with modern Newtonian paradigms, and he outlines a
possible post-modern view o f curriculum.

He then suggests that

notions of "instability," "chaos," "self-organization,"

"complexity," and

"recursion" should be considered in concerning the interactions
between teacher and student in the classroom.

U tilizing Piaget,

Bruner and D ew ey, he exem plifies "equilibrium," "disequilibrium"
and "reequilibration" at various stages of self-generative
developm ent in order to achieve the process pedagogy in schooling
(D oll, in press).
Doll acknowledges the hermeneutics o f understanding and o f self
to embrace a notion of "community" which includes Rorty's notion o f
"conversation."

He strives to introduce a post-modern view of

curriculum through a "new" epistem ology which is hermeneutically
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oriented.

This alternative to a traditional, systematic and linear

Tylerian rationale proposed by Doll (in press) would help to vitalize
curricu lu m .

W illiam Pinar: Autobiography and the Architecture o f S elf
The notion o f "currere," inaugurated and emphasized by Pinar
and Grumet (1976), is the keystone o f the "reconceptualist"
movement of the 1970s.

Currere stems from its Latin root, Pinar

(1976) notes, suggesting that curriculum focus not on the external,
the objective, the public, but rather to involve the search for the
nature o f the individual experience o f the public—the existential
experience o f the educational journey.

Recently, Pinar (1991) insists

that "the significance of place" brings "the particularistic into focus";
it also "sharpens our understanding o f the individual and the psychic
and social forces that direct him or her" (p. 4).

To the contrary,

Foucault (1986b) remarks:
We are at a moment, I believe, when our experience of
the world is less that o f a long life developing through
time, than that o f a network that connects points and
intersects with its own skein, (p. 22)
Pinar (1988a) questions the concept of "authentic self" through
autobiography which would enable students and teachers to
understand them selves and the world itself.

The concept o f an

"authentic self" with knowable characteristics, such as rationality,
em otion, and w ill, is dismantled.

For Pinar (1988b), understanding o f

self is not narcissism, rather it is a "precondition and a concomitant
condition" to the understanding of others (p. 150).
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Pinar asserts that the construction of self requires certain
exclusions which, in terms o f curriculum, as "enculturation," as
political socialization (Pinar, 1988a).

He is suggesting the

construction of an inclusive architecture o f self through
autobiographical reflection.

He insists that a self committed to

education m ight w ell redistribute resources from the dominant self
to those elem ents of the self that have been—via conditioning and
choice—marginalized.

He argues that "the self is fictive; it is an

aesthetic creation, and the means by which the self is planned and
'built' are story-telling and myth-making" (Pinar, 1988a, p. 18).

He

proposes using autobiography as a means for self-reflection and selfunderstanding in relation to the self, curriculum studies, and the
world.

This orientation, M erleau-Ponty (1961) suggests:
produces a table of diverse, com plex probabilities,
always bound to local circum stances, weighted with a
coefficient of facticity. (p. 44)

Each reality of self gives way to reflexive questioning, irony, and
ultimately the playful probing o f yet another reality.

The center fails

to hold; it is deconstructed through increasingly awareness that the
objects of which we speak are not so much in the world as they are
products of perspective.

The very concept o f personal essences is

thrown into doubt.
Pinar (1992) points out that post-structuralism has been rapidly
recognized throughout the last decade and provokes certain
controversies and debates among curriculum studies.

N evertheless,

he embraces such a challenge for curricular scholars, through which
educators may respond reflexively.

As w ell, he recognizes that
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notions

of "narrating" or "to narrate" in writing are highly suggestive

for curriculum theory and practice.

As Robert Scholes

(1990)

remarks, narrative is a central armature o f human thought.
Ted Aoki: Sound of Pedagogical Calling
Ted Aoki proposes a kind of embodying of teaching.

It is not

sim ply representational reflective understanding, nor merely critical
praxis, understood as critical theory searching underlying ideology
which conditions our existence.

This reflective "storying" and

"theming," in Aoki's view , is concerned more about what we already
are w hile w e are existing in the world.

Curriculum, insists Aoki, is

regarded as the m ovem ent o f lived-experience, relations between
man and the world.

Pedagogy for him can be considered as play

which is purposeful without a purpose.

Play is not random but

coherent and meaningful, yet without a purpose in a conventional
sense, because it is not for anything but just for fun, for self
enjoyment, for "being-in-the-world."
significance.

Such a view has great practical

Free association is not just everything goes; free

association still makes connections, because free association brings us
back home to our self--in terms of H eidegger’s "dwelling-in-theworld."

Pertinent here is a Zen story:
A blind man went to visit his friend far away. When
he was ready to leave, the sky was very dark.
His
friend advised him to take a lamp to light the way, he
answered that “I do not need a lamp, bright and dark
are the same to m e.” His friend said: “I know you do
not need a lamp, but if you do not hold a lamp, maybe
someone will com e across you.” He then held a lamp
and walked home. On the way home, one person
knocked on him at his face. He yelled to that person:
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“Hey! watch your way, don't you see the lamp! Are
you blind!” That person replied: “Hey sir, your candle
was not lit.” (personal translation)
This story im plies that holding other people's ideas in order to
understand others is like the blind man holding the lamp; he would
never know whether the candle was lit or not.
Aoki (1990a) believes that students’ and teachers' work and
their self-reflexivities are central to the understanding of pedagogy.
Stories are told, in terms of Heidegger's "telling," in their own voices,
by students and teachers and they share with one another—
"listening to pedagogical being" (pp. 2-10).

This pedagogy signifies

an attempt to create spaces for expressions o f their concerns and
thus brings us a sense of "b e l o n g i n g together" (pp. 12-16).

A fte r -th o u g h ts
The im plications o f post-structuralist perspectives for
curriculum are numerous.

Post-structuralism invites us to rethink,

to question the way we used to think.

Curriculum as post

structuralism is an intriguing reminder of the provisionality of
knowledge.

In this chapter, I have considered the initial exam ples o f

post-structuralist scholarship.

Taubman and M artusewicz

incorporate Foucault's m ethodology into gender-difference and
identity-form ation.

Cherryholmes and W exler em ploy post-

structuralist approaches to focus their critical theory perspectives.
Pinar and Aoki extend phenom enological aspects o f curriculum
theory and practice toward post-structuralism.
post-modern vision in curriculum.

D oll argues for a

These scholars can be view ed as

transitional as they point toward a post-structuralist "view" in
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curriculum, a view currently most com pletely developed by Jacques
D aignault.
In the next chapter, I w ill explicate Jacques Daignault's post
structuralist curriculum thought.

Daignault articulates post

structuralism exten siv ely , dem onstrating curriculum
pedagogy post-structurally.

studies and

In the "deconstruction" of curriculum

many problematics start to em erge as post-structuralists' notions of
the "condition of possibility," the "undecidable," the "trace," or the
"events" are em ployed.
point to curriculum

These problematics as discursive formations

understood post-structurally.

CHAPTER FOUR
TH E W ORK OF JACQUES DAIGNAULT
Gradually it has become clear to me what every great
philosophy so far has been: namely, the personal
confession of its author and a kind o f involuntary and
unconscious memoir; also that the moral (and
im moral) intentions in every philosophy constituted
the real germ of life from which the w hole plant had
grown. (N ietzsche, 1966, p. 13)
I can talk o f Foucault, tell you that he has said this or
that to me, set it out as I see it. This is nothing as long
as I have not been able really to encounter this set of
sounds h a m m e r e d out, of decisive gestures, of ideas all
made o f tinder and fire, of deep a t t e n t i o n and sudden
closure, of l a u g h t e r and sm iles which one feels to be
'‘id a n g e ro u s',, at the very moment when one feels
t e n d e r n e s s —this set as a unique combination whose
proper name would be Foucault. (D eleuze, 1987b, p.

11)
P o s t - s t r u c t u r a lis m

E n co u n ter e d

This chapter discusses the major works o f a major poststructural curriculum theorist—Jacques Daignault.

It provides an

overview of his thought and o f its bearing on the central issues of
contemporary curriculum theory.

Since the influence of G illes

Deleuze on Daignault is enormous, a "reading" o f D eleuze presented
alongside a reading o f Daignault w ill be presented as an intersecting
"event."

I would agree with what Foucault (1977) says when he

writes: ". . . perhaps one day, this century w ill be known as
Deleuzean" (p. 165).
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Thinking of Jacques Daignault, whose com plex and elusive style
strikes me most, I am reminded o f Deleuze's encounter with Foucault.
The "deep attention" and "sudden closure" revealed in Daignault's
rigorous efforts suggest the m etaphysical questioning o f essen ce—
"what is the problematics?" to which I have no fixed answer.

If I

supplied an answer, then Daignault would ask:

The

"Which one?"

concept o f "multiplicity" com es into play here.
The post-structuralist curriculum, Daignault (1983) conceives, is
not simply the transmission o f know ledge, or the transmission o f
values, nor the mastery o f m ethod—"know-how" or "know-how-tobe"—but rather is a "manner" to "stage" knowledge through a
"passage-way" (pp. 7-13).

This passage-way is to think otherwise, as

in Nietzsche's "will to" (as resentment), Heidegger's notion of
"thinking" (thought-provoking) and Foucault's history o f thought (as
unthought), especially in the Deleuzean "sense" (French s e n s ) - surface and event (as the fourth dimension o f language or fourth
person singular).

Daignault is suggesting such a notion of thinking or

sense in which to think on eself as self-educative,

means "to

experiment and to problematize"; to make sense which by itself is a
problematic and problem atizing.

Influenced by Kant and D eleuze,

Daignault asserts that the separation of universality and
particularity, subject and object, one's work and play, one's
intellectual activities and everyday life, teaching and learning is all
but unattainable.

Binary oppositions are denied.

Daignault thinks of

the "excluded middle" (in D eleuze's term "sense-event") being given
ready-made unproblem atically in curriculum studies.
middle is the interest o f determinations of signification.

The excluded
He argues
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that sense (event) is presented both as that which happens to bodies
and that which insists in propositions.

As Ulmer (1985) points out,

classroom is a place for teacher and students' inventions, not simply
reproduction; he insists that "pedagogy is (a) theater that is not
representation but 'life itself'" (p. 174).
require

interpretations

Daignault's

and

L ives become texts.

Texts

reinterpretations.

Staging-Thinking

Jacques Daignault started his career in music.

He was fascinated

by the works of John Cage, Philip Glass and Steve Reich whose work
resem bles a musical version o f post-structuralist thought.

Daignault

studied education at University of Laval, where he finished the Ph.D.
in 1982.

He has studied post-structuralism, mainly the works of

D eleuze, Serres and Lyotard since 1976 in Quebec and in France.

The

influence o f Deleuze on Daignault is obvious; he employs the
Deleuzean notion o f "sense," "expressible and expressed," "surfaceskin" and "paradoxes" in his own teaching and writing.

He writes on

post-structuralism and curriculum theory in a "unique" (there is no
organizing principle) yet consistent way, and he has developed a
"staging" (m ise en scene) or "performative speech act" in his own
educational pursuits (1986, p. 3).
In reflecting upon Daignault's writing, I hope to lay out an
interpretation o f his "ideas" without losing the diagonal senses o f his
writing.

These diagonal senses are "unsayable" (Foucault, 1972,

1977), akin to Derrida's "undecidable," or "trace," and Deleuze's "non
parallel" revolution—which is a "heterochronous becoming" (Derrida,
1978; D eleuze, 1987b).

Language has invented the dualism, says
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D eleuze (1987b); therefore we must pass through dualism because it
is in language.

In other words, to pass through dualisms is not to get

rid o f them, but to fight against language, to invent "stammering"—
AND, AND, AND. . . (1987b, p. 17).

For instance, in Platonic dualism,

we recognize that it is not at all the dualism of the intelligible and
the sensible, o f Idea and matter.

It is not the distinction between the

m odel and the copy, but rather between good copies and simulacra—
false copies (D eleuze, 1990).

Deleuze states that "it is a subterranean

dualism between that which receives the action of the Idea and that
which eludes this action" (1987a, p. 3).

However, I hope, this study

can be grasped in a conventional as well as post-structuralist way to
cast light on the connection between D eleuze and Daignault's thought.
In a series of essays written during the last decade, Daignault
analyzed and demonstrated pedagogical im plications o f poststructuralism through his encounter with Foucault, Derrida, Lyotard,
Serres and D eleuze.

He has staged the questions of future

possibilities in curriculum theory and practice.

Post-structuralism

"as"

Pedagogy

For Daignault, the truth is not merely the subject o f enunciation
nor the subject o f statements, but the "event" itself—the boundary o f
two sides.

In a Derridean fashion, Daignault sees the concept of

truth, as implied by harmonious agreement and that which defines
the "true" opinion o f what something means, as itself a naive notion.
Why study Daignault's essays historically?

Because essays

interweave with one another; there is no organizing principle.

This

"staging" is a stage itself.

Daignault deals with problematics in

curriculum (his usage of education and curriculum is somehow
interchangeable) post-structurally.

For instance, Daignault remarks

in his essay, "Curriculum as composition: who is the composer?"
(1 9 8 9 )
Education is the process through which the subject
resists determinations. That is to say the subject is not
the self-consciousness; actually, the subject is the
subject of education. Thinking is the bridge between
the expressing's self-consciousness and the subject of
education. Thinking is the incarnation of curriculum
as composition; it is what gives birth to an assemblage
of notes, (p. 4)
His "translation" of post-structuralism into curriculum is
insightful.

Thinking means to "problematize," to go beyond subject-

identity toward "the thought o f difference" and "the production of
sense" (Daignault, 1991, p. 376).

This leads to an aesthetics of

problematization that neither excludes the subject nor centers it.
Daignault insists:

This problematization does not exclude feeling or

em otion without reducing everything to it either.

The Indecent Curriculum Machine: Who's Afraid o f Sisyphus?
(,1 9 8 2 a )
One day Sisyphus brought an indecent curriculum
machine that functioned (got out o f order) only if it got
out o f order ( w o r k e d ) .
Im m ediately Sisyphus
hastened to start the machine and since it worked
very well (got out o f order), it got out o f order ( b e g a n
to work) at once. Happy was he to see that his
machine worked (got out o f order) but sad was he also
to see that it was out of order ( w o r k e d ) , (p. 194)
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In the beginning of his first (in English) article, with Clermont
Gauthier, entitled "The indecent curriculum machine: Who's afraid of
Sisyphus?" published in The Journal of Curriculum Theorizing (1982),
Jacques Daignault claim s that the fundamental problem o f the
curriculum field has been the search for identity; in other words, its
definition.

Here, w e can connect this quoted passage with Deleuze's

(1990) comments on Mallarme, dialogue from Zen master, he states:
"'If you have a cane', says the Zen master, 'I am giving you one; if
you do not have one, I am taking it away.' (or, Chrysippus said, 'If
you never lost something, you have it still; but you never lost horns,
ergo

you have horns')" (p. 136).

The point is not to repudiate any

identity nor to embrace every possibility whatsoever.

There is a

paradoxical elem ent im plicitly being connected with the question o f
"What is curriculum?" raised by Daignault.

This curriculum question

and answer parallels the questions raised in post-structuralism.

This

paradoxical instance, therefore, has the property of always being
displaced in relation to itself, of "being absent from its own place," its
own identity, its own resemblance, and its own equilibrium.

It is the

question of "in-between" or "boundary" which runs into all possible
directions at one and the same time.
Since its identity, the curriculum field, Daignault argues, was a
"step-child" or "sub-discipline" to other disciplines.

It was always

associated with or derived from other disciplines and subject
matters, such as psychology, political science, history, sociology,
educational administration.

Daignault contends that curriculum has

been developed and became recognizable during the last two
d e c a d e s.
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Daignault (1982a) does not define what curriculum is, rather,
"how it functions-how to be" (pp. 182-183).

We can understand his

intention via D eleuze's (1986b) statement that "it is absolutely
useless to look for a theme in a writer if one hasn't asked exactly
what its importance is in the work—that is, how it functions (and not
what its 'sense' is)" (p. 45).

This also parallels the "technologies of

self" in Foucault's dealing with self-form ation (Foucault, 1988).
Daignault, then, approaches this problematic o f identity through the
concept o f paradox, adopted from Gregory Bateson (1972) and
Deleuze's (1990) series of paradoxes.

Daignault argues that identity

is inherited from difference, and he remarks that the concept of
identity presupposes the concept o f "sameness."
be the same in order to be identical.

Two items have to

Such a view has been explained

in Hegel's dialectical thinking; it is the identity, b o t h between the
identity o f identity and identity a n d between the identity of
difference and difference (D escom bes, 1986), that constitutes the
"difference" between identity and difference.

H owever, Daignault

goes further to argue that the problematic o f identity is focusing on
the paradoxical instance o f the "difference" itself, not yet
differentiated.

Paradox, says D eleuze, is at first that which destroys

good sense as the only direction, but paradox is also that which
destroys common sense as the assignation of fixed identities.

Deleuze

(1990) asserts that the function of the paradoxical instance is to
"ensure the relative displacement of the two series, the excess o f the
one over the other, without being reducible to any of the terms of
the series or to any relation between these terms" (p. 40).

In other
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words, paradoxical instance functions to condition the possibilities of
being related or divergent.
In this Deleuzean way, then, Daignault (1982a) insists that
curriculum is a paradoxical and nomadic object, which is always
transient (m oving).

In short, curriculum is "thought without image,

object follow ing an always moving empty space" (p. 182).

Here we

should not confuse the acts of thought with the image o f thought; for
him, the curriculum does not exist, but it happens.
(1990) points out, the idea o f "a
occupant having no place"

As Deleuze

place without occupant" and "an

are not to be fixed or to be filled up in

a

place, which would simply stop the game (an "ideal game" in his
mind); to the contrary, he

insists, the point is to keep

empty place and perpetualdisplacement

on playing.The

o f a piece in a game is a

double sliding in a "perpetual disequilibrium vis-a-vis each other" (p.
40).

However, D eleuze (1990) remarks that "the paradoxical entity is

never where we look for it, and conversely that we never find it
where it is.

As Lacan says, 'it fails to observe its place' (elle

manque

a sa place)" (p. 41).
Daignault does not propose that we should stop defining but, on
the contrary, to m u l t i p l y the definitions, to invite a plural spelling.
To define is to distort.

His intention here, with which D eleuze would

agree, is that to define is not a question o f probabilities, combining
the heterogeneous elem ents, simply putting them together.

Rather,

to define is to portray that there are varied lines, in the Deleuzean
(1990) term "series ," made by people (or things) that do not know
necessarily which line they are on or where they should make the
line which they are tracing pass.

The serial form is "realized in the
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simultaneity [of] at least two series" (p. 36).

In short, there is a

whole "geography" in people—with lines o f flight, series o f event.
The notion of time-spatial can be found in D eleuze’s (1986a, 1989)
"movement-image"

and

"time-im age."

Another notion o f "machine" that is articulated in this essay,
related to Deleuze's (1987a) idea o f "desiring-machine," is that of
assem blage, an assem blage o f enunciation, an activity of prolific
writing.

Thus the curriculum machine is in this sense of a writing

produced wherever the curriculum is placed.

The indecent machine,

in Daignault’s (1982a) eyes, is exactly that this prolific writing is
"contingent to the fantasies o f the unconscious and inscribes itself
literally in the tempo o f the poetical involvem ent at the risk of
engendering delight" (p. 188).
The problematic of theory and practice also interests Daignault
significantly; it has been one of the major issues o f curriculum.
Daignault approaches the problematic by using Deleuze's series o f
paradoxes to demonstrate the present dilem m a within the
curriculum field.

For exam ple, regarding the problematics of

teaching and learning, Daignault claim s that there are many
differences among theoretical practices, yet theoretical practices
cannot be confused with the application of theories.

Both Foucault

and D eleuze recognize this point and reiterate that "theory does not
express, translates, or serve to apply practice: it is practice" (D eleuze,
1988, p. 13).
Therefore the problematic in volves, observes Daignault, adopting
Deleuze's third and eighth series o f the proposition in Logic o f Sense
(1990), i.e. that the issue at stake is the distinction or gap between
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theory and practice.

Daignault found this can be understood as the

"gap" between "signans"—as sign ifying— and "signatum," as the
signified, which is called Levi-Strauss' paradox by Deleuze (1990):
The Universe signified long before we began to know
what it was signifying. . . . Man, since his origin, has
had at his disposal a com pleteness o f signifier which
he is obstructed from allocating to a signified, given as
such without being any better known. There is always
an inadequacy between the two. (cited in Daignault,
1982a, p. 187)
What is in excess in the signifying is a place without an occupant.
What is lacking in the signified series is a "supernumerary"—an
unknown, an occupant without a place.
conditions are present:

Daignault asserts that two

"First, the elements of each series have to be

determined by differential relations as in the case for phonem es and
morphemes in the language" and second, there must exist a
paradoxical instance which pervades both series without belonging to
neither a place without an occupant nor an occupant without a place"
(p. 189).

This instance has the function of articulating the two series

to one another, o f making them communicate, coexist, and ramify.
Daignault (1982a) insists that the filling-up or abandonment of
the gap or empty space between two series becomes "terrorism" or
"nihilism."

In terms of terrorism, Daignault argues that the filling-up

o f empty places requires (1) "all radical transformation o f what
exists in conformity with what we believe it ought to be"; (2) "each
one (com petitive doctrines or ideologies) tries to convince the other
that his is the true one," and consequently calls for violence (p. 192).
In terms o f nihilism , he observes that the abandonment of empty
space becomes nihilistic in the sense that "our acts instead of being
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asserted for what they are reactive to something which does not
exist, or becomes a "patched-up activity" (p. 193).

Here, he is

elucidating the "sense" that not only the gap between the two series
is irreducible, but also that the paradoxical instance o f the
pedagogical com plexity maintains and keeps two series (theory and
practice) meeting each other constantly.

He says:

Curriculum can be

defined as "a prolonged hesitation between sense and sense" (p. 193).
Daignault (1982a) concludes:
One day Sisyphus bought an indecent curriculum
machine that functioned only if it got out of order and
that got out of order only if it functioned.
Im mediately he hastened to start the machine and
since it worked very well, it got out of order at once
but also since it got out of order quite well, it began to
fu n ction .
. . . this prolonged hesitation defined the curriculum.
(p. 194)
To Make Someone Know as We Make Someone Laugh: A
Perverse A nalysis o f Promise and Desire in Curriculum H 982b l
In this amusing and provocative essay, Daignault succinctly
illustrates the fundamental paradox o f the pedagogical relation
through the intriguing conversation between Don Juan and Don
Quixote.

The paradox, Daignault (1982b) sees, is exactly the link

between desire and promise, teaching and learning; in other words,
"the promise of the other's desire" (p. 18).

As Lacan (1977) would

say "the subject of a teaching is a learning" (p. 20).

Along with these

lines, he ironically parodies Marxist approaches which are succinct
(sufficient) but too dogmatic.

He writes wittily, "I would become sad

as a Marxist should Don Quixote become a Roller Derby player!" (p. 3)
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In other words, Marxist approaches function to kidnap the readers to
make them happy.
The notion of desire is the central point of this essay.
recall the concept of desire, explicated by Derrida (1985).

We can
He states:

The desire for the intact kernel is desire itself, which
is to say that it is irreducible. There is a prehistoric,
preoriginary relation to the intact kernel, and it is only
beginning with this relation that any desire
whatsoever can constitute itself. Thus, the desire for
the p h a n t a s m o f the intact kernel is irreducible—
despite the fact that there is no intact kernel, (p. 115)
The notion of desire is not the absence instead o f the presence,
but a trace which replaces a presence which has never been present,
an origin by means of which nothing has begun.

The opposite of

desire, in terms of "ananke," makes possible the kernel desires itself-the intact desire for intactness. (Derrida, 1987)
Daignault (1982b) reiterates the relation between "what is" and
"what ought to be."

The gap between what is and what ought to be

has been one o f Daignault's on-going interests.
with the notion of desire.
background figures.

Here he confronts it

Girard, Rosset, Lacan and Deleuze are the

Now he is introducing a notion of desire as

seduction which can be discovered in pedagogical situations.

The

notion of seduction means the interplay, dialogue and encounters
between teachers and students.

The object o f desire is to know and

thus be seduced; it is unreachable or unattainable.

W e can never

know absolutely and yet our quest to know never stops.

Once the

object of desire has been appropriated, it loses its status as desirable;
possession means death.

Incidentally, in this regard Taubman

(1990) points out that pedagogy is the question of achieving the
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"right" distance between teachers and students in com plicity with the
Lacanian notion of "desire."
Desire cannot be a question o f "interior drives," or Girard's "lack
o f being," for to think of it in those ways is to reestablish the realm
o f interiority common to Man, even if one is Woman.

Daignault

(1982b) insists that "such is the romantic lie to which is opposed the
'romanesque' truth" (p. 5).

According to D eleuze (1987b) and

Daignault (1982b), the m isconceptions o f desire may be summarized
as follow ing three:
F i r s t , it can be put in relationship with lack or the law;
s e c o n d , with a natural or spontaneous reality; third ,
with pleasure or, above all, the festival, celebration
(i.e., reversal). (D eleuze, 1987b, p. 103)
We can see here desire represented as a lack, a function not of
the presence of a desirable object, but o f its actual absence and thus
o f its sole imaginary and symbolic presence.

On the contrary,

Daignault (1982b) asserts, desire is not "the inaccessibility of the
object of Desire," but also the assumption that it com es from "an
excessive appreciation of reality is rejected" (p. 6).

Thus he argues

that it is rather from "a radical 'differance' com ing from the pure
fabrication of a double" (p. 7).

This is an undifferentiated whole.

This also can be interpreted in light o f Deleuze's contention that
desire is production, or "desiring-production," not acquisition or lack.
Ronald Bogue (1989), commenting on D eleuze and Guattari, remarks:
Desire is essentially unconscious, and hence unrelated
to negation (there is no "no" in the unconscious),
indifferent to personal identities or body im ages
(central to Lacan's imaginary order) and independent

o f linguistic expression or interpretation (the core of
Lacan's Sym bolic order), (p. 89)
In other words, desire is "not internal to a subject, any more
than it tends toward an object" (D eleuze, 1987a, p. 89).
The notion of Other is much related to desire.

D eleuze (1987a)

defines: "The Other, as structure, is the expression of a possible
world" (p. 134).

This means that it is the structure o f the possible;

that the expressed possible world exists, but it does not exist
(actually) outside of that which expresses it.

D eleuze (1990) argues

that "the error o f philosophical theories is to reduce the Other
som etim es to a particular object, and som etim es to another subject"
(p. 307).

The Other is the subject.

Without the other there is no

su b ject.
In Daignault's staged conversation between Don Juan and Don
Quixote, he sheds light on

the nature of "dialogue" in its process. To

dialogue, as Serres (1983) asserts, is to require a third party and
exclude him/her at the same time.

to

To make som eone know as to

make som eone laugh is exem plified best by an excluded third within
a dialogue through Socratic irony.

Daignault (1982b) describes:

Protagoras knows that brings him equally to know, but
o f a knowledge which brings one to think it is futile to
know anything whatsoever that is true, not even to
know that to really know consists in knowing that we
know nothing. Socrates asserts that his conviction of
being the wisest, which in fact consists in mere
ignorance, com es to him mainly through the contacts
he has with the sophists. It is by questioning them,
that this game brought him to know, but o f knowledge
o f mere ignorance, (p. 18)
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To make som eone know is to dialogue and to make someone
believe that the third party is excluded, "in pretending to say the
truth" (p. 17).

It is in such a way that to make someone know, not

saying the truth, is like making someone laugh.
in a paradoxical position.

The excluded third is

The paradoxical situations within all

pedagogical relations, identifies Daignault (1982b), is "the promise of
the Other’s Desire" (p. 19).
Analogy in Education: An Archaeology without Subsoil (1983)
In this long essay Daignault explicates analogy in education
through "common sense" and "good sense."

He employs his

understanding of D eleuzean "sense" to inquire into curriculum
problem atics, such as theory and practice, teaching and learning.
A nalogy, com m only understood, is a nonconclusive reasoning that
proceeds through a fourth proportional term (A is to B as C is to D).
For instance, a pen to a writer is as a gun to a soldier.
Analogy, in Greek term "analogia or analogos," (from ana, "up,"
"upon," "throughout," and "continuous," and logos, "ratio," "reasoned")
means the comparison of sim ilarities in concepts or things. (A ngeles,
1981)

For Daignault (1983), analogy can be shown as proportional

identity by the means of analog communication.

He proposes four

categories o f analogy in education and further to fill a gap of
"rigorous analogies” in education:
The analogies of good sense and common sense; (2) the
scientific analogies (or theoretical m odels); (3) the
artistic analogies (or poetical metaphor); and (4) the
pedagogical analogies, (p. 20)

1 41
Here, Daignault (1983) again connects these analogies with
D eleuze's notion of sense, repetition and difference, and paradoxical
instance between signifiers and signifieds to deal with the
problematics between teaching and learning.
represent two series which meet in pedagogy.
gap between these two.

Teaching and learning
There is necessarily a

One knows and the other does not.

Let us

recall that the notion of sense, D eleuze (1990) writes, is the fourth
dimension of a proposition:

It is

[N]either the designation (objective signification), nor
the m anifestation (subjective signification), nor
signification (system atic signification). Sense does not
ex-ist but sub-sists in the world and in-sists in
language, (p. 38)
Daignault elaborates Deleuze's "sense" that it is expressed as an
event o f an entirely different nature.

D eleuze (1990) asserts that "it

emanates from nonsense as from the always displaced paradoxical
instance and from the eternally decentered ex-centric center" (p.
176).

In short, sense is produced by nonsense—"a donation of sense"

(D eleuze, 1990, p. 69).

Daignault (1983) also uses Steve Reich's

repetitive music to demonstrate that w hile "the shifting of the
repetition [is being] accelerated at a constant speed," the differential
value w ill be the same as the repetition itself to a certain extent;
"repetition generates the difference"—interpreting the com position
(p. 26).

On the other hand, in the learning process, the difference

needs to be annulled in order to repeat the same passage rigorously.
This means that "the repetition increases toward identity and the
difference decreases to zero"; in other words, "difference gives birth
to the repetition"—learning the com position (p. 27).

We can see
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there is a paradoxical instance which circulates in the difference of
teaching-learning process: "the 'non-sense' of the differential
repetition of analogies analogous to them selves.
r efer e n c e o f the analogies is itself a function of

And this su ithe difference put

forth for the joy o f teaching" (p. 27).
In this article Daignault (1983) deals with the notion of common
sense and good sense again, but related directly to curriculum.
Common sense is
a mechanism
by which is conferred
an identity to things—identity by virtue o f which
things may be know n—and, good sense, a mechanism
by which is imposed a direction, a good order in virtue
o f which a moral—which gives sense to life —may be
founded, (p. 4)
Daignault (1983) uses the analogy of common sense by reducing
the teaching-learning processes as the transm ission
what he terms "the problematics o f instruction."

o f inform ations—

In the

com m onsensical processes of teaching and learning, there is an
analogy of "going from the known to the unknown."

The analogy o f

good sense as transmission o f values is as "the problematics of
education."

It is a "mediation of relevance" (pp. 3-4).

Here, as we

can see, he protests these two notions o f "intellectual" sp a c e common sense and good sense; he warns us that w e must not take
the explanation of a fact for granted, but rather the birth or the
suspicion o f the existence o f this fact—a preconceived opinion
depending upon good sense and common sense.

Rather, he

encourages us to "wage

a battle against

the truisms and prejudices o f

[our] times" (p. 5).

is deconstructing

the notion of common sense

He

and the good sense o f "complex prejudices."
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Daignault (1983) proposes that curriculum is in a twofold
paradoxical position, which is a "complex" prejudice.

On the one

hand, education transmits the cultural heritage of the past; on the
other, it stimulates the youth to bring forth an improvement of
present conditions--an exam ple of an apparently contradictory
prejudice as a paradoxical instance.

We need not confuse

contradiction with paradox, for the principle o f contradiction points
to the real and the possible, not to the im possible.

The force of

paradoxes is that they are not contradictory, but that they allow us
be present at the genesis o f contradictions.
Curriculum Beyond Words. With Words (T984al
W hile this paper focuses on the issue of curricular language, it
also sheds light on the repudiation of an "overabundance of
signifiers" proposed by many structuralists, by Levi-Strauss in
particular.

Daignault (1984a) says: "Curriculum is beyond words,

that is what I say; with words, that's what I do" (p. 1).

This gives

rise to the problematic between the notion of "concept" or
signification and "word," in the sense o f Austin's dictum "to do things
with words" (p. 1).

However, the idea of speech-act

insufficient for Daignault to deal with curriculum.
is looking for the "performative" speech act,

theory is

Daignault (1984a)

and he

argues that "to

be meaningful is not to say the truth, but to succeed in the
'performance'" (p. 1).

This approach im plicates Lyotard's (1984b)

paralogy—a principle o f perform ance—understood as the primary
differences ("the heterogeneity o f the rules" and "the search for
dissent") for a model o f legitim ation.

This legitimation has nothing to
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do with maximized performance.

Paralogy is a m ove played in the

pragmatics o f know ledge.
The gap between philosophy as the content (the scientific) and
literature as the form (the poetic) is applicable to curriculum.
Among the debates between science and art, he sees:
double bind where curriculum stands.

There is an excluded th ird -

pedagogy—in teaching philosophy and literature.
refuses to exclude.

There is a

Daignault (1984a)

He states:

When I teach philosophy o f education, the temptation
is there, very often, to stop the teaching/learning
process (that is: concrete explanations, exam ples,
analogies, etc.), to jump into the philosophical work
stricto sensu. . . . So when I teach, I partly do
philosophy. But that is not philosophy teaching (I
mean common sense teaching), that is the practice of
my second field of study as a third which I refuse to
exclude; that is a third use o f my second field o f study:
neither scientific, nor poetic, (pp. 4-5).
This issue can be related to the problematic of the identity of
curriculum discussed previously (Daignault, 1982a).

He considers

curriculum as the excluded third in the debate between art (the
poetic) and science (the scientific).

He remarks:

Remember that the chem ist who teaches chemistry
does not accomplish the same thing in research as he
does while teaching. . . . Why is it so? Because
chemistry is not beyond words w hile education and
curriculum are. Moreover, chemistry is a real first
field o f study w hile education is a second field of
study. . . .While it is universal in science, it is local in
education, (pp. 9-10)
Daignault (1984a) uses Lyotard's the "narrator," the "narrated"
and the "narratee" to explain the relation between research and
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teaching (research and teaching in science and art).

He argues that

"teaching is the genesis o f the research and creative process itself" (p.
11).

In both science and art, the narratee is a virtual narrator and

vice versa in the teaching process, for competition and selection w ill
determine who w ill be the next master-narrators.

However, there is

the situation o f the narratee becoming spectator (in the case o f art
and education).

In curriculum, Daignault insists that there is a gap

between what the narratees (students) are and what narrators
(teachers) think they should be as narrators.

This gap resem bles the

gap between theory and practice, and there arises a paradoxical
instance between teachers and students.

There are also dangers o f

being terrorist (dogm atic) or nihilist (doing nothing).
Curriculum, says Daignault, is the excluded third in the debate
between art and science.

Daignault also uses Serres' "dialogue" to

explicate the excluded third in the communication process, which is
the finding o f "idealities" for science, the aesthetic piece for art.

The

question, he asks, is: What is the excluded third in education?
Daignault (1984a) answers:

"The history o f arts and the history of

sciences are a struggle against prejudices and cliches o f an age, while
the history o f education is an incredible struggle to find the best
prejudices and cliches" (p. 15).

He then proposes to employ

pedagogical analogy which can perform som ething m eaningful even
with scraps—this is the what is for curriculum.
Daignault (1984a) explicates the analogy (or metaphor) of
Lacan’s interpretation o f definition of the metaphor to demonstrate
pedagogical performance o f analogous comm unication.

He explains:

f(S’/S) = S (+) s
A metaphor is mathematical function such as the
signifier to signify [S] is replaced by a prime signifier
[S'] above the division's bar [/]. That is the condition
[=] for the signifier [S] to reach [(+)] a signified [s]. (p.
17)
In the formula, any signifier to signify which belongs to a
metaphor (in that case the word "metaphor") must be replaced by
another

signifier (in that case the formula itself). What is the

signified of the signifier

o f "metaphor"?

There is no answer; there is

only "infinite regression" from signifiers to signifiers.

Daignault

(1984a) sees that "the chain of signifiers is Desire in Lacan's theory.
And Desire is unattainable.

So the definition of a metaphor is beyond

words, with words" (p. 18).

The concept of "word" can be explained

through an analogy, according to Derrida (1978), to the notion of
"exergue" in the values of money as "usure."

Curriculum is analogous

to the definition of the metaphor, asserts Daignault.

Daignault

(1984a) believes that "curriculum is a metaphor the signification o f
which is unattainable.

The best we can do is to talk about it with

analogies" (pp. 20-21).

One of his hypothesis is the following:

We could learn to practice education as the third
excluded (from the debate between art and science);
we would refuse to be excluded from the so-called
rigorous (scientific and poetic) debates. What I
believe is that common sense and good sense opinions
are the third excluded by art and science. (Daignault,
1984a, p. 6)
Daignault wrote this paper in English; his native language is
French.

Thus he is doing something now with words, something

which is beyond words.

He also develops a "second order rhetoric—a

process in which someone acts like. . . like. . . the first 'like' is an
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analogy, the second 'like' is an analog communication" (pp. 23-24).
D eleuze (1986b) states that "writing has a double function: to
translate everything into assem blages and to dism antle the
assemblage.

The two are the same thing" (p. 47).

The dismantling of

the assem blages, observes D eleuze (1987a), makes the social
representation take flight in a much more effective way than a
critique would have done and brings about a "deterritorization" of
the world that is itself political and that has nothing to do with an
activity o f intimacy.
The problem again, Daignault sees, is that w e confuse education
with good sense and common sense.

Paradox is opposed to d o x a , in

both aspects of d o x a , namely, good sense and common sense.

Deleuze

(1990) explains as follow :
Good sense is said of one direction only: it is the
unique sense and expresses the demand o f an order
according to which is necessary to choose one direction
and to hold onto it. Good sense therefore is given the
condition under which it fulfills its function, which is
essentially to foresee. . . . In common sense, "sense" is
no longer said o f a direction, but of an organ. It is
called "common," because it is an organ, a function, a
faculty of identification that brings diversity in
general to bear upon the form o f the Same. Common
sense identifies and recognizes, no less than good
sense foresees, (pp. 75-78)
Good sense and common sense are therefore undermined by the
principle o f their production, and are overthrown from within by
paradox.

This paradoxical instance is linked to Derrida's insistence

that we must first try to conceive of the common ground, and the
"differance" o f this irreducible difference.

For instance, Zen appears
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to be anti-m etaphysical, and yet Zen masters often make statements
which are quite metaphysical.

Zen masters seem to be fond of

ordinary language, and yet their use of language is often
extraordinary.

This "paradoxical instance," for Zen masters, is the

original teaching o f Zen.
Curriculum and Action-Research: An Artistic Activity in a
Perverse Way (T984bl
This essay Daignault (1984b) returns to the relationship between
theory and practice, or between research and practice.

Daignault

(1984b) is suggesting a particular "geography" o f pedagogical thought
to inform curriculum theorists and teachers.

He distinguishes two

kinds o f "rapport" between theory and practice.

The first

corresponds to "technological space" or Platonistic ge ogra phy, and the
second to "political space"or Nietzschean

g eo g rap hy (p. 5).

The first

kind of rapport is considered as "an activity describing and
explaining objectively a certain portion o f reality, and the diverse
possible applications which enable this reality to be transformed";
the second aims at "the practice itself o f the setting up of a relation
between two opposite conceptions o f theory: objective and
normative" (Daignault, 1984b, p. 5).
This is a point where Daignault goes back to the concept of
Nietzschean "geography" o f thought and Deleuzean "nomadic
movement" and "lines of flight," in order to demonstrate the "spaces"
o f knowledge.

There are "technological," "political" and "pedagogical"

spaces, suggests Daignault (1984b).

According to D eleuze (1986c),

the nomads have no history; they only have geography.

"It is false to
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define the nomad by movement.

Rather he is who does not move. . . ,

and he is only seated while moving" (p. 51).

Daignault argues that

the notion o f space, in a different epistem e which represents modes
o f thought, is the constituting force of knowledge and its background.
The space is the "gaps" or "rapports," he sees, between theory and
practice, teaching and learning signifying the problematics of
curriculum

theorizing.

Daignault illustrates the significant difference between “de facto”
(by fact) and "de jure" (by right), a posterori and a priori, a
distinction also made by Kant and favored by Derrida, which
identifies the difference between pure reason and practical reason.
This difference among the spaces o f knowledge and the problematic
between theory and practice are reapproached.

K nowledge, for Kant,

is a synthesis of representations, "we think we can find a predicate B
outside the concept A, a predicate which is foreign to this concept,
but which we think we ought to attach to it" (D eleuze, 1983a, p. 97).
When it depends on experience it is a posterori; on the contrary, it is
the a priori synthesis which attributes a property to the object which
was not contained in the representation, "rational know ledge and a
priori knowledge are identical" (K ant,1966, Preface).

Daignault is

questioning whether de jure and de facto are reducible to political
space or technological space.
Daignault (1984b) connects the differences and gaps with his
proposed concept o f "pedagogical city" to describe the circulation of
places and occupants in the m iddle, or in-between technological
space and political space.

Daignault (1984b) states:
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One o f the main traits of the technological space and of
the Platonistic geography o f thought consists in setting
as a strict problem of com petence (know ledge, know 
how -to-be and know -how ), the passage from theory to
practice.
"Being" always assumes that som ewhere
exists a passage altogether possible and desirable, (p.
8)
He demonstrates that in three historical stages (antiquity to the
Enlightenm ent, M iddle A ge, Renaissance onwards) o f pedagogical
know ledge production there have also been corresponding changes
between the gap of "what exist" and "what should be."

Daignault

(1984b) claim s:
Education, no matter how it is perceived, has never
been, at least until recently, indifferent toward the
great dreams of humankind. For Plato, education is
seen as a process leading, ultimately at least, to the
realization of certain ideals. . . . We will in succession
com e upon three kinds of knowledge: know ledge, the
"know-how-to-be" and the "know-how," and the three
corresponding educational institutions: society, school,
and the individual. To each o f these three moments of
a dual evolution correspond three great conceptions of
Evil. (pp. 6-7)
First, technological space is evil as "ignorance, knowledge and the
educational city":

The gap between "what is" and "what ought to be"

is constituted by the only thing "that is" (Daignault, 1984b, p. 11).
K nowledge is implied by the passage from the sensible world to the
world o f ideas.

The obstacle to the passage from one world to

another world is "ignorance."
how-to-be and the school":

Second, it is "radical evil, the know
The passage from "what exists" to "what

should be" is no longer justified by knowledge as the guarantor
(Daignault, 1984b, p. 12).

A new conception of the educational

process is required to deal with adopting moral behavior.

The
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process of conversion guarantees the passage from one state to
another.

School becomes "a place in relation to the City of Men"

(Daignault, 1984b, p. 13).

Third, it is evil as "an obstacle, the know

how, and the individual":

The emergence o f the Subject transforms

all knowledge.

Reason substitutes for the laws o f the nature and

those o f God in constituting knowledge (Daignault, 1984b, p. 14).

The

gap between what is and what ought to be points to the realization of
possibilities inscribed in our world: an authentic know-how.

The

pedagogy o f the space o f know-how presupposes an individual force
which is education's role to develop and guide.
Each of these three technological spaces in curriculum is
involved with the possible application of these knowledges; these
prescriptions of the p ossibilities are chosen and regarded as the
guarantors o f later success.

The question of the prescription of

objectives calls for a political decision treated as question o f fact, as
the prescription of means.

Daignault (1984b) remarks that "the

Platonistic geography in constantly folding down the technological
space upon the political spaces treats the prescription of ends as a
simple prescription o f means" (p. 15).

In other words, technological

decisions underlie political considerations.
The question of "folding down" is related to the concept o f a
Nietzschean geography o f thought.

This can be explained through

D eleuze's notions regarding "perspectivism" in N ietzsche, analogous to
Daignault’s notion of "pedagogical city."

For both Deleuze and

Daignault, the pedagogical city is not the questioning of divergence
nor disjunction, because divergence is

no longer a principle

exclusion, and disjunction no longer a means of separation.

of
Rather,

152
"incompossibility" becom es now a means o f communication.

In

Deleuze's terms, each vantage point o f the city points to a city which
corresponds to each different vantage point, always a different city
within the city.
This rapport between theory and practice in political space has a
paradoxical nature.

Daignault continues to explicate the rapport or

gap through the paradox of signification and sense.

The interest of

the determinations of signification lies in the fact that they engender
the principles of non-contradiction and the excluded m iddle, instead
o f these principles being given ready-made.

The paradoxes

them selves enact the genesis of contradiction and inclusion in the
propositions stripped of signification.

This can be recalled as Stoics

display so much interest in the connection of propositions—things
and words (Daignault, 1984b).
Action-research focuses on the investigation political space and
on a question of de jure.

As Serres (1983) says:

To think the concept of disorder does not mean to
establish a dialogue between two symmetrical
ontologies but rather to rethink the relations between
order and disorder in such a way as to show how
everything begins, ends, and begins again according to
a universal principle o f disorder, (p. xxvii)
It is, then, necessary to rethink the world not in terms o f its
"laws"

and its regularities, but rather in terms of perturbations and

turbulences, in order to bring out its multiple forms, uneven
structures, and fluctuating organizations.

Foucault links discontinuity

and power relation to the laws, ethics, and social formation in France
at the time (Daignault, 1983).

153
D eleuze (1988) remarks that "the unthought is therefore not
external to thought but lies at its very heart, as that im possibility of
thinking which doubles or hollow s out the outside" (p. 97).

The

theme, which has always intrigued Foucault, is that of the "double,"
but the double is never a projection of the interior; on the contrary, it
is an interiorization o f the outside.

D eleuze (1988) asserts that "it is

not a doubling of the One, but a redoubling of the Other.

It is not a

reproduction o f the Same, but a repetition o f the Different" (p. 98).
For D eleuze, a problematization of thought has triple roots which are
know ledge, power and self.
Daignault (1984b) concludes:
The type of authorized prescriptions by actionresearch would never be derived from the “having to
be” but from the interdiction to desire it really: to
never prescribe, to never proscribe and never abstain
oneself, (p. 26)
Sem iotics o f Educational Expression (19861
This essay deals with the problematics between text and
knowledge in order to illustrate a "genre" o f teaching.

Daignault

observes (1986) the preponderance of signifiers over signifieds has
been the cornerstone for modern French philosophy and literature.
For instance, Derrida points out that writing (in the sense of trace) is
the logical prerequisite for speech.
do not

Daignault (1986) asserts that "we

write with ideas, but with words" (p.

signifiers instead o f signifieds is employed.

1). More emphasis upon
The style, rhythm, and

opacity of writing constitute aspects o f the work's meaning.
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Daignault (1986) explains: "Hidden into the text, under [a] word's
thickness, concepts becom e almost undiscoverable" (p. 2).
Many would object to this kind of playing on words or pun, for it
creates unnecessary difficu lties for the reader to understand
work.

the

Daignault insists this is a misunderstanding o f the notion

the text.

of

He continues to argue the preponderance of text over

signification lies in the gap between science and literature.

Many

scientists and logicians would consider writing as a transcriptionwritten words of their thoughts.
activity.

For them, thinking is a mental

In positive sciences and scientific communications, the sin e

qua non condition is the preponderance o f signifieds over signifiers.
Knowledge is made o f concepts, not o f words.

The representations of

the world is constituted by concepts as their boundaries or limits.
Such representations are called theories.

Word’s opacity, cacography

and noise make the understanding or usage o f theories difficult.
Daignault (1986) believes we need a bridge between words and
concepts; the bridge is a new genre—"textual staging o f knowledge"
for education (p. 5).

The linguistic expressions o f this genre are

reducible neither to words nor concepts.

Daignault (1986) insists:

This is not to say that I do not want any more to use
words to write and to use concepts to think! When I
say words I mean the matter o f text, that in which
signifiers have a preponderance over signifieds. And
when I say concepts, I mean the matter of knowledge,
that in which the preponderance is inverted, (p. 5)
To speak a language is to use linguistic signs which are
necessarily made of signifiers and signifieds.

Daignault (1986) says:

"A word is a sign, not a signifier; a concept is a signification, not a
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signified" (p. 5).

The instrumental use o f language is to mean

something with words.
science and literature.

There are rules for using language both in
In science, we need to create concepts; in

literature, we need to give form to the text.
these rules are limits or thresholds.

We can understand

These limits in science and

literature entail a gap or "road" between signifiers and signifieds.
The gap is constituted by the boundaries—"the no concept's locus in
signifieds" and "the no word's locus in signifiers" (Daignault, 1986,
pp. 5-6).

The former is called "expressible," the latter "expressed."

Both are the third excluded.
The boundary itself is what conditions the existence of creating
concepts in science and of giving form to text in literature.

For

exam ple, in science, one must build a boundary between what is and
what is not the concept.

The boundary functions as a condition that

"the identity of a concept is warranted and at the same time what is
not the concept can be declared different" (Daignault, 1986, p. 6).
Here, the difference is regarded as negation.

The boundary itself is

neither a part of the concept nor a part o f the difference.
boundary itself is a Derridean "differance."
remarks:

The

Daignault (1986)

"The expressible sub-sists between the world and the

language" (p. 7).

This can be also applied in literature.

The

"expressed" itself as boundary is a condition that a "tightness"
between signifiers is required to produce rhythms; at the same time,
the boundary gives forms to the opacity o f language.

Therefore, the

expressed "in-sists" between the language and the world (pp. 8-9).
In filling the gap between science and literature, in which text
and know ledge defend obstinately their boundaries, there is a
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boundary itself where pedagogy is said to be at work.

Daignault

believes our first intellectual activity in teaching as w ell as in writing
about curriculum consists in textual staging o f knowledge.

In this

regards, Serres (1989a) remarks:
We must im agine a way in which to teach, with the
same genre, both the poem and the theorem, without
wronging either and with mutual enrichment:
experimentation and experience, the new world of
scientists and the storytelling o f time immemorial, the
immortal world o f scientific laws and the new age of
the arts. (p. 34)
Daignault (1986) believes:
Education is the undying trace of the text of our dayto-day life, and such a text, which I call an expression,
is nothing but the boundary itself. Writing about
curriculum, in regards to the problematics o f
curriculum, is neither on the road or in the field but
subsists in the no man's land. (p. 8)
Daignault thinks that the bridge between words and concepts is
exactly the text o f our day-to-day lives.

Curriculum is the ever-

ending trace o f the text o f everyday life.

The trace , in disciplinary

terms, is the boundary itself between literature and science.

This

trace is unnameable for it sub-sists in the world and in-sists in the
language.
(1 9 7 3 )

What it "represents" cannot be represented.

Or, as Derrida

remarks:
The trace is not a presence but is rather the
simulacrum o f a presence that dislocates, displaces,
and refers beyond itself. The trace has, properly
speaking, no place, for effacem ent belongs to the very
structure o f the trace. Effacement must always be
able to overtake the trace; otherwise it would not be a
trace but an indestructible and monumental substance.
(p. 156)
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The boundary Daignault (1986) refers to is that "the no concept’s
locus in signifieds--expressible, no word's locus in signifiers—
expressed" (p. 5).

In Derrida’s terms, this boundary itself is exactly a

"differance"—a undifferentiated whole: a difference which makes the
difference between identity and difference.

The "differance"

undermines the m etaphysical hope o f finding a "transcendental
signified," a concept independent of language.

The metaphysics of

presence, which is self-presence, has been to find a stable place to
stand outside, or above it.

Derrida (1976) says "originary differance

is supplementarity as structure" (p. 167).

Here structure means that

irreducible com plexity within which one can only shape or shift the
play o f presence or absence: that within which metaphysics can be
produced but which m etaphysics cannot think.
The "textual staging o f knowledge," I believe, can be understood
through Derrida's notion o f silence.

For Derrida (1978), silence plays

the irreducible role o f that which bears and haunts language, outside
and a g a i n s t which alone language can emerge.

Ulmer (1985) puts

the matter well:
The risk in talking about silence (as many teachers
must do, and for which the operations of the M ime are
an analogy) is that a meaning might be given to that
which does not have one (and this fall back into
discourse is also a return to Hegelianism ). To control
this risk, sovereignty (a precursor o f deconstruction)
betrays meaning w i th i n
m eaning, betrays discourse
with in discourse, by choosing words, like "silence"
itself, that "make us slide." (pp. 184-185)
Although silence can save one from conceptualization, one should
not be attached to and be bound by it, according to Zen.

Thus the
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master Chap-chou was striking a flint for a light.
"I call this a light.
word.

What do you call it?"

He asked a monk,

The monk did not say a

Thereupon the master said, "If you do not grasp the meaning

o f Ch'an (Zen), it is useless to remain silent" (Chang, 1959, p. 156).
The important point is not whether one should speak or should be
silent, but non-attachment.

It is an extreme to keep silent.

Te-shan

told his disciples, "If you say a word, you w ill get thirty blows.

If

you do not say a word, you w ill get the same thirty blows across the
top of your head" (Chang, 1959, p. 133).

One should allow the mind

to operate freely, naturally and spontaneously.
Autobiography of a Stvle (T988al
The subject is this free, anonymous, and nomadic
singularity which traverses men as w ell as plants and
animals independently o f the matter of their
individuation and the forms o f their personality.
"Overman" means nothing other than this—the
superior type of everything that is. This is a strange
discourse, which ought to have renewed philosophy,
and which finally deals with sense not as a p r e d i c a t e
or a property but as an e v e n t . (D eleuze, 1990, p. 107)
It is my hope that after reading the above passage w e can better
understand Daignault's performance.

In this stylistic essay, Daignault

(1988a) continues to evoke the Kantian idea o f style and manner in
problematic of teaching and learning.

Daignault (1988a) states:

Style is the most expensive form of writing. Style is
always autobiographic and self-educative.
I can not
imagine working on style—even in a very intellectual
activity—without becom ing som eone else: m yself
different; and without feeling the work o f thinking on
my skin and in my stomach. What we call inspiration
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is only a somatic writing process.
eipistomachology. (p. 36)

We need

According to Deleuze (1987b), a style is managing to "stammer"
in one's own language, but he asserts, not "being a stammer in one's
speech, but being stammer o f language itself" (p. 4).

Being like a

foreigner in one's own language, it can be a gesture of the body
which prompts an understanding contrary to what language indicate.
In language, the equivalent o f such gesture are called "sense" or
"solecism," remarks D eleuze.

The follow ing passages from Daignault

(1988a) portrays his illustration of "sense":
E la n o f the E s s a y
Pedagogy and stylE:
oRchestring at temPo
chO rus and w riting.
P R a ctice o f the E P o c h e
Presence to sensE:
aRchaeology of a scriPt
sh 0.t in my life
P R O c ess o f the E P I e r a p h
PausE
pR om Pt
chO Ice (p. 22)
This passage is anagrammatically meaningful.

It is in a

"diagonal" sense inherited in language that Daignault strives to get
across the normative meaning embodied in common sense and good
sense.

We can see Prometheus and Epimetheus are implicated in

these lines.

Daignault (1988a) explains:

technical craft are gifts from Prometheus.
Epimetheus.

"Scientific knowledge and
But thinking is a gift from

The guardian o f hope has modeled human time in his

own image; he has created humanism" (p. 34).

It needs to be

understood, I think, through his perform ance—sty le —o f presenting
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this study.
position.

What I am doing here, I think, is in a paradoxical
As Samuel Beckett (1976) has done: to name the

unnameable.

However, I am "making" sense.

Daignault also exem plifies a difference between French language
and English language.

In some ways he masters both, in order to

point out that not only being a stranger in Others is a very efficient
way to be "outside," as he subsists in that o f Others, but also as
W illiam Pinar's conviction, cited by Daignault, that "the
comprehension of the relations among one's life history, biographic
present and one's intellectual works surmounts one’s engaging in
educational work" (Daignault, 1988a, p. 9).

So this neither means

that speaking (mastery o f a) different language is superior to those
who only speak one language, nor simply to translate or to copy one
into the other; but in the sense o f Deleuze's "becoming," it is not
phenomenon of imitation or assim ilation, but of a "double capture, of
a non-parallel evolution, o f nuptials between two reigns" (1987b, p.
10).

To become is a matter o f "involuting"; it is neither regression

nor progression.

Deleuze admits that it is difficult to explain, yet he

sta tes:
[T]o what extent one should involute. 'I' is obviously
the opposite of evolution, but it is also the opposite of
regression, returning to a childhood or to a primitive
world. To involute is to have an increasingly simple,
econom ical, restrained step. (1987, p. 29)
Deleuze praises the follow ing as to what the definition of "style"
is, as Marcel Proust remarks, "great literature is written in a sort of
foreign language within our own language" (D eleuze, 1987b, p. 54).
In other words, we might be better to speak a kind of "foreign"
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language with in our own language.

In A Theory o f Sem iotics (1976),

Umberto Eco insists that "to re-write in another language means to
re-think" (pp. vii-viii).

W e can clearly see the Daignault's endeavors

present a re-thinking in English language of French, a re-thinking of
what curriculum

means.

To think over something is to think oneself:
what thinking means.

That is in this view,

To know is not the same as to think.

W e can

know many things, w hile not knowing ourselves: that is a matter o f
thinking.

In regard to this matter, M ichel Serres (1983) has

pointedly made a sim ple yet com prehensive comm ent.

Serres states:

"For Plato and a tradition which lasted throughout the classical age,
knowledge is a hunt.

To know is to put to death—to kill the lamb,

deep in the woods, in order to eat it" (1983, p. 28).
is to kill, to rely on death.

In brief, to know

Embracing a Deleuzean notion of thinking,

Daignault insists that to think is to experiment and to problematize.
D eleuze (1988) puts it:

"Knowledge, power and the self are the triple

root of a problematization o f thought" (p. 116).
In examining Rousseau's writings, E s s a y . Derrida explicates the
problem atics o f the relationship between speech and writing
(Derrida, 1978).

Derrida insists:

The difficulty o f the pedagogy of language and o f the
teaching of foreign language is, Emile w ill say, that one
cannot separate the signifier from the signified, and
changing words, one changes ideas in such a way that
the teaching of a language transmits at the same time
an entire national culture over which the pedagogue
has no control, which resists him like the alreadythere preceding the formation, the institution
preceding instruction. (1978, p. 170)
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In his article, "The Professor o f Desire," Steven Ungar (1982)
argues that the impact of the importation and exportation o f foreign
discourse is not sim ply the abstract translation from one language or
culture to another, but rather to heighten "our awareness o f the
social factors affecting the distribution of French ideas as something
other than duty-free import" (p. 85).
. . .Yfl-X Cursus r. . .1 J IA 2. Arts aRe. . . (T988hl
This essay can be interpreted in its title itself, Daignault (1988b)
explains, that the title is a "transliteration" of the follow ing three
paragraphs:
Why an excursus, [now? To deal with the form. Is it
possible to change the field without m oving the
comma? Anything goes in curriculum? To answer
those questions, I propose an y-x dictionary of n
elem ents instead o f a function. A contribution to
curriculum staging.] The above is an abstract the title
of which is not yet known; only thought. The abstract
is not an abstract o f this paper but a t r a n s c r ip t io n of
an « x » , teasing [a « t » signe] here and there, in the
c u r s u s o f this paper, (p .l)
Once again, Daignault (1988b) discusses the difference between
Kant’s concept o f "method" and "manner."

The former, Daignault

notes, stricto sensu, is the notion of s tr u c tu r e .

Derrida notes:

This

structure refers only to space, geometric or morphological space, the
order of forms and sites (Derrida, 1978); the latter "manner", refers
to Deleuzean "becomings", is style, morality of existence (D eleuze,
1987a).

For Daignault (1988b), method is "singular and definite,

which means that it is T H E

way; manner is singular but indefinite,

which means it is A way; then he focuses on curriculum study and
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insists that it is always plural—W A Y s , which means it is neither
definite nor indefinite" (p. 14).

Daignault interprets the difference

between transliteration and translation, which is "iter," as "way" (in
Greek) or "repetition" (I=re[t]).

He (1988b) notes:

In Latin, iter means "way" [hodos in Greek; as a prefix,
it also means "repetition." I say it again: "I" = re-"t."
In the work o f R oussel, anagrams (anaphones, actually,
as in the work o f Saussure) were only A way: iter or
hodos; a manner. Saussure maybe tried to embed
anagrams in THE way of sem iotics: trans-iter or metahodos [to go across the way]; a method. I am trying to
conceive of passages in many ways: iter-iter [way &
repetition]; W AYS. N ot all the w ays—only som e—but
always plural. I try to transcribe flashes that emerge
from the play o f transliteration; that makes perhaps a
translation, (p. 16)
Daignault is
answer, question

trying to show the passage between answer and
and question which means not the passage from a

question to an answer, but their absolute difference—in the
Deleuzean term "unilateral distinction."

The event, being itself

im passive, involves the transformation o f relationship between
difference and opposition.

The absolute difference allow s both active

and passive to be interchanged more easily, since it is neither the
one nor the other, but rather the effect of their common result.
Daignault is writing the text anagrammatically to connect what we
normally acquire intellectually.
ways of writing and thinking.

He is building bridges to show other
The connection he makes is not

anything counts.Rather, Daignault (1988b)
is in everything:

insists that "everything

in many ways only" (p. 7). The bridge is

paradoxical, for Serres; it connects the disconnected.

Daignault
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em phasizes that such a question "always im plies an answer the
destiny of which is to close space; that kind of space the opening of
which is called problem" (1988b, p. 6).

This can not be confused with

the relation of cause and effect; rather, says D eleuze (1990), "[events]
being always only effects, are better to form among them selves
functions o f quasi-causes or quasi-causality which are always
reversible [the wound and the scar]" (p. 8).

It is to think the

possibility o f thinking a relationship without thinking it.
Daignault strives to think o f curriculum as a non-complete
relative difference—unilateral distinction.

Curriculum is, says

Daignault, an intransitive v e r b -to pass, only to pass, in terms of
Joycean "riverrun."

He also insists that curriculum is regarded as an

"event," which subsists or inheres in language.

Curriculum, like an

event, sim ply happens.
The Language of Research and the Language of Practice: Neither
One nor the Other: Pedagogy (1988c1)
This paper deals with that language, used by researchers and
practitioners, that is caught up within the "intellectual" space which
everything is reducible to either propositions or things.
(1 9 8 8 c)

Daignault

states:
To worry about differences between the language of
research and practice is to be concerned about the lack
o f a common language, then of a dialogue, of a
collaboration, of an involvem ent, and finally o f any
real improvement in education, (p. 46)

Here, on the basis o f the difference between research and
practice, Daignault raises the question: Is a dialogue possible between
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researchers and practitioners in curriculum without any common
language?

The answer, insists Daignault, is "yes."

The lack of a

common language is a false problem to which no resolution can be
reached if it is seen as a real problem.
reductionism, argues Daignault.

The real problem is a twofold

On the one hand, a reduction to what

is common to both languages of research and practice—a weak than
common sense—is a kind o f nihilism .

One the other hand, a reduction

to kn ow led ge—the absolute domination of research language—is a
kind of terrorism.
Daignault (1988c) uses a Frank O'Hara poem to explicate
differences between theory and practice, which is analogous to
painting and poetry for him.

He reiterates, cited from The Selected

Poem s o f Frank O'Hara (1974), which is appropriate here:
I am not a painter. I am a poet. Why? I think I would
rather be a painter, but I am not. W ell,
for instance, Mike Goldberg is starting a painting, I
drop in. "Sit down and have a drink" he says. I drink;
we drink. I look up. "You have SARDINES in it." "Yes,
it is indeed something there." "Oh." I go and the days
go by and I drop in again. The painting is going on,
and I go, and the days go by. I drop in. The painting
is finished. "Where's S A R D I N E S T All that's left is just
letters, "It was too much," Mike says.
But me? One day I am thinking of a color: orange. I
write a line about orange. Pretty soon it is a whole
page o f words, not lines. Then another page. There
should be so much more, not o f orange, o f words, of
how terrible orange is and life. Days go by. It is even
in prose, I am a real poet. My poem is finished and I
haven't mentioned orange yet. It's tw elve poem s, I
call it O R A N G E S . And one day in a gallery I see Mike's
painting, called S A R D IN E S , (p. 47)
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Daignault view s this poem as an analogy to teachers and
teaching. Daignault proposes that we can write something about
teachers, entitled T e a c h e r , while doing so without saying a word on
teaching.

This something he calls pedagogy.

Daignault (1988c)

argues:
D ifferences between the language o f practice and the
language of research are not reducible at the surface
level. . . . Nevertheless, language is language. At some
level, there are no differences between languages. . . .
K nowledge could be defined as the linguistic
articulation of a sym bolic exchange. . . . The world is
not reducible to a general sem iotics, (pp. 49-50)
The surface level is the one of vocabulary, the syntax and the
style.

Both languages "deserve" more than any reduction to what

they have in common.

According to the sem iotics definition of

language, anything could be seen as a sign to be exchanged against
another sign.

Within the limits of language, one could argue that

there are similar structures between research and action,
practice.

The one of knowledge is an example.

theory and

However, the

collaboration between researchers and practitioners at the language
level must be encouraged, but not at the cost of reducing everything
to fragmented knowledge or common language.

For example,

Foucault (1973) argues that there is no such thing—common
language—any longer;

he dem onstrates the relationship between

madness and reason:
The constitution o f madness as a mental illness. . .
affords the evidence o f a broken dialogue [between
reason and m adness], posits the separation as already
affected, and thrusts into oblivion all those
stammered, im perfect words without fixed syntax in

1
which the exchange between madness and reason was
made. (p. x)
Daignault (1988c) again raises the question of boundary
concerning the com plexity of the world—what is "general text" in
Derrida—to argue that "there is no possible knowledge o f the world"
(p. 50).

Knowledge represents a focus on signs.

com plex interweaving o f signs and "notes."

The world is a

The notion of note, claim s

Daignault (1988c), can be defined as "a force (a kind o f differential)
and a difference of intensity insisting on the fuzzy border of any
sign" (p. 50).

For instance, culture can be defined as "any plane of

the world, any particular focus or folding o f a given assemblage o f
signs and/or notes" (Daignault, 1988c, p. 51).

A culture or a plane is

a partition of three discourses: "text," "score," and "versification."
Daignault (1988c) asserts:
A discourse made o f signs only is a text. A discourse
made of notes only is a score. A discourse made of
both signs and notes is a versification. . . . A partition
made of texts only is a sem iosis. A partition made of
scores only is a notation. A partition made of verses
only or any combination is a composition. The same
partition can be seen at the same time as a sem iosis, a
notation and a com position; that is what composition
means, (pp. 51-52)
Daignault proposes to define research and practice in curriculum
as "compositions"; in short, curriculum as com position.

Therefore, the

pedagogy he perceives is a composition of texts and notes.

Pedagogy

is operating on the boundary between a simulacrum of prescription:
a what ought to be curriculum and a simulacrum of description: a
what is curriculum.
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Where Did the Subject Go? (1989a)
This essay is based upon Derrida's deconstruction—"differance"
andDeleuze's concept of "different-ziation"

to claim that the subject

is not dead, but "resisting with its skin" (p. 2).

The resistance,

Daignault (1989a) remarks:
Against a structural reversal, with
liquidation o f subjectivity; against
consciousness as the center of the
against the sublation (a u f h e b u n g )
subject into the collective subject
o f the world, (p. 1)

its pure and sim ple
the return o f selfworld; and finally
o f the individual
as a broader center

The concept o f differance has been discussed previously (see
Daignault, 1986; also chapter two).

The concept o f skin, adopted

from Deleuze, is that of the "surface" o f events, things and states of
affairs.

The skin or surface is where our senses are working.

Deleuze insists, cited from Paul Valery, "what is most deep is the
skin" (1990, p. 10).

Everything happens at the boundary or limit

between th i n g s and p r o p o s i t i o n s .

Everything returns to the surface,

this is the result o f the Stoic operation—the unlimited return.
Becoming-mad or becom ing unlimited is no longer a ground which
ru m b les.
Daignault (1989a) argues that the irreducibility in discursive
analysis is one of the major contributions o f post-structuralist
thought.

He says:
It denotes “today's unthinkable” in the midst of
structuralism, in the possibly hegem onic situation of
language, because language today has also becom e a
problem: [Tjhere is no way out of it; but not
everything can be reduced to it. (p. 8)
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The concept of "flash" in the lightning o f darkness, explained by
Daignault, is exactly the sense of "differance" in relation to itself in
which differentiation is realized; this also can suggest Derrida's
"trace" which involves leaving a trace and erasing itself at the same
time.

As Lyotard's (1987) concept of difference within identity,

passion within reason, in light lies our darkness.

A lso in Deleuze's

notion of "between," a passage from Virginia W oolf cited by Deleuze,
can be used to explain (which he recorded) that "I spread m yself out
like fog B E T W E E N the people that I know the best" (1987b, p. 27).
D eleuze (1987b) remarks:
The middle has nothing to do with an average, it is not
a centrism or a form of moderation. On the contrary,
it's a matter of absolute speed. Whatever grows from
the middle is endowed with such a speed. We must
distinguish not relative and absolute m ovem ent, but
the relative and absolute speed o f any movement, (p.
27)
Daignault insists that the global text—what Kristeva (1980) calls
"general text"—is not reducible to the language, or sym bolic order, or
sem iosis, but that it does not elude these things either.

He is

suggesting everything can be distinct from the global text, yet the
global text can never be distinct from all those things—what Kristeva
(1980) calls "particular text"—that are distinct from it—D eleuze
terms "unilateral distinction."
Curriculum as Composition: Who is the Composer? (1989b)
In staging his own writing and teaching, Daignault starts this
essay to deal with the problematics of the notion o f subject or
subjectivity found in many post-structuralists' works and his
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proposed "composition" (This essay was later published in 1991).
Many critical theorists, Marxists in particular, have been dissatisfied
with and detested by the privileged "apparatus" of the notion of
"general text"-textuality.

Paul Smith (1989) argues that not only

such a notion as textuality is questionable as that to which all
conceptual phenomena must be submitted, but also problematic is
the impotence to which the notion leads us, unless it leaves room for
m ediation by active subject/individuals.

Daignault (1989b)

emphasizes that the subject is neither a person, nor any form of
individual, collective or transcendental consciousness; rather, the
subject is comprised of the "dynamics of an analyzer and of a
synthesizer both dealing with expressions I call notes" (p. 1), or as
impersonal plural agency.

In part this parallels the notion o f "agency

without agents" in Foucault’s "subject-positions."

Foucault (1972) has

said that a subject is not a "speaking consciousness," but rather "a
position that may be filled in certain conditions by various
individuals" (p. 115).

Moreover, this echoes Deleuze's (1987a)

"individuation with subject."

Daignault (1989b) remarks that the

subject o f education is the locus of the composition of a subjectivity
in curriculum which makes sense.

To describe a pedagogy qua the

subject o f education does not consist in analyzing the relations
between the teacher and what he says, the students and what they
say (or wanted to say); but in determining what position can be
occupied by any individual if he/she is to be the subject o f education.
Daignault emphasizes the com position of expressing that is "a
process through which his self-consciousness offers less and less
resistance to the reality o f transcendental e x p r e s s i b l e s and to the
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em ergence of new empirical e x p re s se d s" (1989b, p. 1).

In Daignault's

notion of "composer," we can clearly see that "expressing" is a
present on-going process, the concept o f "expressibles" is a
transcendental, ideal concept of "what ought to be"; the concept of
"expresseds" is simply the emergence o f new empirical presence.
remarks that the composer is

He

constituted in the "dynamics" of both

"synthesizer" and "analyzer" in the work

or play (pp. 3-4).

dynamic process produces the expressed

as the doubling of the

expressible, the doubling o f a double.

This

For the expresses has already

incorporated the expressible as interiorized double.
The issue of "sense," "expression," "expressible" and "expressed"
can be found in Deleuze's (1990) "logic of sense," which dealt with
the distinction between things and propositions, expressible and
expressed.

The concept o f "notation," adopted from Jean-Jacques

Rousseau, according to Daignault, has much to say about Derrida's
critique o f Rousseauistic phonocentrism.

Notation is not simply a

supplement of speech, rather it precedes speech and it does not exist
without writing.

It is unforgettable; it is to be rearranged, no longer

to be spoken about, but to be written on as composition o f the
subject (Daignault, 1989b).
The mastery of the individual’s survival is one o f the most
significant successes o f science and rationality.
is the major player in the Enlightenment.

The faculty o f reason

Yet we found in

contemporary discourses that if one has multiple goals, and many
ways to evaluate them, the concept o f rational decision making is
threatened.

If everything is reasonable, then nothing is reasonable.

Daignault's concept o f "composition" and "decomposition" are
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som ehow perceptible in a sense o f the notion o f "event" in Foucault’s
project, it suffices to say the concept o f "multiplicity."

W e can

understand the problematic in terms of the m ultiplication in voices.
The breakdown of rational standards has led to an "anything-goes" or
nihilistic attitude, as Feyerabend (1975) terms it.

A ll competing

voices have been silenced, causing society to become stagnant and
stultifying.

We need to discover by what forces problems transform

them selves and to demand the constitution o f new ways o f thinking.
W e have other problems to discover; w e need to create a new series
o f events.
The no concept's locus is called "expressible" and the no word's
locus, an "expressed."

Both are not something.

Both are not nothing.

The expressible "sub-sists" between the world and the language.
Difference is identical to negation in defining a concept by scientific
usage.
events.

Deleuze (1990) says that "they are not things or facts, but
We can not say that they exist, but rather that they subsist

or inhere" (p. 5).
reinscribed.

The subject can be reinterpreted, restored, and

In conclusion, Daignault (1989b) remarks that "the

subject o f education [the frontier, once again, between an expressing
and a composer] grows, through such a process o f com position,
towards a continuing problematization of the ego" (p. 15).

Such an

event, com position and decom position, functioning against all
personalism, psychological or linguistic, promotes a third person, and
even a "fourth person singular," the non-person or "It" in which we
recognize ourselves and our community better than in the exchanges
between an I and a You.

173

Education. Poststructuralism and Local Emancipation (19901
This essay, comprised of 111 passages quoted from post
structuralist texts (m ost are his own translation from the French),
contrasts Foucault’s notion o f truth with Habermas' idea of
emancipation.

The debates (e.g., Graff, 1984; Dews, 1986; Ray, 1988;

Poster, 1989; Habermas, 1990) between critical theory and poststructuralism has occupied the center stage of disputes regarding
social theory in various disciplines.

Daignault attempts to localize

those arguments and to shed light on curriculum discourses.

The

major issue here is the difference between concepts of "progress" or
human emancipation in post-structuralism and critical theory.

The

notion of progress for critical theorists, Daignault argues, is
synonym ous with "universal emancipation."

Daignault (1990) also

reminds us that the Enlightenment (A u fk la ru n g l is the "foundation o f
the very idea of progress in modern and contemporary education" (p.

1).
Daignault review s several problematics, "local" rather than
"global," o f those debates and their consequences for contemporary
curriculum theory.

These problematics include the old

Enlightenm ent meta-narratives, the notion of progress, the concept o f
truth, and universal foundation of reason.

He then proposes an

ethics (new ethics) without moral, power and interpretation, and
"local emancipation."

This new ethics, follow ing Foucault's

conception, is conceived as a very strong structure o f existence,
without any relation with the juridical per se, with an authoritarian
system , with a disciplinary structure (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983).
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Traditional notions about our morality has been articulated in the
idea of analytical or necessary link between ethics and other social or
econom ic or political structures (Foucault, 1983).

The challenge is to

problem atize prevailing practices and to interrogate power relations
inherent in all social existence.

It is to support local and minor forms

o f knowledge and a dislocation of comm only held conceptions about
experiences, practices, and events.
It is not only the truth is what enables the mind to think; it is
also the truth that enables us is to care for oneself and others.
Foucault (1988a) insists that to know oneself is to care for oneself.
Daignault (1990) notes that "any pretention to reach the Absolute is
a movem ent through which something is excluded; there is no
absolute truth" (p. 3).

The project of Foucault is to particularize the

universal, not to deny it.

The way o f telling the truth is an endless

interpretation, and to tell the truth is independent o f a political
regim e which tends to be indifferent to truth and w hile prescribing
the truth.
Daignault (1990) notes we move toward a relativism , to a
thought which is independent of any system of thought.

Daignault's

thinking here refers to Serres' (1989b) notion to understand without
a concept.

Serres proposes to search for a new knowledge--

"knowledge without death" (p. 110).

Serres (1989b) notes:

Alexander [the concept] reigns over all, including his
opponents. His power is so great that none remains
who can object. To contradict the king is to belong to
the king, to oppose power is to enter into the logic of
the powerful, (p. 142)
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Daignault insists that post-structuralism does not criticize the
universal, but does criticize the juncture between the global and the
universal.

This juncture is what produces dogmatism.

Dogmatism is

conceived as any local victory which tries to impose itself as a norm.
However, this local victory is simply a universal effect.

Daignault

proposes to avoid dogmatism by thinking of this effect locally, not
globally.

This "localism" may be regarded as "relativism," not a

global philosophy, a "local effect of their [post-structuralists]
commitment to reach the universal" (Daignault, 1990, p. 36).

Post

structuralism requires one to assume responsibility for truth.

To

champion localism without com m itting to truth is what produces
nihilism.

Daignault (1990) concludes:

"Local emancipation is not

nihilistic" (p. 36).

Commentary
Daignault's work revives the question o f the construction of the
subject.

Structuralism is correct when it throws back into question

the central position of the subject in humanism; it is by insisting on
the fact that the subject is sym bolically determined that it succeeds
in decentering it, indeed even dissolving it.

But structuralism leaves

intact the question of the sensible and not merely sym bolic
relationship of the subject to the body.

From my view , one merit of

Deleuze's work is that it has com pletely revived this question.
Daignault (1989a) notes:

"It is not a matter of going back to the

romantic or phenom enological subject, but o f showing that the real
fissure of the "I" com es into being also through differance-making

176
and not just through becoming-differance" (p. 37).

It is important to

note that the articulation of understanding and speaking o f the self
are subjected to a different kind o f reading.
shifting perspectives.

It is the novelty of

The key concept, explained by D eleuze (1990),

is consequently that of individuation.

He states:

The essential process of intensive quantities is
individuation.
Intensity is individualizing; intensive
quantities are individualizing.
Individuals are signalsign system s, (p. 47)
The question of signals is taken up again in A Thousand Plateaus
(1987a) in reference to the synthesizer: the synthesis of continuous
variation; it is precisely at that point that the sensuality of sense is to
be found.

Not that sense is sensible, but its synthesis is.

Furthermore, a synthesis im plies a surface for recording differences
in intensity, a sort of skin of differentiating sense; the condition
without which the subject would never be anything more than a sign
in a differentiating structure, or a differentiation subordinated to the
identity o f the plentitude o f consciousness.

D eleuze (1987a) remarks:

The individual is in no way indivisible, but never stops
dividing as he changes his nature. There is no me in
what he expresses; because he expresses [IJdeas as
internal m ultiplicities made up o f differential relations
and points that stand out, of pre-individual
singularities. And there is no I expresses there either;
because there again he is forming a multiplicity of
actualization, like a condensation o f points that stand
out, an open collection o f intensities, (p. 143)

Jacques Daignault's curriculum theory draws upon French
philosophers M ichel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, G illes D eleuze, Jean-

Ill

Fran?ois Lyotard and M ichel Serres.

In these essays reviewed here,

Daignault analyzes and demonstrates pedagogical im plications of
post-structuralism and stages questions regarding future p ossib ilities
for curriculum.

In my view , Daignault's major contribution to the

curriculum field is to challenge us to rethink curriculum and
ourselves as educators.

He exhibits how we can understand and do

curriculum p o s t - s t r u c t u r a l l y .

More importantly, to understand

Daignault's work is to "listen" to his performative staging and to
encounter.

These essays hint at the minimum effect he has

produced.

Another summarized version of Daignault's work, "Traces

at Work from Different Places," can be found in W illiam Pinar's book,
Understanding Curriculum as Phenom enological and Deconstructed
T ext (1992).
Daignault is provoking a new way o f thinking in a complex way
and in an elusive manner.

This new way of thinking, he insists, is

not analytical thinking, which is in terms o f "either/or"; nor is it
dialectical thinking which is "both/and" (W ilden, 1972).

He provokes

a notion of thinking or sense that to think oneself as self-educative
means "to experiment and to problematize" (D eleuze, 1988; Foucault,
1989) and to think otherwise; to make sense which by itself is a
problem atic and problem atizing. Fundamentally Daignault's works
can be grasped through the concept of paradox, the paradoxical
instance and nomadic movement.

The notion o f paradoxical instance

is the movement of forces which circulates between two series of
oppositions and moves both directions at the same time.

It is the

moment of the simultaneity o f coincidence when an occupant without
a place is the same as a place without an occupant.

As Deleuze
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(1990) remarks, "the younger becoming older than the older, the
older becom ing younger than the younger—but they can never
finally become so; if they did they would no longer be becoming, but
would be so" (p. 136).
Daignault reiterates the relations between nihilism and terrorism
in pedagogy.

Following D eleuze, he states that "there exist two great

illness of structure.

The filling-up o f the empty case by its

accom panying subject and the empty case left alone without
accompaniment.

The consequences in education are terrorism and

nihilism" (Daignault, 1982a, p. 192).

Such a twofold reductionist's

tendency in curriculum theory and practice is evident in the gap
betw een what is and what ought to be.

In the play between what is

and what ought to be one creates pedagogical meaning.

Daignault

remarks that this idea can also be related to the concept o f structure
which encapsulates what is and what ought to be and forms a closed
system .

He argues that the demotion of the paradoxical and endless

movement within the structure is in question.

Daignault rejects the

presumption of a fixed principle, a center and a solid foundation
which regulates structure, and thereby forecloses the system.
These essays exhibit the movement o f his thought and style.
They "stage" the problematic between theory and practice.
Problem atics o f binary oppositions (description and prescription,
teaching and learning, thinking and action, method and manner, etc.)
are presented as irreducible to either one.

Daignault insists that they

are inseparable from the m ovem ent o f paradoxical instances.
short, sense as nonsense produces meaning (se n s ) .

In
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Daignault's thought is derived from understanding paradox.
offers us first, a definition of curriculum as paradoxical.

He

He

approaches curriculum through D eleu ze’s notion o f "sense," "occupant
without place" and "place without occupants." To define is to distort,
but Daignault does not propose that we should stop the project of
definition; on the contrary, one works "to multiply the definitions."
Second, he explicates the notion o f desire, arguing that desire as
seduction can be implicated in the pedagogical situation.

Paradox is

exactly the link between desire and promise, teaching and learning;
in other words, it is "the promise o f the other's desire" (Daignault,
1982b, p. 22).

To teach, for him, is to promise the other's desire: to

seduce through knowledge.

Third, Daignault presents an analogy o f

common sense and good sense, in Greek, as d o x a .

Common sense is a

mechanism by which identity is conferred to things and is an analogy
o f the known to the unknown.

Good sense is a mechanism by which

a direction is imposed, a good order and is an analogy o f the moral to
be founded.

Through contrasting with analogy, para -d o x is opposed

to both aspects of d o x a , paradox would provide us with pedagogical
meaning.

Fourth, he explores political space and technological space

in curricular thought, questioning the "excluded third" between these
two spaces.

Whether "de jure" and "de facto" are reducible to

political space or technological space is questionable.

Fifth, regarding

thinking, knowing and feeling, Daignault insists that thinking is
different from knowing, but knowledge and feeling are not opposed
to thinking.

As Serres (1983) remarks:

death" (p. 28).

"To know is to kill, to rely on

Sixth, regarding d i f f e r a n c e and unilateral distinction,

he explicates the notion of "text" and problem of language.

He
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reexam ines Derrida's readings o f Jean-Jacques Rousseau to
demonstrate the unilateral distinction to shed light on d i f f e r a n c e .
Seventh, regarding style, manner and method, he challenges us to
think ourselves in provocative ways as self-educative.

He elaborates

D eleu ze’s (1987b) definition of style, i.e., "great literature is written
in a sort of foreign language within our own language" (p. 57).
Eighth, regarding dialogue and translation, the questions of
curriculum planning and im plem entation, research and practice are
raised to reinscribe the excluded third.

He insists that curriculum is

a non-com plete relative difference, an intransitive verb--to p ass—or
in the Joycean sense, "riverrun."

Ninth, regarding the subject of

curriculum, he questions and claim s that it does not exist, but
subsists in things and insists in language; this questioning of
curriculum as "event" gives us new understanding o f curriculum and
curriculum

discourse.

CHAPTER FIVE
TO W ARD A PO ST-STR U C TU R A LIST CURRICULU M AND
PEDAGOGY: A TAOIST CONNECTION
Authentic teaching is watchfulness, a mindful
watching flow ing from the heeding of the call in the
pedagogical situation that the good teacher hears.
Indeed, teachers are more than they do; they belong to
that which is beyond their doing; they are the
teaching. (Aoki, 1988, p. 16)
Starlight asked Non-Being: "Master, are you? or are
you not?" Since he received no answer whatever,
Starlight set him self to watch for N on-Being. He
waited to see if N on-Being would put in an
appearance. He kept his gaze fixed on the deep void,
hoping to catch a glimpse of Non-Being. All day long
he looked, and he saw nothing. He reached out to
grasp, and grasped nothing.
Then Starlight exclaimed at last: "That is IT."
This is the furthest yet! Who can reach it?
I can comprehend the absence o f Being
But who can comprehend the absence of Nothing
(V o id )?
If now, on top of all this, Non-Being IS ,
Who can comprehend it?
(The Way of Chuang Tzu. 1965, p. 125)

This study concludes by linking post-structuralist thinking with
the Chinese Taoist and Zen perspectives, a linking that may suggest a
next step for curriculum theory developm ent.

To begin this process

o f linking, I w ill review aspects of Taoism, Zen philosophy, and post
structuralism as they speak to important concepts in contemporary
curriculum discourse.

We begin by exam ining briefly Taoism and

Zen, then moving to commenting on certain connections among
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Taoism , Zen, and post-structuralism.

From possibilities created by

these connections, I w ill briefly reflect on the follow ing curriculum
concepts: the self and its displacem ent, language as paradox,
aesthetics, and listening.

This reflection represents the end of the

b eg in n in g.

Taoism and Zen Philosophy
Chinese Taoist philosophy, namely Lao-tze (Lao-tzu) and
Chuang-tze (Chuang-tzu), is embodied in everyday life and seems to
be more attractive to many Chinese than Confucian philosophy.

Lao-

tze's The Tao Te Ching (1989) is comprised o f approximately five
thousand words.

In Chinese culture, many people would contend

that the less is said, the more is meant; it is understood as saying
more by saying less.
felt.

To many Chinese, Tao can not be known but

Some people combine The Tao Te Ching with the Book of

C h a n ges (known as I-C h in g ) to explain the mystery and beauty of the
universe, the meaning o f life and death, the secret passage beyond
the world o f positive knowledge where there is a realm o f forces
unseen.

Zen philosophy, mainly influenced by Taoist thought, has

been always associated with the Buddhist school o f thought, known
as Zen Buddhism.

Zen has been regarded by some as a "psychological

leaping o f the unconscious" or a "metaphysical awareness of
transcendental reality."

Zen is often said to be "illogical" and "anti

intellectual" in nature (Suzuki, 1949, 1963; Dum oulin, 1979).
Taoism and Zen philosophy are paradoxical in nature.

Lao-tze

says that "one who knows does not speak; one who speaks does not
know" (Lin, 1948, p. 257).

In the Taoist view, language can be
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regarded as a paradox.

In the opening of The Tao Te Ching. Lao-tze

claim s that "the Tao that can be spoken of is not the everlasting Tao.
The Nam e that can be named is not the everlasting name" (Chen,
1989, p. 51).

Chuang-tze not only developed a com plete theory of

know ledge, but also felt and expressed more poignantly the pathos o f
human life.

Chuang-tze states that "those who dream of the banquet

wake to lamentation and sorrow.

Those who dream o f lamentation

and sorrow wake to join the hunt" (Merton, 1965, p. 64).
continues:

"What we love is the mystery of life.

corruption in death.

He

What we hate is

But the corruptible in its turn becomes

mysterious life, and this mysterious life once more becomes
corruptible" (Merton, 1965, p. 64).

Zen, as noted earlier, appears to

be anti-m etaphysical, and yet Zen masters often make statements
which are quite metaphysical.

From the perspective o f Zen, there is

neither a fixed meaning nor a fixed referent for each term in
language.

Taoist and Zen master often employ multiple usages and

m eanings, and their m eanings are not determined by extra-linguistic
referents but rather depend on internal linguistic conditions.
In Taoism , the true character of "wu-wei" (literally translated as
non-doing or doing nothing)—"do not act" is not mere inactivity but
"perfect action"—because it is an act without activity (Chen, 1989, p.
81).

In other words, it is action not carried out independently of

"Tien" (heaven) and "Di" (earth) and in conflict with the dynamism o f
the w hole, but in perfect harmony with the w h ole—Tao.

However,

w e must not confuse "Tao" with "the sublation o f 'aufubeng' of
H egelian thought" (Daignault, 1989a, p. 3) or the structuralist's
"transcendental signified."

Tao is everywhere and nowhere at the
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same time.

Wang Pi (1979), commenting on Lao-tze, argues that the

relationship between Tao and Te (L ao-T ze is The Tao Te Chingl is a
paradox.

Tao is considered as substance and Te as function.

In other

words, with non-being as substance, all things w ill function w ell.

At

the same time, insists Wang (1979), "although it is valuable to have
non-being as function, nevertheless there cannot be substance
without non-being" (p. 67).
being,

nothingness

thinking.

The concept of "wu"(having not),

or non-

(or void) is the most importantelement in Taoist

If being is to be understood or to be useful, it has to

function through non-being.

Lao-tze remarks:

Thirty spokes unite around the nave;
From their non-being (loss o f their individuality)
Arises the utility o f the wheel.
Mold clay into a vessel;
From its not-being (in the vessel's hollow )
Arises the utility o f the vessel.
Therefore by the existence of things we profit.
And by the non-existence o f things we are served.
(Lin, 1948, p. 87)
He continues to say:
Tao produced the One.
The One produced the two (Ying and Yang)
The two produced the three.
And the three produced the ten thousand things (all
th in gs-creative u n iverse).
The ten thousand things carry the Ying and embrace
the Yang, and through the blending o f the material
force they achieve harmony. (Lin, 1948, p. 214)
Here Ying and Yang are introduced to im plicitly invoke the "yu"
(having) and "wu" (having not), ultimately to reach the One out of
Tao.

In a "Tai-Chi" sym bol, we see a white dot within the black

portion, a black dot within the white portion.

Both complementary
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and contrasting features are present at the same time.

Zen and Tao

as the middle way would be committed to neither, in terms o f any
dualism; for instance, idealism is as untenable as realism.
Contrasting with Taoist and Zen philosophy, according to James
Liu (1988), Confucius is the "one who knows it cannot be done but
does it" (p. 25).

In other words, Confucius had to use words to

explain that words are unnecessary.

It is this idea o f "words do not

exhaust meaning" that suggests more meaning than what is explicitly
expressed-"you know what I mean" (Liu, 1988, pp. 1-37).

This

problematic o f language is central to post-structuralism, as w ell as to
Taoism and Zen philosophy.

Reflections on language and discourse

led to Foucault's connections among language, knowledge and power,
to Derrida's attack on dualism and his critique of logocentrism , to
D eleuze's fourth dimension of language, to Lyotard's comments of
"language game," and to Serres' dialogue in an information society.
The intellectual is no longer com m issioned to play the role o f advisor
to the masses and critic of ideological content, but rather to become
one capable o f providing instruments of analysis.

Foucault (1986a)

notes:
[W]hat is philosophy today—philosophical activity, I
mean—if it is not the critical work that thought brings
to bear on itself? In what does it consist, if not in the
endeavor to know how and to what extent it might be
possible to think differently, instead legitim ating what
is already known? (pp. 8-9)
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Connections

Between

Taoism

and

Post-structuralism

Heideggerian thought (later H eidegger) has much in common
with Taoist thinking (Parkes, 1987).

The influence o f Heideggerian

thought on structuralists and post-structuralists is quite significant;
several structuralists (Barthes and Levi-Strauss) are fascinated by
the influence of Zen philosophy in Japan and are interested in China.
Barthes (1982) explicitly states that writing is in its own way a
"satori"—a Zen event—defined as "a loss of meaning," "a seismism"
which perturbs the thinking subject (p. 10).
speech-void.

This event produces a

At the same time, this void makes writing possible.

Post-structuralists are also intrigued by what has happened
philosophically in the East; som etim es they explicitly acknowledge
the difference between the W est and the East (Foucault, 1970;
Derrida, 1982; D eleuze, 1987a; Serres, 1989b).

Several elaborate the

influence of Eastern thought in their writings (D eleuze, 1987a; Eribon,
1991).

Deleuze explicitly states that the notion o f "Body without

Organ" is much related to "Tao."
o f Zen.

Foucault is interested in the practice

China, Serres (1989b) notes, is the last "universalizing

ideology" in the world.

The implicit connection, I am suggesting here,

is a first step toward the dialogue between the W est and the East in
contemporary curriculum theory.
The connection between Western and Eastern thought has been
elu sive and not evident; from different interpretations o f each
tradition no consensual understanding could emerge.

Gadamer

writes, in H eidegger and Asian Thought (1987), that "the generation. .
. would be very reluctant to say anything in print about a philosophy
if he/she were him /herself unable to read and understand the
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relevant texts in the original language" (p. 7).

Having written on

Japan and China, Barthes (1982) seem s to confront an unknown that
is neither about Japan nor about China.

This unknown refers back to

his own language, and through his language, that of all the W est.

I

wish to suggest certain passages between the W est and the East
tradition in light o f Post-structuralism, Taoism and Zen philosophy.
This passage-w ay may help W esterners to understand poststructuralist curriculum from a different, non-W estern perspective.
For the purpose of linking the characteristic features of the post
structuralist curriculum to Taoism or Zen philosophy, I would
propose at this point to review several important concepts in poststructuralism:

"paradoxical instance--the excluded

middle,"

"preponderance o f signifiers over signifieds," "deconstruction," and
the postmodern turn.

Som e (Cohen and Goldman, 1990) characterize

the philosophy of Chuang-tze as a Taoist deconstructionism.

For

Taoism and deconstructionism, a text does not fix a state o f affairs;
nothing is fixed and every interpretation transforms the reading
perspective.

Both deconstruction and Taoism reject any philosophical

system that accommodates Western m etaphysics and the notion o f a
transcendental and personal Being.

Taoism provides a useful

counterweight to Western logocentrism and the m etaphysics o f
presence at the same time.

One can quote from Taoist texts to

support Derrida's deconstruction o f Western philosophy, or
alternatively, one can say that, from a Taoist perspective, such
deconstruction is unnecessary.

In deconstructive context, the

attempt is not to ascertain the underlying wisdom of the texts, or to
locate their internal coherence, but to explore the texts as
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expressions o f ideology, culturally dominant values, and popular
culture.

This attempt tends to focus on differentiation rather than

consolidation of the marginal, on the rise of new locii o f local
struggle, and on the appearance o f new technological communication
m ed ia.
In post-structuralism, Foucault and D eleuze argue that things
(meaning, history, etc.; contrary to propositions) are not joined
together by a process o f continuity or interiorization, but instead
they rejoin above and beyond ruptures and discontinuities (Foucault,
1970, 1972; D eleuze, 1987a, 1988).

The notion of discontinuity is

neither the "arrow," nor the "cycle," nor the "pyramid."

The point is

not that there are no continuity and hierarchy in history, but rather
that we treat any assumed continuity and hierarchy with suspicion.
This attitude m oves out o f the confines of history into the
preconditions of the possible as possible.

Foucault articulates an

unquestionable suspicion toward any order through which
knowledge is transformed into power and vice versa.

In sum,

Foucault (1979) insists that there is "no power relation without the
correlative constitution o f a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge
that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power
relations" (p. 27).

In D iscipline and Punish (1979), Foucault also

demonstrates that dualisms are molar or m assive effects occurring
within m ultiplicities.

D eleuze (1988) em phasizes that "Body without

Organ" is "a problem not o f the One and the multiple but o f a fusional
m ultiplicity that effectively goes beyond any opposition between the
One and the Multiple" (p. 137).

The multiplicity of forces, the

multiple being o f force, Taoist observes, is "wu-wei"—an act without
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activity.

These forces are unfolded on the surface of internal depth

and then folded under the surface; any given perspective can only be
validated by reverting to still other perspectives.

Serres (1982)

explicates the notion of "noise" (La Belle N o i s e u s e ) to implicate or
"indicate" that the birth o f order com es from the chaos or disorder,
the functions o f Hermes and the "parasite" points to undermining the
certainty o f being, expressions o f indeterminacy, and any binary
system.

This thinking parallels Lao-tze's concept of "wu," the

fathom less form, the form less foundation o f all forms; all forms are
derived from it.
Looking beyond a "hermeneutical circle" o f the exchange
between sense and utterance (or signifier and signified), Derrida
intends a revolutionary thesis: le double d id oub le ce qu'il redouble.
D e d o u b l e r means "to split," to "cut in two," so that signifier can
rebound and make "half" o f the signified into signifier.

The signified

itself is thus distributed into two functions, signified and signifier,
which it can perform in turn or simultaneously (Derrida, 1978).

This

"differentialism" o f Derrida, characterized by Robert M agliola (1984),
is "between the Tao" (pp. 2-11).
Let us read a poem by Tao Yuanming:
In this there is true meaning;
I wished to wax eloquent, but have forgotten words.
(Liu, 1988, p. 43)
Post-structuralists are particularly concerned with the
foundations and limits of theory.

The lesson they learn from

N ietzsche is that truth is not "a transcendent unity."

They replace

mind with "text" (as the locus of enunciation of meaning), and replace
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identity with "difference" (as the strategy o f reading).

They argue

that the subject is the point of origin of meaning and the world
consists o f actions amenable to the understanding o f the subject—and
yet the "subject" is displaced.

Derrida (1978) notes:

Nothing within this language (the language of
everything that has participated, from near or far, in
the adventure o f Western reason), and no one among
those who speak it, can escape the historical guilt. . .
which Foucault apparently w ishes to put on trial, (pp.
35, 58)
Displacement of the Self
The notion of self has been central in curriculum studies.

The

traditional recognition o f the individual self in the W est seem s to be
the center o f society; relationships are considered by-products o f
interacting individuals.

In the East, matters o f self seem trivial

compared to concern for fam ily and community.
stronger in the W est than in the East.

The sense of self is

This attitude results in

detailed study of human nature in the West; one is always in search
o f further individualization.
basis

of

One is attempting to grasp what is

the individual soul.

at the

On the other hand, the East tendsto

focus upon Nature and in so doing to obliterate the individual; there
is often no sense o f self.
One can not care for self without knowledge.

Knowledge of self

is also the knowledge of a certain number o f rules and conduct or o f
principles which at the same time function as truths and regulations.
The care of self therefore is to em ploy and to explore these rules—
the game of truth.

The relations of power, according to Foucault,
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constitute a field o f knowledge and operate between individuals.
Power and knowledge directly imply one another.

Foucault exposes

how the subject of knowledge and the subject o f power together
com pose the regime o f truth in modern society along these lines.
However, the aim is not to free truth from power but to open up the
possibility o f the constitution of a new politics o f truth.
The subject is to be understood as a "form" that "is not above all
or always identical to itself" (Foucault, 1987, p. 121).

This means

that subjects are constituted differently in different discursive
situations; and different forms o f relationships with the self are
established through these different m odalities of subjectivity.

The

practices of self are, Foucault (1986a) insists, "not something that the
individual invents by him /herself.

They are patterns he finds in his

culture and which are proposed, suggested and imposed on him by
his culture, his society and his social group" (p. 122).

These

processes o f self-form ation are not "natural" but are something done
to the self, performed on the self.

The "technologies" of the self also

suggest the body as a set o f relations for experimentation and
invention that may be exercised for the purpose o f constituting the
self.

This eroding o f the identifiable self is manifest in a wide range

o f practices of self.

The disappearance of the subject from the center

gives way to reflexive questioning, irony, and ultimately the playful
probing o f yet another reality.
are thus displaced.

Our ways of understanding the self

Foucault (1977) also warns us an attempt "to

capture the exact essence o f things, their purist possibilities, and
their carefully protected identities," is necessarily an essentialism .
He explains:
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[TJhis search [for the origin] assumes the existence of
im m obile forms that precede the external world of
accident and succession. This search is directed to
"that which was already there," the image o f a
primordial truth fully adequate to its nature, and it
necessitates the removal of every mask to ultimately
disclose an original identity, (p. 142)

Language as Paradox
Tao [Yuanming], one of the greatest Chinese poets, has expressed
reality as an undifferentiated w hole, the same as that expressed by
Chuang-tze.

For Tao [Yuanming] to convey, in poetry, a sense of the

undifferentiated state of reality, there is no medium other than
words, which involves the making of distinctions.

Tao [Yuanming]

resolves the dilemma by accepting Chuang-tze's advice to "forget
words" after getting the "meaning" as w ell as the latter's paradox,
"great eloquence does not speak" (Merton, 1965, p. 27).

The paradox

is, o f course, that Tao [Yuanming] has to use words to tell us that he
has forgotten words, and since he is writing about his own act of
writing this poem.

His words may be taken as an example of

Deleuze's "hammering" or Daignault's writing about curriculum as
with words and beyond words.

As noted earlier, Zen Buddhists seem

to be fond of ordinary language, and yet their use of language is
often extraordinary.

This paradoxical nature, for Zen Buddhists, is

the original teaching of the Buddha.

This paradoxical instance is

embedded within the undifferentiated state o f reality, which sheds
light on Daignault's (1989a) "curriculum as composition."

Language
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does not simply represent or mirror the reality; instead it is part of
reality and reflects upon itself.

Foucault (1970) notes:

Though language can be spread them [things] before
us, it can do so only in an unthinkable space. . . we
shall never succeed in defining a stable relation of
contained to container between each of these
categories and that which includes them all. (p. xvii)
This unthinkable space is similar to Daignault's (1988c) gap
between "signs" and "notes," the relation between power and forces.
Forces constitute power; forms constitutes knowledge.
not pass through forms but forces.

Power does

To affect is a function of force, to

beaffected is like a matter o f force.

Force as an

exercise o f power

shows up as an affect, since force defines itself by its very power to
affect other forces.

This space is the condition of possibility o f the

undifferentiated state o f reality.

In this way the gap, detached from

any specific use and any substance, attests to the sublimation from
within the primacy o f paradox; it produces by way o f paradox a more
com plex or bifurcated paradoxical instance.
In curriculum, the notion of paradox (para-doxa, d o x a as the
dogmas o f the tim es) might be brought into everyday classroom and
practice.

We need to attend a new sense of order—paradoxical order

or chaotic order, by continuously questioning taken-for-granted
assumptions.

Since there is no resolution that can be reached, no

possible choice that can be made, this disorder o f order, adding new
dim ensions to the discourse, may be imperative for curriculum
theory.

To identify the paradox, however, is not to resolve it.

Daignault (1989b) insists:

"The translation of a ’t' too many is . . .

passages between answers and questions, not the [or even a] passage
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from a question to an answer, but their absolute difference
[differance]" (p. 361).

The absolute difference is the paradoxical

instance, the condition of possibilities o f undifferentiated whole.

The

strategy is not to produce answers or solutions to problems or to
assist in the development o f new social intervention.

Rather, it is to

make us experience that period's discourse as a specific selfsufficient web that can account
As

for the w hole o f its own world.

noted earlier, Foucault (1973)

insists that

[A]s for a common language, there is no such thing; or
rather, there is no such thing any longer; the
constitution o f madness as a mental illness, at the end
o f the eighteenth century, affords the evidence o f a
broken dialogue, posits the separation as already
effected, and thrusts into oblivion all those
stammered, im perfect words without fixed syntax in
which the exchange between madness and reason was
made. (p. x)
This attitude locates madness in an area of unforeseeable
freedom where frenzy is uncharted; if determinism can have any
effect, it is in the form o f constraint, punishment, or discipline.
Curriculum and the Aesthetics o f Existence
One day, Chuang-tze was dreaming about becoming a
butterfly; it is so alive and flies wherever it wants
happily. He forgets him self so it does not notice his
existence. Suddenly, he wakes up and feels him self
lively. He can not tell whether he, Chuang-tze, was
dreaming as a butterfly or being a butterfly he was
dreaming about him self. There must be a distinction
between Chuang-tze and butterfly. It is called w u h u a. (personal translation of Chuang-tze D r e a m s
B u tte r f ly in Wang, 1909, p. 12)
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This story is about the "fluttering" between Chuang-tze and the
butterfly.

It can also be said to be about reality and illusion,

knowledge and ignorance, even about the reality o f uncertainty.

This

notion of fluttering parallels Deleuze's (1987a) notion o f "perpetual
disequilibrium," or D aignault’s (1984a) "passage-way" (pp. 3-7).
There may be some questions about this story's verifiability or
experience of a dream.

Asking questions like these is like asking

what shapes the clouds have.

The clouds are neither square nor

round, any more than dreaming or waking.

A story is a story.

Whether or not I am Chuang-tze or a butterfly may be an interesting
question, but that uncertainty does not detract from the story.

The

aesthetics of the story have to do with the "effect" o f meaning rather
than with its content per se. Story-telling may be another passage to
understand curriculum.

This approach has been im plied by other

traditions in critical pedagogy and teacher developm ent: curriculum
as "story-telling" (Aoki, 1983; Egan, 1986; Elbaz, 1991), "collaborative
teacher's autobiography" (Raymond, Butt & Townsend, 1992) or
curriculum as "autobiographical text" (Pinar, forthcom ing).
example is Graham's Reading and Writing the S elf (1991).

Another
He

em ploys autobiography in English teacher education and curriculum
through "reading and writing" the self.

His work suggests it may be

possible to open the way to achieve authentic self understanding via
curriculum.

However, D eleuze (1987a) sees that:

N o longer are there acts to explain, dreams or fantasies
to interpret, childhood memories to recall, words to
make signify; instead, there are colors and sounds,
becom ings and intensities [and when you are
becoming-dog, do not ask if the dog you are playing
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with is a dream or reality, if it is "your goddam
mother" or something else entirely]. There is no
longer Self that feels, acts, and recalls; there is a
"glowing fog, a dark yellow mist" that has effects and
experiences m ovem ents and speeds, (p. 162)
We live our lives as a story we are telling, reminds Jean-Paul
Sartre (1969); "a man is always a teller of tales, he lives surrounded
by his stories and the stories of others, he sees everything that
happens to him through them; and he tries to live his own life as if
he were telling a story" (Sartre, 1969, p. 39).
o f life.

Story-telling is a way

For instance, science is a "story" in the language of a logico-

mathematical system , as inductively and deductively tight as we can
make it.
Telling stories can be playful.

Gadamer (1988) argues that "play

is really limited to representing itself.
representation" (p. 97).
purpose outside itself.

Thus its mode o f being is self

Play must be purposeless and have no
Inconclusiveness is conclusive after all, once

it becom es an identifiable consciousness.

Lyotard (1984b) describes

this purposeless "space" or "scene" as that "which in the modern
poses the unpresentable in the presentation itself. . . that which is
concerned with new presentations, not purely for the pleasure o f it,
but the better to insist that the unpresentable exists" (p. 89).
write to be other than what w e are.

We

The purpose of writing is to

"know to what extent the exercise o f thinking one's own history can
free thought from what it thinks silently and to allow it to think
otherwise" (Racevskis, 1987, p. 133).

One tells a story in a voice that

m ingles with the voices of the other storytellers.

We tell stories
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together.

To tell a story about curriculum is to tell a story about

stories and ourselves.
Another story is pertinent here.

"The joy of fishes" (1965) is

about Chuang-tze:
Chuang-tze and Hui-tze were crossing Hao river by the
dam .
Chuang said: "See how free fishes leap and dart: That
is their happiness."
Hui replied: "Since you are not a fish, how do you
know what makes fishes happy?"
Chuang said: "Since you are not I, how can you possible
know that I do not know what makes fishes
happy?"
Hui argued: "If I, not being you, cannot know what you
know, it follow s that you, not being a fish, cannot
know what they know."
Chuang said: "Wait a minute! Let us get back to the
original question. What you asked me was how do
you know what makes fishes happy? From the
terms of your question, you evidently know I know
what makes fishes happy."
Chuang continues: "I know the joy of fishes in the
river, through my own journey, as I go walking
along the same river." (Merton, 1965, pp. 97-98)
This story im plies playfulness.

Chuang-tze and H ui-tze were

together for a long time; they were playing with each other.
Pedagogy and curriculum are enriched by constantly questioning
assumptions among students and teacher.

Clem Adelman (1992)

suggests that play can be regarded as "a quest for vocation" and best
be understood as an intermingling between the "imagination" and the
"feedback from attempts to test the consequences on others and
things of 'what i f questions" (p. 139).

Such a questioning entails an

"opening" of perspectives, a multiplicity of voices.

In curriculum,
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many are looking for correct answers to universalize, normalize and
standardize their so-called "objective" agendas (Phillips, 1987;
Jackson, 1992); only a few are asking important questions to localize
alternatives, to de-objectify objectivity.
Therefore, the role o f curriculum theorizing is not to formulate a
global analysis of the ideologically coded, but rather to analyze the
specificity o f the mechanisms o f power and to construct, little by
little, strategic knowledge.

Curriculum functions to displace

discursive practices, such as self-form ation, sense-m aking, historical
awareness, rather than merely transform particular discourses.

As

noted earlier, these strategies are less interested in achieving a
unified w hole, either within collaborative com m unities (M iller, 1990)
or within individuals, and more on exploring the possible connections
among those fragmentations and differences.

Derived from the

analysis o f the discursive formation o f schooling, curriculum theory
becom es practice.
apply practice:

Theory does not express, translate, or serve to

It is practice.

B od v-effect and S elf-stvlization
Another im plication o f post-structuralism and Eastern thought in
curriculum can be considered as a kind of body teaching and
displacement of the self.
to words or representation.

Traditionally, teaching is merely connected
Students not only acquire knowledge

through "the movement of signifiers," (Derrida, 1978) but they also
think knowledge by "thinking through their body" (Gallop, 1988) or
by feeling (not merely knowing) the know ledge they explore.
Students are practicing "body reading" in the texts and everyday
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experience (Grumet, 1988).

These ideas call us back to the body,

back to the primordial experience of childhood, and back to the
"skin" o f a new body; these are problematics best raised by Lyotard
(1988-1989):

"Can thought go on without a body?"

For thought

without a body is the prerequisite for thinking o f the death of all
bodies, and of the death o f thought that is inseparable from those
bodies.

Foucault (1986a) suggests that "it is physical pleasure

[effects of body] that w ill have the last word and dism iss the prudish
speeches [thought] with a peal of laughter" (p. 213).
One o f the differences between the West and the East concerns
the notion of "individuality"-including the notion of self.

The

construction of self, in the East, is thought as that there is lack o f a
adequate basis for individuality.

One reason is that many see such a

basis as requiring not only moral autonomy but also what Max
Weber (1951) called a "unified personality" (p. 235).

Modern

Western tradition has constructed the self through the emphasis on
privacy; Cartesian skepticism regarding the problem o f know ledge,
facilitating criticism of authority figures; "romantic" approaches to
the em otions, including the profound ways in which the relations
among emotional, sexual, moral, and religious tendencies that were
explored by Rousseau, D ostoyevsky, and Freud; an emphasis on
econom ic and political rights; and even on philosophies defining the
individual as the ontologically formed human subject.

The notion of

self has been explicated by post-structuralism through the scrutiny
o f pow er/know ledge relation and sexuality, the function of desire,
the method o f autobiography, the languages games, and the
comm unication and relationships to others in information society
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(Foucault, 1978, 1985, 1986a, 1989; D eleuze and Guattari, 1983b,
1987a; Derrida, 1985; Lyotard, 1985; Serres, 1982, 1983).

The

"Otherness" is recognized and is essential to understanding the self.
Awareness of the Other and of the technologies o f self-formation
permit individuals to be affected by their own means--a certain
number o f operations—on their bodies and souls, thoughts, conducts,
and way of being, so as to transform them selves to attain the order
o f things.
However, it is difficult to discern any trans-cultural standards by
which they necessarily amount to the "best" or the most "authentic"
construction of the self.

An advance in intellectuality is not a

fulfillm ent of the wish to know.

Lyotard (1990) describes knowledge

as "the desire of the W est as a wish to know, and the wish to know
an avoidance o f

as

responsibility, as a flirtation with the known in

which the knowing subject 'never gets his fingers burned'" (p. 99).
In addition, Chuang-tze tells us:

"When knowledge went north" to

search for truth, knowledge failed (Merton, 1965, pp. 118-120).

This

understanding of reality echoes Serres' (1983) "to know is to kill" (p.
28).

It is not a question o f discovering truth in the subject but of

remembering truth, recovering a truth which has been forgotten.
Chuang-tze says:
answers.
know.'

"We com e nowhere being right, since we have the

'For he who knows does not speak, he who speaks does not
And 'the w ise man gives instruction without the use of

speech'" (Merton, 1965, p. 120).

The subject does not forget

her/him self, her/his nature, origin, or her/his supernatural affinity,
but she or he forgets the rules o f conduct and what she or he ought
to have done.

The use of language is necessary, yet problematical, in
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all communications.

W ittgenstein (1922) once remarked:

of language. . . mean the limits of my world" (p. 34).

"The limits

J. H illis Miller

(1977) also argues that "language is not an instrument or tool in
man's hands, a subm issive means o f thinking.
thinks man and his 'world'" (p. 444).

Language rather

As the vocabulary o f

expression is expanded (forcibly), so is the potential repertoire of
relationships among human com m unication

and understanding.

Foucault explicates the identification and construction of self through
the nexus o f power and knowledge relation.

Individuals are effects

o f power, the tools of power, the elements o f its articulation, not its
points o f application.

Pedagogical

Listening

The philosophy o f listening has been suppressed by a
dominating culture of "talking" or "speaking" in the West.

The

mechanism o f "saying without listening" has been regarded as
constituting itself a generalized form o f domination and control.
Listening is not passive but active.

Aoki (1989) explains "listening"

through etym ology ("Listening" in Chinese):

Listening involves ears,

eyes, mind and undivided attention altogether in order "to listen."
He remarks that "listening to the foregoing carefully allows us to
become thoughtful o f how we may have becom e beholden to the
metaphor o f the I-eye—the I that sees" (Aoki, 1989, p. 5).
to listen to the living speech of the Other.
to one's words but to o n e .

W e need

W e must not merely listen

After all, "what would be the value of the

passion for knowledge if it is resulted only in a certain amount of
know ledgeableness and not, in one way or another and to the extent
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possible, in the knower's straying afield of himself?" (Foucault,
1986a, p. 8)

Jo Anne Pagano (1990) insists that "to engage in

conversation is to inflict oneself toward the Other.

Conversation is

made up of gesture and posture as well as of word" (p. 133).

We

need to listen to "voices" or the "tone" of teaching (Aoki, 1990a; van
Manen, 1986, 1991).

It is in the teaching of the teachers that

students can acquire, assim ilate, and transform a set of practices into
a permanent principle o f action and to get prepared.
Gemma Fiumara (1990) also suggests that the strength of
contemporary thinking lies "less in the creation o f new basic concepts
than in the new m essages o f past thoughts that enable us to
rediscover and 'hear'" (p. 76).
the way to full expression
discourses.

This pluralism o f expressions opens

of all discourses, to a free play of

The challenge to curriculum is thus to facilitate

renegotiation o f the meaning system s within which "the problem"
exists, to open the way to new solutions.

We can see that Foucault's

(1970, 1972) project functioned as one of problematizing the
presuppositions of utopian dreams by liberating the power o f truth
from the forms of hegemony that imprison it.
would say:

"To invent, is

not

to produce, it

As Serres (1982)
is

to translate" (p.65).

Listening, however, is not to be envisaged as yet another position so
much as a path of a coexistential nature aimed at an understanding
o f the m essage or theory.

This understanding w ill extend listening to

develop in the direction of further conjunctions and crossfertilization.
r ea litie s.

This understanding also opens the door to multiple
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Eric Chappell, in his Ph.D. dissertation entitled The Azimuth of
Language: Explorations o f the Limits o f Expression (1985), attempts
to articulate the m eaning-of-the-w hole, which he terms "calling," in
the texts and everyday life.

This approach intersects with Aoki's

notion o f pedagogical belonging and Heidegger's "dwelling."

This

calling also involves pedagogical listening which means that not only
should we listen to the m essage carefully, but more importantly, we
should listen to the unsaid or the silent—saying what it does not
speak.
"I."

The realization o f the silent im plies the intervention of the

To break the bonds o f any "given" has tremendous implications.

Listening to the calling is authentic and is an embodiment of the
undifferentiated w hole o f reality.
Ted Aoki (1989) pursues a bridge over the W est and the East
through phenom enological belonging and grounding (H eideggerian
"dwelling").

He proposes an attitude of "belonging" and "dwelling" in

curriculum and pedagogy.

He reiterates Heidegger's "dwelling":

To dwell, to be set at p e a c e , means to remain at peace
within the f r e e , the p r e s e r v e , the free sphere that
safeguards each thing in its nature. Everything that
already belongs to the gathering nature of this thing,
appears as something that afterward read into it. . . .
To be a human being means to be on the earth as
mortal. (H eidegger, 1971, pp. 147, 149)
The notion of "bridging" and "belonging" in Aoki represents the
key point of his phenom enological curriculum theory.

He constantly

evokes the notion of "calling" of teachers and students in pedagogical
situation.

We as educators, he insists, should practice and be able to

acquire a sort of pedagogical "listening," whose meaning is two-fold;
first of all, the teacher needs to be attuned to pedagogical living with
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students that their voices can be heard.

M oreover, the teacher needs

to be so attuned to allow a listening to the v oice—the "calling"—of the
good in the lived pedagogical situation with students (Aoki, 1989,
1990b).

Teachers would invite students into m odes o f dialogue as

participants rather than pawns, as collaborative interlocutors instead
o f slates to be filled.

A student is a teacher and vice versa.

speak and listen together.

They

They are different; they are connected.

The End of The Beginning
Post-structuralism is an on-going discourse, or a "subject-inprocess."

Since curriculum scholarship is focused on knowledge

production and self-form ation within our culture, a more in-depth
analysis of socio/historical and self-reflective discourse is needed to
answer questions regarding the m obilization o f meaning embedded
within cultural formation, o f organizing forces o f the state in assuring
a decentered yet unified future.

In other words, contemporary

curriculum theories must be analyzed in terms o f the relations
among self, power and knowledge.
We must be w illing to confront and to transgress the limits of
our discourse, to understand the conditions o f possibility for
entrapment in historical categories in order to m ove beyond those
categories.

This approach opens up the question o f the relationship

o f theory to practice, a phenomenon from which a new ethics—an
aesthetics of existence—can be advanced, one based not on the lifting
o f censorship and prohibition but rather on a more limited ethic that
invents new forms of life independent from reified political and
social structures.

The call for "dialogue at the margins" (Schultz,
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1990) or "local emancipation" (Daignault, 1990) is needed to examine
how the relations o f boundaries o f our discourse and our subjective
constitution as the paradoxical social dynamism are being realized.
D ialogue between Eastern and Western philosophy is worth
continuing.

Derrida (1976) says:

We must begin where ver we are and the thought of
the trace which cannot take the scent into account, has
already taught us that it was im possible to justify a
point o f departure absolutely. Wherever we are: in a
text where we already believe ourselves to be. (p.
162)
To develop further a dialogue between Eastern and Western
philosophy, it is evident that one has to understand first the
languages of both traditions, and to be able to "translate" one
language into the other.

A concern with the dialogic allows us to

m ove beyond the conversation itself to attend to the conditions o f its
production.

One has to "read" the philosophical problems and

solutions presented in different traditions and be able to
conceptualize in one's native system so as to create passages.
Perhaps one beneficial consequence would be a better understanding
o f one's own cultural position.

N o improvement in self-

understanding is possible without such discovery and exploration.
Foucault (1985) reminds us:
There are times in life when the question of knowing
if one can think differently than one thinks and
perceive differently than one sees is absolutely
necessary if one is to go on looking and reflecting at
all. People w ill say, perhaps, that these games with
oneself would better be left backstage; or, at best, that
they might properly form part o f those preliminary

exercises that are forgotten once they have served
their purpose, (p. 8)
M ichel Serres (1989b ) remarks:
A touch o f irrationality is a saving grace for us, a
stroke o f luck which gives us som e breathing space, a
loose fit in the machine which makes us alive. Life,
intelligence, goodness probably came out o f this free
play and this lack o f restraint. Leave som e ears of
wheat in the field for the gleaners, he [the farmer]
said. Perhaps w e shall learn one day that the most
reliable machines leave room for the unexpected, (p.
11)
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